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Debtors are the forgotten by-product of every 
commercial society, and the way in which they are 
treated is often an index to the importance which a 
society attaches to its commerce. This thesis 
examines the English attitude to civil debtors during 
an age when commerce increased enormously. The 
chronological limits of the study are rather arbitrary, 
but they roughly circumscribe a period which began 
with the unquestioned rule of the "old law" over 
debtors, and ended when the first abolition act had 
been passed. Within this period I have sought to 
trace the movement of opinion, the forces by which it 
was fed, and the legislation in which it was reflected. 
Such a study has a number of inevitable 
limitations. In particular, over such a long period 
no single attitude can receive exhaustive study, and 
broad generalisations must be made which can be based 
on a study of only a fraction of contemporary comments 
on the law. Unfortunately the other alternative of a 
close study of a shorter period would have presented 
even more problems for a New Zealand student with 
limited primary resources. Moreover so little has 
been published on the conditions of the lower levels 
of commercial society, that a smaller topic would have 
lacked any wider perspective within which it might 
have been evaluated. There are only perfunctory 
references to bankruptcy and insolvency within available 
secondary materials on the period, and almost the only 
commerce described is foreign trade, and industrial 
manufacturing. This study has in some ways served 
only to supply a possible general perspective on the 
treatment of debtors. Research would need to be 
iv. 
extended to a far larger literature in order to confirm 
some arguments. Nevertheless I cannot complain of a 
lack of primary resources. Over such a long period 
there was a very substantial amount of material in 
the Parliamentary Papers and Debates, and the journals 
and magazines of the period. Through the generosity 
of the University of Canterbury History Department this 
was supplemented by a selection of pamphlets on 
microfilm • 
.Any study on such uncharted seas is never far 
from even vaster oceans both alluring and daunting. 
There are many links whic~might be made with other 
movements of opinion in the period. Thus although 
the immediately relevant secondary literature available 
to me was small, there were many studies within the 
period which had some bearing on the subject, if only 
by way of analysis of' parallel movements. I cannot 
pretend to have mapped or even to have noticed every 
one of these straits. 
It is therefore necessary to mention the debts 
I owe to those who guided me. Fortunately, unlike 
the insolvent debtors of eighteenth century England, 
I am not in danger of being imprisoned until I repay 
these debts, for in that case I too might face a lifetime 
of confinement. But, like those debtors who sought 
v. 
release under the Insolvent Debtors Act, I of'f'er instead 
a schedule of' my debts and creditors, conscious, as they 
were, that I risk perjury f'or f'ailing to mention some of 
those who helped me. 
My primary debt is to my supervisor, Dr. John 
Cookson, who suggested the topic, carefully pondered 
the varied questions I brought to him, and encouraged 
me to explore some of the links with the wider themes 
of the period. I am grateful to a number of friends 
and members of the Law Department who guided me through 
the jargon of the Common Law. I am also indebted to 
librarians in the Supreme Court in Christchurch, the 
Otago University Library, the Victoria University 
Library and the Alexander Turnbull Library. Particular 
thanks are due to the librarians in the University of 
Canterbury, who dragged the massive volumes of the 
Journals of' the House of' Commons from the basement, 
and searched f'or even less accessible if smaller works 
elsewhere. Mr Robert Erwin and Miss Barbara Lyon from 
the Reference Section were very kind, as was Miss 
Heather Cox who handled many elusive interloan requests. 
My thanks also to the Head Librarian for supplying 
for my use an electronic calculator. 
Others have assisted in various ways. My 
friend, Mr. John George of the Economics Department, 
University of Canterbury, guided the statistical 
analyses recorded in Appendix Three. My typist, 
Miss Colleen Taylor, has done an excellent job. 
Finally my brothers, parents, and f'riends have added 
vi. 
figures, proof-read chapters and endured my conversation 
on the subject over the last year. To all of these 
persons I am most grateful. 
mine alone. 
The errors must remain 
vii. 
ABSTRACT 
In the Common Law of England, a writ of capias 
could be used to arrest a debtor and hold him on bail 
or in prison until he was brought to trial, and there-
after until he paid the debt. This thesis studies 
the development of attitudes to this law in the period 
1750 to 1840. At the commencement of this period the 
law was universally accepted, even if attempts were 
made to mitigate its harsh effects. By the end of 
the period, imprisonment before trial had been abolished, 
and imprisonment after trial had been restricted. 
This thesis explores attitudes to the old law 
and investigates the sources of criticism of it in the 
new moral attitudes of the period and the better informa-
tion on the problem. Agitation by pamphleteers is 
traced. Nineteenth century criticisms of the practice 
are related not only to compassion but to new attitudes 
to the function of law, although the former motive is 
not discounted. Parliamentary reactions to the law 
are analysed, and there is special attention to 
reformers in Parliament, dating from Lord Beauchamp in 
1780 to Henry Brougham in the eighteen-thirties. The 
political significance of reform is considered • 
.An account is given of the social problems 
caused by imprisonment for debt. The number who 
suffered such confinement is investigated, and the 
commercial background to the question. The "trading 
morality" of commercial parts of society is seen as the 
chief opponent of reform. 
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Then his lord, after that he had 
called him, said unto him, 0 thou 
wicked servant, I forgave thee all 
that debt, because thou desiredst 
me: 
Shouldest not thou also have had 
compassion on thy fellowservant, 
even as I had pity on thee? 
st. Matthew, xviii. 32-3. 
The text of Thomas Francklin, 
A Sermon preached in the 
Chapel, (1774), in support 
x. 
of the Thatched House Society. 
See p. 101. 
debts! 
CHAPI'ER I 
THE CREDITOR'S LAW 
Imprisoning a man because he could not pay his 
Seen from the vantage point of the twentieth 
century, the very concept seems barbaric. Twentieth 
century observers, it is true, think of most of the 
Common Law and Criminal Law of England in the past as 
cruel, but imprisonment for debt seems more harsh than 
1 • 
other aspects of the Law. Eighteenth century observers 
would have also admitted that the law fell with a heavy 
hand upon its victims. But, they would want to point 
out, in practice juries were reluctant to convict the 
defendant where his punishment would have been harsh. 
They preferred to reduce the charge to one with lighter 
penal ties. 1 The Law was sacrosanct, but men were 
skilled in evading its force. 
The laws for debtors were regarded in this same 
manner. Eighteenth century Parliaments, with ritual 
regularity, passed temporary Insolvent Acts, which releas-
ed most of the debtors then in gaol. They were reluctant 
to alter the law which put men there. For if the law 
of imprisonment for debt were changed, what would happen 
to the sanctity of contract, and to the jurisdictions of 
King's Bench and Common Pleas? Englishmen.of the period 
unconsciously accepted a dichotomy: they believed that 
liberty was every Briton's prized possession, yet they 
entrusted every creditor with the right to deprive his 
1 L. Radzonowicz, A History of English Criminal Law, 
i. 94-97. 
2. 
fellows of this liberty. Henry Fielding described this 
sophistry in his novel Amelia, published in 1751. Fielding 
and his brother were exemplary magistrates in the city of 
London, and they were eager to reduce crime in the metropolis 
by enforcing the law and ridding the courts of venality. 
In Amelia, the bailiff who had just arrested Booth for his 
debts, declared his belief in liberty: 
'I am all for liberty, for my part.' 'Is 
that consistent with your calling,' cries 
Booth. 'I thought, my friend, you had 
lived by depriving men of their liberty.' 
'That's another matter' cries the bailiff. 
'That's all according to law and in the way 
of business. To be sure men must be 
obliged to pay their debts, or else there 
would be an end of everything.' 
When challenged that liberty is inconsistent with such a 
doctrine, he replied in a conundrum: 
'Why ••• would it not be the hardest thing 
in the world, if a man could not arrest 
another for a just and lawful debt ••• 
Is not liberty the Constitution of England? 
Well, and is not the constitution as a man 
may say, whereby the constitution, ••• that 
is the law and liberty and all that-.' 2 
He was in the same confusion into which the historian can 
fall, unless he can unravel the law. This is the more 
necessary, because the debtor laws were the product not 
of statutes but of Common Law. 3 Consequently any portrait 
of the eighteenth century laws can only attempt to integrate 
a patchwork of varying textures. 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LAW 
The problem with Legal History is that it is usually 
not history. Legal History as a discipline exists only 
to explain contemporary law. Because England does not 
2 Fielding, The History of Amelia, (Routledge edn.), 
pp. 307-8. 
3 Holdsworth, xi. 603. 
3. 
have a Constitution as such, the best way to understand 
existing law is to describe how it developed. Consequently, 
while there is quite a large literature on the history of 
the debtor laws, (particularly written from the standpoint 
of American Law), it is unhelpful on the motives and 
processes of reform, and is technical in its treatment of 
the 'old law'. To such writers, the important reforms 
are the ones on which contemporary Bankruptcy practice is 
based. 4 Legal History is also preoccupied only with the 
institutions of the 'old law'; the courts and procedures 
and officers. It treats the development of Common Law as 
a progression towards the contemporary situation. The 
debtor law was fated to develop as it did. 5 Actually, 
eighteenth century lawyers had a similar belief, and there-
fore they resisted attempts to reform the law by statute. 
Eighteenth century law allowed the imprisonment of 
a debtor in two cases. Firstly, any plaintiff claiming 
debts over forty shillings could hold his debtor in prison 
or on bail, until the case was heard in court. This was 
known as mesne process. Secondly, once the Court had 
found for the plaintiff, the debtor could be held in prison 
until he paid. This 'final process' was known as 
imprisonment on execution for judgement debts. It applied 
to debts of any size, although often small debts could be 
sought through separate Courts of Requests. 
4 Cf. R. Ford, "Imprisonment for Debt", Michigan Law 
Review, xx~ (1927). 28, 31. 
5 Cf. T. Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law, 
pp. 389-393; F. Pollock and F. Maitland, The History 
of English Law before the time of Edward I, pp. 203-
216. ~ w.s. Holdsworth, who avoided all such 
pitfalls. 
4. 
There are several significant aspects of this 
procedure. In particular it acted against the person 
of the debtor rather than his property. English Law also 
allowed execution of the judgement of the court on the 
property of the debtor, but such execution was hedged 
about with legal qualifications. Consequently proceed-
ings against the person of the debtor were almost always 
preferred. Such imprisonment was not seen as punishment. 
The debtor laws were not part of the criminal code, but 
of the civil law regulating relations between private 
citizens. Imprisonment was a protective measure to 
secure the debtor's person until he paid. The law. 
assumed that he could pay, and thus imprisonment was not 
a penalty but a coercion. Such a theory of imprisonment 
owed much to the medieval concept, in which the felon was 
held in gaol until he was punished. 6 Shrewd supporters 
of debtor imprisonment stressed that debtors were not being 
punished. Popular opinion and common sense, however, saw 
the imprisonment of debtors as a penalty for their 
misdemeanours, regardless of its legal statuso 
Another incongruity of the law was its use of civil 
arrest; that is the arrest of one civilian by another 
when no criminal offence was alleged. This practice 
probably began before the concept of a 'crime' was clearly 
understood, and when certain civil offences seemed to be 
offences against the King's Peace, as well as against the 
individual creditor. 7 Civil arrest on mesne process was 
6 
7 
Cf. R.B. Pugh, Imprisonment in Medieval England, passim. 
A. Harding, A Social History of English Law, pp. 62, 
66-7; Ford, pp. 26-27. 
5. 
the main focus of demands for reform. The legal procedure 
was for the plaintiff' to file a writ which ordered the 
county sheriff to take and hold the defendant on bail until 
the case was brought to trial. There were slightly 
different procedures in each of the superior courts. In 
Common Pleas the testatum capias was used; in King's Bench 
the Bill of Middlesex, and in Exchequer the writ of guo 
8 minus. The plaintiff' only had to state the debt on oath 
as an affidavit; he was not required to give any proof of 
it. 
Once the debtor had been seized by the sheriff's 
bailiff, he was entitled to be held for twenty-four hours 
at the bailiff's house, while he sought to arrange bail, 
to agree with the creditor as to some acceptable composi-
tion, or to pay the debt in full. This was the point in 
the proceedings most likely to please the creditor. The 
disgrace of imprisonment was for those who could not or 
would not pay. To be bailed out, the debtor had to 
produce two "respectable housekeepers" each willing to 
guarantee double the amount of the alleged debt. The 
bailiff was naturally cautious in accepting persons as 
bail, for should they prove insolvent, the sheriff had to 
pay the debt. 9 This responsibility was graphically describ-
ed in the Pleader's Guide, published in 1796: 
8 A. Freedman, ''Imprisonment for Debt", Temple Law 
Quarterly, ii (1928). 345. Holdsworth, iii. 247-251; 
Bl. Comm., iii. 281-286. 
9 Cf. E. Farley, Imprisonment for Debt Unconstitutional 
and Oppressive, pp. 21-2; Barrister-at-Law, The Rise 
and Practice of Imprisonment in Personal Actions 
Considered, p.49. 
But let the Plaintiff ere he sue 
In debt or~ for money due, 
Swear to the sum, the writ indorse, 
And let the Shrieve said writ enforce, 
Be quick to execute but slow 
To take the proferrld bail below, 
Lest with the Plaintiff's Suit embroil'd, 
The Shrieve at his own weapons foil'd, 
The bond assign'd, the Debtor fled, 
Himself Defendant in his stead, 
Be doomed with curses to bewail 
The horrors of insolvent bail. 10 
6. 
If bail could not be arranged to the satisfaction 
of the bailiff, the debtor was then sent to prison to 
await trial. While there, there was still opportunity 
to settle with the plaintiff, but he was equally liable 
to have other creditors begin actions against him, lest 
the first plaintiff receive the last of the debtor's 
money. The case had to be tried within four court terms 
and procedures for trial filed prior to this, or else it 
would be dismissed. It took that long to reverse a 
fraudulent arrest. Thus it was possible by mesne process 
to dispose of an unwanted neighbour for twelve months, 
by alleging an impossibly high debt. It was also possible 
to make money in this way, by commencing mesne process 
against a country gentleman, who would be forced to pay 
the 'plaintiff' to withdraw his writ. 11 
The anomalies in the procedure were considerable. 
They were a consequence of various simplifications of 
procedure which had by the middle of the eighteenth century 
coalesced and eliminated a number of stages in the action 
which had formerly made arrest of the person costly and 
clumsy. Competition between the Courts of King's Bench 
10 Loe cit, quoted by Holdsworth, ix. 253. 
11 Farley, pp. 22-3. 
7. 
and Common Pleas for the profitable business of civil 
actions had led them to simplify the procedure, and omit 
the pledge traditionally required of the plaintiff. 12 
Moreover, the power to arrest the debtor had been extended 
to such cases by alleging a fictitious trespass vi et armis 
(by force and by arms). The writ of arrest read that the 
defendant absented himself unlawfully from court, and that 
he "lurks, wanders and runs about in your county." 13 
None of this was meant to be taken literally; it was 
technical language; a form of words which expressed the 
origin of the procedure rather than its rationale. 
Imprisonment on execution for judgement debts was 
the logical correlative of mesne process imprisonment. 
The writ of capias ad respondendum was executed, when 
judgement had been obtained, by the capias ad satisfaciendum, 
the ca-sa. 14 In the trial, neither the plaintiff nor 
the defendant was permitted to give evidence. There 
were other traditional forms of execution of judgement. 
Fieri facias (the fi-fa), ordered the sheriff to seize 
the debtor's goods and chattels; levari facias, the 
goods and produce of the land; and elegit allowed the 
creditor to occupy half of the defendant's land. 15 
These remedies were less than efficient in recovering 
debts. They did not extend to freehold land, which was 
very often a debtor's primary asset. The notes and 
bills of exchange of an increasingly commercial society 
12 Freedman, pp. 345-6. 
13 Farley, p.63, Cf. BI. Comm. iii.281. 
, 
14 Holdsworth, viii. 231; Freedman, p.347. Jfili, xci. 
15 Holdsworth, viii. 230; Plucknett, p.390. 
828. 
8. 
were out of reach of any process of law. Also the sale 
of goods and chattels by the sheriff was an expensive, 
inefficient and slow way of recovering money. Thus in 
an age of great commercial sophistication, that very 
sophistication enabled the debtor to secure his property 
out of reach of his creditor, and thus it forced the 
creditor to use the heavy-handed weapon of arrest and 
impvisonment. 16 
And in gaol the debtor remained, perhaps for life. 
While there was hope that he would pay, the creditor was 
unwilling to release him. Because the plaintiff had to 
choose between a ca-sa and a fi-fa, there was no way of 
seizing the property while the debtor was imprisoned. 
To release him on compassionate grounds meant surrendering 
any legal means of recovering the debt. 
was often forgotten in gaol. 
Consequently he 
The processes for recovery of debts were expensive. 
The plaintiff might well spend more than the amount of 
the debt in attempts to recover it. Thus there was an 
increasing demand in the early eighteenth century for 
the re-establishment of the old 'Courts of Requests' or 
'Courts of Conscience' where small debts below forty 
shillings could be dealt with summarily and cheaply. 
Many such local acts were passed by Parliament in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Under the 
jurisdiction of these local courts, imprisonment was 
imposed only for a limited period of up to a year. 
I 
These courts were used against a poorer kind of debtor, 
and their prison sentences were in effect punishment for 
16 Plucknett, pp. 389-90; Holdsworth, viii. 233. 
the inability to pay. This aspect of the law has been 
studied elsewhere, 17 and is not separately covered in 
this thesis. 
9. 
Some kind of historical background to the eighteenth 
century debtor law is necessary, for the remedy against 
the body of the debtor rather than against his property 
was a comparatively late development in the Common Law. 
In the medieval period the body of the debtor was immune, 
because control of it was held by the feudal Lord and not 
the man himself. 18 The early writs, fi-fa and elegit, 
were effective remedies in a small society with an economy 
less based on money. Imprisonment for debt resulted from 
three developments: the growth of new writs, the change 
in court procedure, and the expanded legal definition 
of contract. The Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Henry III 
c.23, empowered lords to arrest their bailiffs, and the 
statutes of Acton Burnel in 1283 and Westminster in 1285 
extended such powers to merchants. 19 It was gradually 
made more widely available. Competition between the two 
great courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas led the 
Judges of King's Bench to permit the modification of the 
writ of trespass, and led the Judges of Common Pleas to 
invent an equivalent action. Both courts subtly amended 
the practice when Parliament first tried to control the 
misuse of judicial procedures., in 1661. 20 
17 In the excellent article by W.H.D. Winder, "The 
Courts of Requests", LQR. Iii. (1936). 369ff. 
18 Freedman, pp.332-3. 
19 Bl. Comm,, iii.281; Holdsworth, viii.230f. 
20 J.C. Fox, "Process of Imprisonment at Common Law"., 
LQR, xxxix. ( 1 9 23 ). 46-59 • 
1 o. 
Imprisonment f'or debt was f'urther spread by the 
extension of' it to cases where no f'ormal contract existed. 
The various kinds of' debt were gradually made eligible 
f'or arrest, until Slade's Case in 1602 allowed an inf'ormal 
indebitatus assumpsit to be recovered by the court 
procedures normally reserved f'or f'ormal contracts. Of' 
this Case, Wo1f'f' wrote: 
this f'amous decision f'inally elevated 
contractual obligation assumed by the 
def'endant to the rank of' being the prime 
cause of' his liability. 21 
These were complex developments. Holdsworth stresses 
that the way they arose at the initiative of' the courts 
. 22 
provided the creditor with excessively generous remedies. 
Parliamentary attempts to regulate the laws f'or debtors 
and creditors were evaded, and a very technical procedure 
established. Reading the writs, the outsider might 
well conclude, as did Edward Farley: 
Here is a sample of' English justice, 
three f'orgeries and a lie to take a 
man's perso~3ror a trespass he never 
committed. 
But the lawyers def'ended this by pointing to precedent. 
There were a number of' attempts in Parliament to modif'y 
the law, but, as Marjorie Blatcher comments about such 
agitation in Elizabethan Parliaments: 
21 H. Wolf'f', "Debt and Assumpsi t in the light of' 
Comparative Legal History", Irish Jurist, i. (1966). 
321. Cf' J.W. Salmond, "The History of' Contract", 
LQR, ii:L. ( 1 887). 166-179; J.B. Ames, "The Hi story 
of' Assumpsit", Harvard Law Review, ii. (1888). 53-69. 
22 Holdsworth, viii. 232-3. 
23 Op. cit., p.90. 
Through all the attacks on the 
procedure there runs a note of 
exasperated helplessness. It 
defrauds the Crown of the fines 
on originals ••• it deprives the 
Common Pleas of its rightful 
jurisdiction ••• it oppresses 
the subject and makes a mockery 
of justice : In short it is a 
monstrous make-believe and 
someone o-y.ght to do something 
about it.24 
11 • 
Blackstone's comments on the procedure reveal 
that lawyers accepted the make-believe. The law worked 
acceptably, as far as they were concerned. Creditors 
were less happy at the limitations of procedure against 
property. Probably they also felt that the relief 
available to insolvent debtors considerably weakened 
the force of the law. 
The Insolvent Debtor laws did not cover all 
debtors. In a different category were debts to the 
Crown, including unpaid taxes, admiralty dues and fines. 
Such persons were imprisoned under the Exchequer writ 
of guo minus, and did not share in the relief measures 
for ci vi 1 debtors. Not until the twentieth century 
was their position substantially improved, although it 
was often worse than that of civil debtors. 25 
In contrast the bankruptcy statutes eased the 
situation of some debtoI•s. There has been no satis-
factory study published of the development of bankruptcy. 
Insolvency and bankruptcy were distinguishable by the 
24 M. Blatcher, "Touching the Writ of Latitat, 'An 
Act of No Great Moment'", in Bindoff, et. al. ed., 
Elizabethan Government and Society, p.205. 
25 Ford, p.26; Plucknett, p.389. 
late sixteenth century, as a result of the 1571 statute 
1 3 Elizabeth 1 c. 7. In this statute and its 
predecessors, bankruptcy was regarded as a crime, which 
only benefitted the debtor. Therefore commissioners 
were appointed to take and distribute a bankrupt's 
property. 26 However the procedure developed to the 
advantage of both debtor and creditor, within strict 
limi ta ti ons. Only traders with debts over £100 were 
12. 
eligible, and, until 1623, only British subjects. 
only an elite were eligible for a Commission of 
Thus 
Bankruptcy. The trader in financial difficulties 
could not himself choose to become a bankrupt. Instead 
a number of his actions, including departure from the 
realm, arrest for debt, and outlawry were defined as 
acts of bankruptcy, entitling the creditors to sue for 
a Commission. This Commission had power to examine 
the bankrupt, to take his account books and to investi-
gate his debts. They could dispose of his property 
and imprison him if he would not co-operate. Thus a 
Commission of Bankruptcy could be a valuable protection 
for the interests of creditors, but as the pamphlet 
published in 1789, entitled Considerations on a Commission 
of Bankruptcy, stated, the consequences would be less 
desirable if the bankrupt was dishonest. If there was 
more than one major creditor, individuals were far 
better to use the writ of debt than share the assets of 
the debtor with other creditors. 27 The expenses of a 
26 Shairman, p.206; Holdsworth, viii. 243. 
27 Loe, cit., p.21ff. 
13. 
Commission were worthwhile only if the debtor possessed 
substantial property. For the debtor there were real 
advantages in an act of bankruptcy, for if he was certi-
ficated as discharged by the Commission, his unpaid 
debts were cancelled, and he was immune from imprison-
ment. The loss of his commercial reputation was his 
most serious danger. Some bankrupts were imprisoned 
by hostile or suspicious commissions, and such men 
petitioned Parliament, on occasions, to be included in 
28 the relief offered to insolvent debtors. One such 
petition stated that bankrupts: "have been Traders and 
if discharged may be of more benefit to the nation than 
most of the insolvent debtors. 11 29 They were a wealthier 
class of debtor, for whom the right to better treatment 
was willingly accepted. Only in the eighteen-forties 
did bankruptcy and insolvency procedures begin to come 
together. 
ATTITUDES TO THE LAW 
The eighteenth century attitude to debtors con-
tained a number of different emphases, and there was 
debate within the period on the fairness of the laws. 
One strand of opinion emphasised the respect due to 
the law, on the grounds of its historml development 
and the protection it gave to creditors. Another strand 
emphasised humanitarian responsibility for those in 
28 
29 
Holdsworth, viii. 238-242. 
The Case of Persons in Prison who are under 
Commissions of Bankruptcy, ( 1755'{). 
14. 
financial need, and the suffering resulting from imprison-
ment. 
debtor. 
One side stressed the creditor; the other, the 
One stressed the law; the other, the need for 
relief from the law's heavy hand. After 1770 these two 
strands became transmuted. The desire for relief was 
replaced by a desire for abolition. The need to 
protect the creditor became determination to strengthen 
the rights of the creditor. The timing of this change 
in attitude cannot be too closely pinpointed, but with 
the single exception of the comments of Samuel Johnson, 
nothing published before 1770 advocated new measures. 
The concept of the rule of law was one of the key 
attitudes of eighteenth century Englishmen. It was 
admitted that the law had been changed in the past, and 
could be changed again. But most observers denied 
that there was any need for changes, or if changes were 
to be made, they ought to increase the powers of creditors. 
Such arguments were rehearsed whenever a community sought 
a Small Debts Act. For example in 1763, when the town 
of Bradford sought to establish a Court of Requests, it 
produced evidence before the House of Commons of the 
difficulties and problems of traders in that town, with 
its large trade in cloth. 30 That was justification 
enough. It was quite possible to forget that the debtor 
was himself a person. Blackstone, describing the develop-
ment of simplified legal procedure, which was designed 
to hasten.the operation of the law against a debtor's 
body, commented that: "this fiction, being beneficial 
'-
30 ili[, xxix. 433, 441. 
to all parties, is readily aquiesced in •••• 11 31 It 
is doubtful whether the debtor would have accepted that 
generalisation. 
When the debtor was borne in mind, his potential 
15. 
dishonesty was most prominent. Blackstone calmly comment-
ed on how unsatisfactory the law had been before processes 
against the person existed: 
this immunity of the defendant's person 
••• producing great contempt of the law 
in indigent wrongdoers, a capias was32 
also allowed, to arrest the person. 
This was the emphasis of the greatest jurist of the 
century. Its greatest novelist, who himself disliked 
the law, put the common attitude into the mouth of the 
bailiff, in his novei, Amelia. "Would it not be the 
hardest thing in the world", the bailiff remarked, "if 
a man could not arrest another for a just and lawful 
Many persons also thought that the law should 
take cognizance of the fact that England's greatness 
was founded on its commerce. Therefore the law should 
favour the merchant. 34 Robeon's study of the attorneys 
of eighteenth century England shows that their social 
status was close to that of the merchants. 35 Consequent-







Bl. Comm,, iii. 283. 
ll2.i.£, iii. 281 • 
Fielding, Op. cit,, p.307. 
Barrister-at-law, p.56. Of L. Sutherland, "The 
Law-merchant in England in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries'', Transactions of the Ro~al 
Historical Society, Ser 4. xvii. (1934). 149-17 • 
R. Robson, The Attorney in Eighteenth Century 
England, p.68ff. 
Most observers from the higher levels of society 
saw imprisonment for debt as a rightful punishment: 
To speak of the Debtor otherwise than 
as a Rogue would appear, to the Majority 
of the World as an Impeachment of their 
Understandings, 
16. 
wrote one onlooker. The creditor's justification of 
imprisonment was that: "He deserves it all, has brought 
it on himself, has been idle, extravagant, has gamed, 
and spent his Creditor's Money luxuriously. 1136 Colonel 
James took the same attitude towards the imprisonment of' 
Booth, in Fielding's novel, when he said: "It will be 
better both f'or him and his poor lady, that he should 
smart a little more. 1137 The extravagant debtor deserved 
punishment, for he had committed a crime. There was 
great concern at legislation which: "stript the trespass 
of insolvency of that reproach which in its own nature 
it deserves. 1138 Even Sir William Eden, who felt that 
imprisonment for debtors or felons: "as a punishment, 
is not according to the principles of .wise legislation", 
described debtors as: 11certainly a species of criminal. 1139 
The connotation of the words 'insolvent debtor' 
was not a pleasant one_ in the eighteenth century. 
Property owners in the neighbourhood of the Fleet prison 
described their tenants as: "hardly any but Bankrupts, 
Insolvents, and Persons of the most infamous and 
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and necessi tious persons", claiming poor relief' f'rom the 
parish when they did not deserve it.4° With such an 
image, debtors could scarcely expect much sympathy. 
Yet traders were not completely satisf'ied with 
the law as it stood. There were continual complaints 
about the ease with which debtors could spend their 
creditors' money in prison. Consequently some demanded 
the right to examine the debtor bef'ore his admission to 
gaol, and others·sought a national Small Debts Act, with 
summary procedures.41 
This portrait of' harsh attitudes towards debtors 
must not stand alone. For compassion was a strong senti-
ment in the eighteenth century, and seems to have had a 
marked inf'luence upon legislation. 
f'ocussed on the persons of' debtors: 
This compassion 
That when they are Prisoners, they become 
a Misery to themselves, a Grievance to 
their f'amilies, and a Burden to their 
Friends, is certain; while their Confine-
ment brings no Remedy to the too rigid 
Creditor; but thus deprived of their 
Liberty, they are prevented f'rom becoming 
industrious useful Members of the Common-
wealth.42 
This broadsheet of' grievances emanated f'rom the prisoners 
in King's Bench, but it met with much sympathy outside. 
Actually, many an opponent of the law had been imprisoned 
for debt at some stage in his career, including the most 
illustrious of them all, Samuel Johnson. 43 Expressions 
40 Qi, xxxii. 349. 
41 Eden, ~-52; GM, xvii. (1747). 78. 
42 King's Bench Prisoners, To a Member of Parliament, 
(1753), p.1. 
43 Boswell's Life Of Johnson, (Oxford edn.), i. 303-4. 
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of' sympathy for debtors were common in the journals, and 
there was frequent comment upon the sufferings of debtors. 
The Prompter in 1735 estimated that there was only one 
chance in a hundred that the debtor would survive his 
stay in prison.44 This was scarcely an educated guess, 
but even Johnson speculated that five thousand debtors 
died in English prisons every year.45 At least these 
fancies reveal a widespread awareness of': "the sloth and 
darkness of a prison", 46 and of the: "abuses, extortions 
and.insults of jailors."47 It is significant that the 
brief' petitions regularly presented to Parliament by 
most debtor prisons were petitions "complaining of 
their distress, and praying relief'." They were not 
requests to reform the law, but only to alleviate suf'f'er-
ings. The appeal was: "first to set things even, and 
afterward to keep them so."48 They only desired the 
liberation of debtors then in prison. Such appeals were 
addressed to Parliament. The courts were the upholders 
of the law, but Parliament was considered to have a 
compassionate duty to mitigate the sufferings of the 
subjects of the realm. Parliament enshrined the 
principles of equity, when Common Pleas and Chancery 
failed to. Thus the· debtors looked to the moral 
sensibilities of' the Commons' men, for: 
44 Quoted by !!M., iv. (1735), 123. 
45 Idler, no. 38, (1759). 
46 .ill.£., no. 22, (1758). 
47 Eden, p. 54. 
48 R. Courtville, Arguments Respecting Insolvency, 
p. 16. 
the Compassion of the House, to save 
them from surfering, in a Land of 
Liberty, those Miseries which are 
intolerable in themselves, and incon-
sistent with the Principles of Humanity.49 
19. 
Yet even this petition, from the King's Bench prisoners, 
only desired that their ancient gaol be rebuilt, in 
order to reduce their sufferings. The Commons quickly 
acted to urge this rebuilding; they were not likely to 
respond to anything other than the revelation of specific 
grievances of debtors in a specific situation. Thus in 
1729, a committee of the House of Commons had enquired 
into the state of the Fleet prison, after James Oglethorpe 
M.P. had complained that a friend had been held thepe in 
close confinement with prisoners suffering from smallpox, 
and that as a result he had died. The Report of the 
Committee revealed the use of torture and existence of 
starvation in London debtor prisons. Oglethorpe later 
helped debtors to settle in America, and thus helped to 
found the colony of Georgia. 50 But the 1729 enquiry 
only led to the unsuccessful prosecution of two gaolers. 
Over the century, many acts of individual 
beneficence either supplied food to the prisoners or 
paid for their liberation. As W.K. Jordan has shown, 
such benefactions had begun by the end of the sixteenth 
century. Debtors were thereafter regarded as some of 
the main charitable objects in England. 51 Not only 
49 CJ, xxvi. 457. 
50 T.G. Booth, "Fate of Debtors in Georgian England", 
Law Notes. xliii. (1939). 9-10; V.W. Crane, "The 
Philanthropists and the Genesis of Georgia", 
American Historical Review, xxvii. (1921-2). 63-9; 
A. Babington, The English Bastille, pp. 84-7. 
51 W.K. Jordan, Philanthropy in England 1480-1660, 
pp. 264-6, 370-1. 
charity recommended such action. If' the state was 
weakened by the unemployment of' its labour f'orce, then 
relief' of' the debtors was the only way to put: 
"industrious, usef'ul Members of' the Commonwealth" back 
to work, and thus preserve the wealth of' the state. 
Also it was claimed that large numbers of' Englishmen 
had f'led overseas to escape the harsh weapon of' civil 
arrest: 
and it is notorious at this Instant, 
f'rom these Motives there are amongst 
those unf'ortunate Fugitives many 
excellent Shipwrights, Woollen-
Manuf'acturers, Mariners and various 
Artists, whose absence is a double 
prejudice to our Nation; since 
while England wants them, they are 
promoting Arts, Sciences, and Trades, 
among her patent Enemies and encroach-
ing Rivals.52 
This·theme awakened several deeply f'elt concerns of' the 
nation. The imprisoned soldiers and seamen also were 
a loss which threatened the commercial prosperity and 
national security of' England. 53 
It would seem that the image of' the debtor as 
an idle rogue was more widespread than the image of' him 
as a national asset. Yet the two attitudes were not 
thought to be totally incompatible. It was possible 
f'or the creditor to believe in the justice of his power 
to arrest the debtor, yet for him also to help relieve 
the debtors in gaol. In quite another category were 
20. 
demands to change the law. The few writers who advanced 
such proposals were to be much quoted in later years, 
52 
53 
King's Bench Prisoners, To a Member of Parliament, 
p .1 . 
Cf'. Reasons Humbly 0ff'ered, (1755), p.1.; Evening 
E.2.§.1, 5 April 1753, quoted by LM, xxii. (1753). 170. 
21. 
but they won no support in their own age. Until the late 
seventeen-seventies they did not find a Parliamentary 
advocate, and thus their proposals were never very detail-
ed. This kind of change in the law was not politically 
profitable, and society had no enthusiasm for it. On 
the whole, society tended to show "neglect and contempt" 
for insolvents, except for "inventing and administering'' 
new agents of bankruptcy and insolvency. 54 
It is against this background that the views of 
men like Sam Johnson and Henry Fielding must be under-
stood. There were occasional proposals for law reform 
right through the century, but most of them wanted no 
more than some kind of release mechanism, so that prisoners 
would not remain in prison all their lives. For example 
in 1735 Fog's Journal printed a proposal to divide 
debtors into four categories; the criminal, the culpable, 
the pitiable and the unfortunate. The last three groups 
were to be discharged from prison, although the culpable 
required the assent of their creditors. 55 This gave 
the debtors little more than they already had. The 
greatest objection to the law was that it imprisoned 
many debtors for life. 56 Out of the literature of 
complaint, two main themes emerge. The first is the 
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Scarcely the most zealous admirers of 
our institutions can think that law 
wise, which, when men are capable of 
work, obliges them to beg; or just, 
which exposes the libert~ of one to 
the passions of another.~7 
This fluent exposition by Samuel Johnson of the moral 
shortcomings of the law was a most influential state-
ment in later years, but other men had already argued 
similarly. Another important contribution was the 
ridicule, already quoted, which Fielding accorded the 
law. He regarded arrest for debt as primitive, and in 
an elegant passage compared the bailiff to a butcher, 
who had: 
no other design but to cut out the body 
into as many bail-bonds as possible. 
As to the life of the animal or the 
liberty of the man, they are thoughts 8 
which never obtrude themselves on either. 5 
A second theme in the literature of complaint 
was that the law was inadequate for the needs of the 
creditor. The debtor might be held in gaol, but there 
he could continue to spend his ill-gotten gains, and 
the creditor lacked any means to seize his property: 
"If, says the Creditor, I ever get my Money, I cheat 
the Debtor; if he never pays, he cheats me." Thus 
the law was paradoxical. It was "strange that it 
22. 
should have power to make a man useless to the Community, 
and not to make him discover and surrender his effects. 1159 
Raphael Courtville's comments were hardly the literary 
57 Idler, no. 22. 
58 Fielding, op. cit., p.306. 
613. 
59 Courtville, pp. 8, 11. 
Cf. GM, xxx. (1760). 
23. 
achievement of' Johnson's or Fielding's, but he offered 
specific proposals to eliminate arrest if the debtor 
would settle with his creditor. 
Who was to be blamed for this absurd state of 
affairs, where the creditor's money was lost, and the 
debtor's liberty also? In answer to such a question, 
eighteenth century critics voiced a suspicion of lawyers, 
which was a common attitude in the period. "No-one 
believed that attornies ••• exhibited either of these 
qualities of private morality and public spirit," writes 
60 Rob,emn, and the writers on the debtor law were among 
the sceptics. A commentary in Fog's Journal derived the 
evils of the system from the number of lawyers seeking 
to enrich themselves. His drastic solution was to 
spare nine or ten, but kill the rest! 61 The pettifoggers 
and bailiffs so prominent in Smollett's novels and other 
mid-century literature, have an unsavoury aura. They 
were the troublers of the community, who felt it was 
in their interest "always ••• to cherish the seeds of 
strife and animosity", 62 for they alone regular.ly profit-
ed from the litigation which was initiated to recover 
debts. 
Suspicion of lawyers may have been widespread, 
but at this period it did not always lead to discontent 
with the debtor laws. This is seen in the lack of any 
literary debate on the question. Writers of pamphlets 
and articles did not refer to other discussions of the 
60 Robson, p.136. 
61 Quoted by LM, vi. (1737). 260. 
62 Imprisonment for Debt Considered, Translated from 
the Italian, (1772), p. v. 
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law, but often implied that they alone had exposed the 
situation. And thus the laws passed in the period to 
relieve the debtors were largely a product of compassion 
rather than of discontent with the entire system. 
THE RELIEF ACTS 
Although Parliament never attempted to alter the 
law regulating the relationship of debtor and creditor 
during this period, it did regularly interfere to miti-
gate the consequences of the law. This was done in two 
main ways. When the gaols became too full, temporary 
acts were passed which effectively released most of· the 
imprisoned debtors. Also the 'Lords' Act' of 1759 and 
its predecessors permitted the release of debtors held 
on execution for judgement debts, ±f they surrendered 
their property, although in this case the creditor was 
given the discretion of continuing the imprisonment at 
his own expense. 
Such relief acts were first passed in the Restora-
tion period. Before that, the Privy Council had 
frequently interfered to force specific creditors to 
accep·t compositions from their debtors. Acts of royal 
clemency were not unknovm, either. 63 It was the 
decline in the importance of the Council which led 
petitioners to ask Parliament to take action. Not 
until 1670 was any legislation passed, but then, by the 
Act 22 & 23 Car. II c.20, justices of the peace were 
63 Holdsworth, viii. 234. 
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empowered to release judgement debtors, who swore on oath 
that their property was valued at less than £10. Eight 
years later, these provisions were extended to debtors 
on mesne process who had been imprisoned for six months. 64 
In the eighteenth century two separate types of legisla-
tion developed from these prototypes. About twenty-five 
temporary acts were.passed, each releasing most of the 
debtors who had been held since a specified date. Also 
in 1729, a permanent act was passed which continued to 
relieve prisoners on execution. 65 
Temporary acts "for the Relief' of Insolvent 
Debtors" were passed in 1755 (and amended in the next 
session), in 1761 (and amended later that year), in 
1765, 1769, 1772, 1774, 1776, 1778 and in 1781. 66 
There was a period of thirteen years after 1781 when no 
such bills were passed. They then resumed in 1794, 
and again in 1795, 1797, 1801, 1804 (amended in the next 
session), 1806, 1809, 1811, and 1812, the last two 
acts being amended in the following sessions. The 
final such bill was passed in 1813, after the passage 
of a permanent measure. 67 
64 30 Car. II c. 4. Ibid, viii. 235. 
65 2 Geo. II c. 22. Ibid, xi. 597-9. 
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Nineteen acts over sixty-three years meant an 
average of one such act every three and one third years. 
This figure suggests a greater regularity than was in 
fact the case. Between 1750 and 1781 there was a 
gradual increase in the passage of such acts, but this 
was suddenly stopped in 1781. Whenthe acts were again 
passed, after 1794, the average time between them was 
just over two years, which was a dramatic increase in 
frequency, resulting from the increased number of 
prisoners. But their passage was always erratic, and 
there never was any certainty that such a bill would 
pass. 
What was the legal status of these temporary 
relief acts? They did not alter debtor-creditor 
relations as established by Common Law, even if in 
practice they altered the force of such laws. They 
were, as Romilly said, only ex post facto laws: "which 
took away, merely because such was the pleasure of the 
legislature, the stipulat·ed effect of contracts entered 
into under the sanction of law. 1168 Such laws operated 
to remove the debtor from prison, but not to exempt him 
from liability for the debt. The 1755 Act may be taken 
as an example. It required gaolers to make a list of 
the debtors that they held on 1 January 1755. (The 
choice of such a date and its distance from the date 
of the Royal Assent to the bill determined how many 
debtors would be relieved.) Those owing debts to the 
68 Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly, ii. 410. 
Crown, or more than £500 to one person were ineligible 
f'or the list. Those whose names were recorded were 
permitted to swear upon oath as to the nature and value 
of their property, and as to the honesty of' their deal-
ings. If the debtor was not suspected of' perjury, he 
27. 
was then to be released by the justices at their quarter 
sessions, and his property seized and distributed to his 
creditors. There were also provisions to induce debtors 
who had fled overseas to return and surrender their 
property. No person released by the previous Insolvent 
Act could be released on this occasion. 69 
Thus an insolvent act was a clumsy but eff'ective 
means of releasing those debtors who wanted to leave 
the gaol. Over the next twenty-five years, these acts 
became increasingly complex and sophisticated, especially 
in their definition of fraudulent situations, and in 
their provisions for the distribution of property. 
Holdsworth described such acts as "a permanent set of 
conditions, periodically enacted", 70 and indeed the 
acts changed little from one bill to another, for it was 
the custom for the member who sought leave for such a 
bill simply to present the house with the text of the 
previous act, with blanks f'or dates and sums to be 
filled in Committee. In Committee other amendments 
69 28 Geo. II c. 43, in Statutes at Large, (ed. 
Pickering), xxi. 247f'f. All subsequent 
references to statutes up till 1806 are drawn 
from this; thereafter from Statutes of the 
United Kingdom, . and Ireland. 
70 Op. cit., xi. 598. 
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were sometimes made to such bills. In 1765 an amendment 
required insolvents to advertise their intention to seek 
release in the Gazette. The 1768 hct was extended to 
those who failed to pay sums settled by arbitration. In 
1772 the bill was elaborated to deal with those who sought 
release a second time after being remanded on the first 
occasion. By 1778 the act was seventy-seven clauses in 
length, and in 1781 the whole bill was redrafted in a more 
logical sequence. 
In 1765 the maximum debt permitted was increased 
to £1,000, and in 1776 imprisoned bankrupts were also 
made eligible, and there was an increasing tendency to 
manipulate these bills to suit wider circumstances. 
Thus special clauses were introduced in 1785 to cover 
two Quakers who were in gaol, and in 1772 the Marshal 
of King's Bench was indemnified against liability for 
some escaped prisoners. In 1776 Thomas Touchet, a 
"lunatic", was released by the Act, although he was 
unable to swear on oath. The timing of the acts was 
influenced by other events. In May 1776, as events in 
America became more disturbing, clauses were added to 
the bill in committee to enable commissioned and warrant 
officers to simply use the act, and to induce men to 
enlist for the forces, by more certain discharge if 
they did so. 71 Much the same procedure had been used 
in 1761, as a result of which six hundred men were 
expected to enlist. 72 
71 CJ, xxxv. 775-6, 794. 
72 AR, iv. (1761). 85; 1M,, xxx. (1761). 164. 
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Were such clauses inducements for the Commons 
to pass the insolvent bill? And was the crowded state 
of the prisons a reason for introducing such a bill? 
There is all too little evidence available to answer 
such questions, but it is clear that as the bills became 
more frequent, opposition to them was more often heard. 
In 1753, when leave was sought to introduce an insolvent 
bill, the motion was defeated by 53 to 51 votes. It 
was much the same in 1754, 78 and the London Magazine 
concluded that Parliament had lost interest in helping 
any but the rich. 74 
It does seem that knowledge of the number of. 
prisoners in the great London debtor prisons was 
usually the main reason for insolvent acts. 
said of these acts in 1780: 
As Burke 
They are a dishonourable invention, 
by which, not from humanity, not from 
policy, but merely because we have 
not room enough to hold these victims 
of the absurdity of our laws, we turn 
loose upon the public three or four 
thousand naked wretches.75 
The pattern in 1753, 1761 and 1768, at least, was that 
a petition from five hundred prisoners in the Fleet 
provided the occasion for the introduction of such a 
bill. Such petitions were often entrusted by their 
signatories to a sympathetic metropolitan member. The 
debtors might also circulate appeals to members of the 
House to support these bills. An appeal of this kind, 
emanating from the King's Bench debtors in 1753, flatter-
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judgement", and described, f'or his benef'it, the horrors 
of a gaol, "that grave f'or the living. 1176 
Insolvency bills were introduced by private 
members, although they were probably referred to the 
Judges of' the superior courts. The members who intro-
duced the bills had reason to know of' the gaols. They 
include Velters Cornewall of Heref'ordshire, William 
Thornton of' York City, Thomas Budgen of Surrey, George 
Cooke of Middlesex, George Onslow of Surrey, Richard 
Whitworth of' Staff'ord borough, Herbert Mackworth of' 
Cardiff' and George Nares of Oxford City. Among these, 
borough or metropolitan members, with large gaols at 
hand, are very apparent. 
There is some reason, then, to think that the 
crowded conditions of' London gaols, which together held 
about half of' the debtors in England, was a key reason 
for the passage of an insolvent act. Certainly there 
were large numbers of' London prisoners released by such 
acts. On one day in July 1769, 150 prisoners were 
discharged at the Guildhall, and in 1774, in one day 
1200 prisoners were released by the magistrates at st. 
Margaret's Hi11. 77 In 1776 before the bill was passed 
there were pµblished reports of some eight thousand 
debtors awaiting it. 78 
76 King's Bench Prisoners, To a Member of Parliament, 
p. 2. 
77 AR, xii. (1769). 114; ibid, xvii. (1774). 139. 
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Such reports no doubt stimulated sympathy for the 
prisoners, but it is clear that members were interested 
in more than just freeing debtors. They laid particular 
stress on the clauses for remanding the fraudulent. In 
practice the courts, forced to consider so many petitions, 
were rarely concerned to punish any but the blatantly 
dishonest. This was a constant cause for complaint. 
"Insolvent Acts", said one pamphleteer, "empty the 
prisons with nearly the same want of distinction as they 
are filled". 79 The popular name for relief under the 
' 80 temporary bills was "whitewashing". 
This was not the only fault in the temporary acts. 
Their other failure was their inability to touch the 
debtor who declined to use the act, but chose rather 
to spend his property in prison, or worse, in the "Rules" 
of the prison, outside its walls but within its discipline. 
An attempt was made in the 1761 act to provide compulsory 
powers to creditors, but the spectacular result prevented 
any repetition. Aided by a liberal interpretation of 
the act by London magistrates, the debtors were released 
by the thousands, to the disadvantage of their real 
creditors. "Fathers compelled sons, brothers, sisters, 
and bailiffs their employees", and the debtors soon 
received their property back from these sham creditors 
to whom it had been surrendered. Meanwhile the genuine 
"suffering creditors" were very unhappy at their losses. 81 
79 Considerations on the Laws between Debtors and 
Creditors, p. 9. 
80 Y:i, xxxi. (1762). 13. 
81 QM., xxxi. (1761). 476; er. 1.M,, xxxi. (1762), 580; 
AB., iv. (1761)~ 111, 113, 124, 164. 
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Parliament was called back into session early to 
rush through an amending act, and there was to be no 
further attempt to provide compulsive powers for creditors. 
The defence offered by debtors in the pamphlet~ 
Compulsive Clause in the Present Act of Insolvency had 
no effect. 
Thus compassion and compulsion had their limits. 
These limits were increasingly tested in the seventeen-
seventies, as acts were passed more regularly. In 1765 
there had been a feeling that the act was too close in 
t . t 't d 82 d th t . ime o is pre ecessor, an ere was s rong opposi-
tion in 1776 to attempt to allow debtors who had been 
re-imprisoned for further debts to be released again. 83 
In 1778 an attempt was mounted to postpone consideration 
of the insolvent bill, but this was not successful. 
The next year, the request to introduce a bill was 
refused. 84 
A profound change of attitudes was developing. 
This can be sensed in the changing preambles to the bills. 








Whereas many persons, by Losses, and 
other misfortunes are rendered incap-
able of paying their whole debts; and 
though they are willing to make the 
utmost satisfaction they can, are 
nevertheless detained in prison by 
their creditors; and whereas such 
unhappy debtors have always been 
deemed the proper objects of publick 
compassion ••• 85 
viii. (1765). 90. 
xxxv. 776. 
xxxvi. 971; ibid, xxxvii. 212. 
28 Geo. II c. 13. 
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Such a preamble remained virtually unaltered in the acts 
of' the subsequent twenty-three years. It regards the 
debtors as the object of compassion as well as justice. 
But in 1781 the act was recast, and the new preamble 
was radically different: 
Whereas, notwithstanding the great 
pn::judice and detriment which acts 
of insolvency produce to trade and 
credit, it may be convenient in the 
present condition of' the gaols in 
this Kingdom, that some of the 
prisoners who are now confined there-
in should be set at liberty ••• 86 
The grudging tone of' this preamble denotes a profound 
alteration in attitudes, the reasons for which are 
traced in a later chapter of this study. 
These temporary acts were operated only at the 
whim of Parliament. There were other relief acts 
however that were permanent. These were of three 
kinds. Firstly there were acts against frivolous 
arrest, secondly an act which might relieve judgement 
debtors, and thirdly a number of' "irnrnuni ties" f'or 
persons, places and days. 
The law against frivolous or vexatious arrests 
was probably the most significant of' these provisions, 
for rather than relieve an imprisoned debtor, it forbade 
his arrest if' the debt was below a certain sum. The 
first such act - 12 Geo. I c. 29 - was passed in 1725. 
This laid down that there might be no arrest on mesne 
process where the debt or cause of action was not more 
than £10 ifl brought in a superior court, or more than 
f'orty shillings if' brought in an inf'erior court. 87 
86 21 Geo. III c. 63. 
87 Holdsworth, xi. 595; P,P. 1792, Report no. 97, p. 1. 
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The superior courts were King's Bench and Common Pleas; 
the inferior courts included a wide range of municipal 
courts and Courts of Requests. As a result there was a 
marked social distinction between the debtors held in 
the King's Bench and Fleet, the gaols of the two superior 
courts, and the prisoners in other gaols. 
law was made uniform for all courts. 
In 1779 the 
arrest. 
These limitations only extended to mesne process 
Debts of any size could lead to imprisonment 
on execution. But the delay before this could be 
executed against the debtor encouraged the development 
of' Courts of' Requests, which would more quickly judge 
and execute sentence on debts under forty shillings. 
However the ef'f'ectiveness of the limits on mesne process 
arrest is dubious. Creditors were not required to 
prove that the debt was above forty shillings, and if' 
they sought to recover their legal costs also, it invari-
ably would be. It was popularly thought that creditors 
always exaggerated the sum they had lost, in order to gain 
the right to arrest. 88 The act against frivolous 
arrests"an ,:fjact failed to stop them completely. A wife 
could anonymously sue her husband f'or a very large sum, 
for which he could not afford bail, and thus she could 
enjoy a freedom not possible in his presence. And 
Peregrine Pickle, in Smollett's story, was arrested for 
an imaginary debt of £1,200, to punish him for his 
journalistic attacks on his patron. 89 Individual misuse 
88 LM, xxxiii. (1764). 75, Cf. Holdsworth, xi. 595-6. 
89 T. Smollett, Peregrine Pickle, p. 522. Cf. AR, 
ix. (1766). 94; ibid,, xxiii. (1780). 208; 
ibid, xlvii. (18osr=-400. 
of the law continued, but arrests for small debts were 
curtailed somewhat by the law. Far more persons were 
arrested for debts between forty shillings and £20 than 
for any other sums, and when in 1747 the Frivolous 
Arrests act expired before Parliament had renewed it, 
there was an enormous increase in arrests, many of them 
for trivial sums as low as seven farthings. It was 
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"A harvest of pettifoggers and bailiffs", 90 and it 
demonstrated that the frivolous arrests act was success-
ful in stopping many arrests for trivial sums. 
A second kind of permanent legislative limit on 
imprisonment for debt provided for the release of some 
judgment debtors. The act, 2 Geo. II c. 22, passed in 
1729, and amended in 1730 was renewed several times until 
1759. This act sought to control some of the extortions 
of bailiffs and gaolers, but like so much eighteenth 
century social legislation, it simply laid down a defini-
tion of wrong behaviour, and provided no powers of 
enforcement. It would seem from the observations of 
John Howard that the regulations were frequently breach-
d 91 e • 
Under stringent conditions the act allowed for 
the release of debtors. Such debtors had to owe no 
more than £100, and had to provide a detailed account 
of their property. The creditor could veto the release,, 
for any reason. If he did, he had to pay two shillings 
and fourpence to the debtor every Monday for his mainten-
ance. 92 
90 LM, xvi. (1747). 529. 
91 State of the Prisons, pp. 5, 12, 26. 
92 2 Geo. II. c. 22. ss vii-xiii; Cf. Holdsworth, xi~ 599. 
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In 1759 the fifth renewal of the act was about to 
expire, and on 6 March an unrevised renewal was introduced 
into the House of Commons. However, on 12 March, the 
House ordered a Committee to amend, explain and render 
the old act more effectual. On 10 April Alderman 
Dickinson presented a new bill to the House, which passed 
through the House. It received one amendment in Committee 
incorporating some compulsory powers for the creditor. 
The bill was passed without amendment by the Lords, and 
received the Royal Assent on 2 June. Because it was 
thought to greatly favour debtors, an lnsolvent bill, 
already in progress was dropped when the permanent act 
was introduced.93 
The act thus passed - 32 Geo. II c. 28 - was 
entitled "An Act for the Relief of Debtors with respect 
to the Imprisonment of their Persons, and to oblige 
Debtors II . . . , and it was commonly referred to as the 
This title it apparently inherited from "Lords' Act". 
the 1729 Act, which had originated in the Lords, whereas 
the 1759 Act did not. Walter Clay, writing one hundred 
years later, suggested that the bill was influenced by 
Samuel Johnson's criticisms of the debtor law. 94 
Certainly the timing of hls articles lends support to 
this suggestion, for Johnson's comments were published 
in September 1758 and January 1759. Johnson, though, 
wanted far more than Parliament gave: "It may be hoped, 
that our lawgivers will at length take away from us the 
93 
94 
CJ, xxviii. 461, 471, 557, 564, 570, 573, 579, 594, 
b25. 
Cf. W. Clay, The Prison Chaplain, pp.33-4; 38-9. 
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power of starving and depraving one another, 1195 he wrote 
in the second article. The essay was widely reprinted, 
but in the London Magazine and the Annual Review it was 
placed alongside an article reprinted from the Critical 
Review, which discussed a pamphlet comparing the French 
and English attitudes to the debtor laws. 
argued that: 
That artj.cle 
the law••• might surely interpose, 
without injustice to L,"creditory to 
limit the ex~ent and duration of that 
puni sl:\men t. 9 
It went on to suggest how grateful creditors would be 
for the right: 
to compel from Ldebtory a most exact 
and rigorous account of what they 
should have at that time in possession, 
to be immediately secured for the bene-
fit of the creditors.97 
And this was exactly what Parliament sought to do. 
The act began by forbidding the sheriff's officer 
from taking .the debtor to a tavern. It strictly 
controlled gaol fees, and the rules and fees of the 
gaol and the legacies it received were to be displayed 
on a notice in the gaol. The elaborate terms for the 
release of the prisoner with debts below £100 are 
reminiscent of the suggestions in the Critical Review. 
His property must be listed in a schedule, and they are 
to be delivered to assignees who should distribute them 
equally to the creditors. If a creditor .chooses to 
detain the debtor he must pay "groats", as in the old 
95 Idler, no. 38. (1759). 
96 Critical Review, vi. (1758). 510. 
97 ~, p. 511. 
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act, but if he fails to pay them at any time, the prisoner 
may be released. Debtors may be compelled to use the 
act, so long as all their creditors are advised, and 
share in the dividend. Should a prisoner refuse to co-
operate, he may be transported to America for seven years. 
Should he be set free, any property he may possess in 
the future will be liable for seizure to pay the debt, 
but he is to be immune from arrest. 98 
This act remained in force until 1821. In 1786 
it was amended to extend to debts of £200. In 1799 the 
amount was further raised to £300, and in 1797 the "groats" 
were raised from two shillings and fourpence per week to 
three shillings and sixpence.99 These concessions to 
inflation are beyond the scope of this chapter. There 
were some earlier attempts to alter the law. In 1768 
leave was sought very early in the session by Nares, 
Cornewall and Grey, all sponsors of temporary acts, to 
introduce an amending act. No more was heard of it. 
In 1774 and 1775 attempts were made by Herbert Mackworth 
and Sir Charles Whitworth to amend the bill to control 
the seizure of property from the debtor once he had been 
discharged. These attempts failed. 100 
How effective was the Lords' Act? It was very 
quickly put to use in the courts, 101 but the numbers 
using it were never large. The pr ovi si on of "groats" 
98 32 Geo. II c. 28. SS i-xx. 
99 26 Geo. III c. 44; 39 Geo. III c. 50 (Cf. 33 Geo. 
III c. 5). 37 Geo. III c. 85. 
100 CJ, xxxii. 35; ill£, xxxiv. 556 et. seq.; ~, 
xxxv. 235 et. seq. 
101 fili, xcvii. 567. (1759). (2. Burro 799). 
should have ensured that judgement debtors were either 
freed or fed by the debtor. But John Howard reported 
in 1777 that the Lords' Act had not given groats to 
twelve prisoners in the whole of England, and the cost 
of suing for them was often greater than the original 
debt. 102 The debtor could rarely afford to prepare a 
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schedule of his property to the satisfaction of the court, 
for this might cost two or three guineas. Above all, 
the act failed completely to distinguish the fraudulent 
debtor; from the unfortunate. 103 
A third permanent limitation on imprisonment for 
debt was a number of immunities which had long prevented 
arrest of certain persons, or in certain places, or at 
certain times. Immune from arrest were amb&ssadors, 
members of Parliament, and barristers. 104 Such eocemptions 
were not popular with others. Thomas Delamayne declared 
that they existed so that the lawyers and members of 
Parliament who had the power to change the law, would 
not do so, because they were never threatened by it. 105 
This was a conspiracy theory, and a more natural explana-
tion is that the necessities of Parliamentary and legal 
business led to the exemptions. Diplomatic embarrass-
ment caused by the arrest of foreign emissaries led to 
the extension of the immunity to them also. 106 
102 State of t~isons, p. 5. 
103 Courtville, pp. 22-4; PP, 1792, Report no. 97, 
p. 31. Account of the Society, p. 280. 
1 Ol~ Bl. Comm. iii. 289-290. 
105 Barrister-at-law, pp. 75, 87-8. 
106 Cf. Walpole, Letters, (ed. Toynbee), xiv. 410-411. 
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There were more anomalies in immunity of places. 
Arrest was not permitted in the Inner Temple, so that 
lawyers would not have to flee when unable to pay their 
debts. 107 There was also a general immunity from arrest 
for persons in the so-called "verge of court", whi eh 
traditionally meant an area of twelve miles in circum-
ference around the King's residence. In this area no 
civil magistrate had any power, but only'1.he officers of 
the Palace Court. This "verge of court" had long become 
stationary in the Whitehall and St. James area, and became 
an enclave of about three square miles within which the 
embarrassed debtor might find refuge from the bailiff. 108 
In Fielding's novel, Booth avoided arrest by renting 
rooms in this area, until he was enticed outside by the 
tale that his wife had fallen sick in Mrs Chenevix's 
toyshop. 1 09 
Readers of Amelia may recall that earlier in the 
novel the tale is told of the Rev. Mr Bennett, who also 
was pursued by bailiffs. Clergymen were not immune 
from arrest, and popular folk-lore declared that many 
innocent clergymen were detained in episcopal prisons 
on such charges. Mr Bennett avoided this fate, and he 
was able to earn some money by fulfilling preaching 
engagements in London. This was possible because of 
the other immunity, that of Sunday, when the bailiff was 
107 Holdsworth, Xll. 37; R.J. Blackham, The Story of 
the Temple, p. 59. 
108 Cf. J .c. Stevens, "The Verge of the Court and 
Arrest for Debt in Fielding' s Amelia", Modern 
Language Notes, lxiii. (1948). 104-9. 
109 Op. cit., pp. 303-5. 
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obliged to def'er arrests. 
Immunities to various persons, places and times, 
along with occasi anal insolvency acts, the Lords' Act 
and the limitations on arrest produced a patchwork of' 
alleviations :Crom the law. Yet taken together, they 
:railed to shield more than a f'raction of' debtors :Crom 
their :rate. The only e:r:rective limitation was the cost 
of' legal proceedings to the creditor, a cost which he 
could have no guarantee of' recovering. The Law itself' 
:ravoured the debtor, but in practice the scales did not 
rest quite as heavily on the side of' the creditor as the 
Law implied. Prisoners were released by various 
compassionate measures and private charities, and f'or 
their part, they did not challenge the legal basis of' 
the practice. Compared to the complaints and turmoil 
of' the last twenty-f'ive years of the century, imprison-
ment for debt seemed almost popular. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE DEBTOR'S LOT 
The insolvent debtor was the product of' his circum-
stances. Thus any examination of' the nature and extent 
of' insolvency in the late eighteenth century verges on 
becoming a f'inancial portrait of' the age. A social 
analysis of' imprisoned debtors can with similar ease 
become an examination of' the commercial basis of' the 
social structure of' the period. 
These are all f'undamental questions about the 
eighteenth century, but in the present context it seems 
wiser to avoid these large problems, whilst pursuing 
smaller ones. In the past, the debtor has largely 
been f'orgotten by both the economic and the social 
historian, although a study of the less successf'ul 
products of' society is a usef'ul counter-balance to 
studies of' its achievements. This chapter will attempt 
to describe the debtors, particularly those of' the late 
eighteenth century,, and the f'irst part of the nineteenth 
century, and also attempt to catalogue how widely 
imprisonment f'or debt was f'eared. 
CREDIT; THE BROAD ROAD TO PRISON 
The existence of' debtors implies the existence 
of' credit. And credit was, to the eighteenth century 
trader, the f'oundation of' the f'inancial web of' society. 
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The increasing awareness in the period that England's 
greatness was based on its prosperity enshrined commerce 
in sacredness. This prosperity was assuredly based on 
credit, so surely credit deserved the protection of the 
law?1 
Certainly commerce at every level was based upon 
credit to a remarkable extent. Individuals at every 
level of society were engaged in such transactions to 
a degree unknovm today. It was an age when piece 
payment was slowly being superseded, and when wages 
were paid at infrequent intervals. 2 As society became 
more and more engaged in money transactions, imprison-
ment for debt was seen as a crucial legal inducement to 
keep contracts and to pay bills. Therefore traders 
talked a great deal about credit, and if challenged, 
distinguished between a "wholesome" variety on which 
society depended, and a "pernicious II kind which caused 
harm. 3 
However one pitfall is at hand if we accept the 
eighteenth century idea of credit. "Credit" in itself 
is an elusive Will-o-the-wisp. All that can be found 
are particular "creditors" lending money, or selling 
goods on delayed payment to particular "debtors". 
This does not produce a class of creditors and a class 
of debtors, for a tailor might be both a debtor of an 
1 Cf. J. Wade, Treatise on the Police and Crimes of 
the Metropolis, pp. 125-6. 
2 T.S. Ashton, Economic History of England: The 
Eighteenth Century. pp. 206-7. 
3 PP, 1831-2, (239), xxv. 61. 
iron-monger and at the same time his creditor. As 
T.S. Ashton has written: 
Social history has sometimes been written 
in terms of debtors and creditors, on the 
assumption that the two belonged to 
different social classes. The creditor4 
is supposed to be rich, the debtor poor. 
44. 
Such caricatures were unhelpful. Eighteenth century men 
talked a great deal about Credit, and they treated it 
as a strange abstraction. Perhaps for this reason they 
thought that imprisonment for debt would have a deterrent 
value. Yet not every case of purchase on credit was 
safeguarded by use of the capias procedure. 
The lower orders of society experienced the worst 
of imprisonment for debt. Mrs Dorothy George described 
it as one of the uncertainties in the life of the London 
poor. Crartsmen, mechanics and labourers were orten 
arrested, and endured desperate poverty in prison. 5 
The debts ror which they were held were usually under 
rorty shillings, and thererore dealt with by the Courts 
or Requests. House rental and food bills unpaid usua~ly 
led to arrest. Labourers who had to wait up to twelve 
months for their wages were often in bondage to small 
retailers, like butchers and bakers. 6 Cash sales were 
unknown. 
Semi-skilled and unskilled labourers were rarely 
granted credit ror more than the essential commodities. 
4 Op. cit., p. 206. 
5 M.D. George, London Lire in the Ei hteenth Centur, 
(Penguin edn. , pp. 297-302. Cf. Persons Confined, 
pp. 4, 23; PP, 1792, Report no. 97, pp. 27-8. 
6 Wade, Treatise on the Polj_ce and Crimes of the 
Metropolis, pp. 130-1. 
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The more substantial a man's position appeared, the more 
credit he would receive. The fraudulent had only to 
claim a good name and family, and to dre_ss accordingly, 
to be extended goods on credit. 7 Landlords and 
publicans would give long periods of grace to persons 
with "an income", before issuing writs for their arrest. 
Dickens thought that. most middle class people in the 
nineteenth century were tempted by this to live beyond 
their means. 8 The higher a debtor in the social scale, 
the greater was the reluctance to arrest him. Aristo-
crats and gentry, like Rawdon in Vanity Fair, often 
evaded their debts for years, lived in the "Verge of 
the Court" or travelled overseas when their creditors 
became restive. Some gentlemen were arrested, but 
they usually took advantage of "The Rules" of a London 
prison, to live outside its walls. 9 
Outside the metropolis, arrest may have been used 
less frequently. However, towns with an efficient 
Court of Requests had an effective means to enable 
creditors to proceed at law to recover their small debts. 
Such courts were active especially in industrial towns. 
Exeter, which had an average of nearly ninety-nine 
committals to prison every year from 1798 to 1818, is 
one example; Liverpool in the same period averaged two 
hundred and twenty; Sheffield, about three hundred, 
7 Cf. PP, 1 816. ( 4 72), i V. 11 8/463f. 
8 All the Year Round, xi. (1864). 463-7. 
9 GM, lv. (1785). 663; er. Temple Bar, xix. (1867). 
487-492. 
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and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, about sixty. 10 Industrial 
factories often paid wages only annually, and there-
fore credit from traders was a necessity. 11 The 
increase in urban workers led to an increasing demand 
from traders for Courts of Requests. Elaborate peti-
tions to the House of Commons became increasingly common 
after 1750. When the town of Bradford sought such a 
court, its petition explained how the existence of a 
large class of cotton workers greatly increased the 
need for trading credit, which would only be encouraged 
by a Small Debtors Act. The deterrent value of imprison-
ment for debt was itself a reason for providing credit 
lavishly, with little fear that money would be lost. 12 
In rural communities also, the agricultural 
labourer depended on the irregular income of casual 
employment or upon annual payment, and therefore credit 
was important. Yeomen were more self-sufficient, but 
they too rarely paid in cash. Arrest was probably less 
important in the country to enforce payment, but in 
times of agricultural distress, mesne process arrest 
was a constant danger. 13 
10 ,EE, 1819, (237), xvii. 145ff; nos. 19, 55, 77, 120. 
11 Cf. T.S. Ashton, p.207. 
12 CJ, xxix. 433, 441. There is a list of the 
Courts of Requests in Schedule A of 9 & 10 Viet. 
c. 95. (1846). Cf. also the Report of the 
Select Committee on the Recovery of Small Debts, 
PP, 1823, (386), iv. 183ff. 
13 Cf. Ashton, p. 206; Goldsmith, The Vicar of 
Wakefield, p. 158 ff. 
Figure One for Debt in 1801 Committals 
Source: d"x One See Appen l. 
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Figure One provides a graphic representation of' 
the debtors committed to prison in 1801, calculated by 
counties .• The figures underlying it are presented in 
Appendix One, in which there are also cited the number 
of debtors James Neild found in the same coun-ties in 
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1800. The figures provided are proportionate to the 
population in the 1801 Census. The map therefore reveals 
the extent to which imprisonment was a remedy for the 
non payment of debts in different areas. However, 
because this is based on records of numbers imprisoned, 
and not of the writs for arrest, some caution must be 
used in interpreting it. For although the bailiff. 
placed the debtor in gaol, he could also transf'er himself' 
to another gaol by writ of habeas corpus, and such cases 
cannot be distinguished in the records. Such trans-
ferrals generally moved debtors to London, and the 
Fleet or King's Bench prisons, and these gaols were 
further filled by debtors from neighbouring counties 
under King's Bench or Common Pleas' jurisdiction. The 
two great prisons were national,- not county gaols, and 
this explains the high figures for London, the home of' 
the Fleet, and Surrey, the home of King's Bench. 
Nevertheless, even without including the figures of 
these two gaols, London and Surrey would have extremely 
high committal rates; in London 11.0 and in Surrey, 
25.0. It is clear that London courts for creditors 
were the most efficient and most busy, even adjusted 
for population. They seem to have reduced the committal 
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rate in some of' the Home Counties; Bedf'ord, Hertfordshire, 
Berkshire and Wiltshire. On the other hand, Essex, 
Hampshire, and Kent all had active Courts of Requests in 
their large towns. 
Counties with large cities were more vigorous 
in their use of imprisonment than were rural counties. 
Somerset, dominated by Bristol, contrasts with Dorset. 
York had full gaols in Sheffield and York city, and in 
Lancashire both the Liverpool and the county gaol were 
heavily patronised. The Midlands shows a consistently 
moderate use of imprisonment, whereas the rate in the 
North Country and Lake Districts are surprisingly high. 
The gaols in Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Carlisle both 
served as regular lodgings for debtors; long established 
heavy 'industry' no doubt resulted in familiarity with 
the legal processes by local traders. 
The geographical incidence of imprisonment for 
debt is one indication of how widespread it was. 
Another is the social origins of those imprisoned. Lack 
of adequate information hampers attempts to so classify 
debtors, but the sessional papers of 1822 give complete 
lists of' the names and occupations of the debtors who 
had recently sought release through the Insolvent 
Debtors' Court. Table One contains an analysis of' a 
sample of' these lists. 
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TABLE ONE 
SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION OF DEBTORS RELEASED 
BY THE INSOLVENT DEBTORS' COURT, 1821-1822. 14 
Debtors 1821-2. Coloquhoun's 
Estimate of' 
Society in 1802. 
I Aristocracy 
II Middle Ranks 
1 • Agriculture 
2. Industry and 
Commerce 
3. Prof'essions 














The table has been modelled to conf'orm to Patrick 
Coloquhoun's subdivision of' society, 15 and his estimates 
of' the proportion in each of' his categories provides a 
useful comparison. However, this table only supplies 
inf'ormation about those debtors who petitioned f'or relief' 
through the Insolvent Debtors' Court. Others, who 
came to a private arrangement with their creditors, or 
who could not af'f'ord relief' through the Court were not 
recorded in this list, and this may have included sixty 
per cent of' all debtors. 16 Nor are two major groups of' 
debtors: bankrupts, and prisoners sentenced by the Courts 
of' Requests f'or limited periods. Thus large traders on 
the one hand, and labourers on the other, are under-
represented here. 
14 For the source of' these f'igures, and an expansion 
of' them, see Appendix Two. 
15 Quoted by H. Perkin, The Origins of' Modern English 
Society, pp. 21-2. 
16 PP, 1819, (237), xvii. 145f'f'. 
Nevertheless, the tabulated information reveals 
the very wide occupational and social range of the 
imprisoned debtors. Nearly five per cent classified 
themselves as gentlemen, and an even higher percentage 
51. 
were professional men. Government employees and clerks 
were V\e..l represented, but the manufacturing and labour-
ing classes were less well represented, and unskilled 
labourers were remarkably few. These figures were 
drawn mainly from hearings at the London Court-house, 
so they reflect the London occupational range particu-
larly. Nevertheless the Commercial and Industrial 
classes are out of all proportion to their actual 
numbers in society. The majority of debtors came 
from this group, whereas only ten per cent of society 
fell into this category. More detailed breakdown of 
the figures reveals that 38% of all debtors were 
merchants or shopkeepers, whereas the 1851 census 
showed 4.8% of Londoners in this group. 17 Ten per 
cent of all released debtors were grocers, and altogether 
18% food salesmen of various kinds. 
Such figures are supported by contempo.rary 
comments. In 1819 the Warden of the Fleet prison 
had noted the large number of shopkeepers in prison. 18 
A Royal Commission in 1840, after a substantial amend-
ment in the law, estimated that nearly two thirds of 
all debtors were traders. Its definition of a trader 
17 F. Shepherd, London 1808-18 0: The Infernal Wen, 
p. 389. But in this list, 49.3 o, presumably 
mainly females and children, are listed as 'others'. 
18 PP, 1819, (287), ii.14/334. 
was broad, but the general conclusion was valid. 19 
Thus imprisonment for debt was not just a means by 
which the law oppressed the poor. Arrest was most 
commonly used against the retail traders who themselves 
most often sold goods on credit. The deb tor laws 
enabled the trading class to prey upon itself. 
Both Adam Smith and Napoleon described England 
20 as a nation of shopkeepers, yet almost nothing is 
known of these men, the scale of their businesses, and 
their financial commitments. Contemporary observers 
admitted this. 21 Traders were an immensely varied 
group. The bulk store with a strong capital backing 
was quite different from the corporate merchant trading 
company with overseas interests, and different again 
from the small shop operated by its owner, which had a 
trifling capital investment and turnover. The large 
trader, whose creditors were owed more than £100 each, 
was protected from imprisonment by the bankrupt laws. 
It seems that most traders did not have high enough 
debts to be eligible. Although loss of good name and 
credit was the worst result of bankruptcy, the 
subtleties of the bankrupt law made it a hazardous 
22 experience, so sometimes traders preferred arrest. 
Thus from a sense of their own insecurity, traders were 
swift to arrest others. 
19 PP, 1840, (274), xvi. viii/8. The Commission was 
doubtful whether farmers, attornies and surgeons 
could be called traders - referring to the defini-
tion of a bankrupt. 
20 Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p. 337; Concise 
Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, p. 151. 
52. 
21 . J.H. Elliott A Remonstrance addressed to Lord 
Brougham,. (1B38), p. 1.3. Cf. A. Briggs, Victorian 
Cities, (Penguin edn.), pp. 108-9. 
22 Considerations on a Commission of Bankruptcy. (1789), 
pp. 21-28. 
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Traders did develop a feeling of mutual identity 
in their insecurity. In the nineteenth century, they 
saw themselves as the "middle class", which was the basis 
of English greatness. They contrasted themselves with 
the "murky multitude of poor, and destitute, and despePate 
persons whose increasing numbers and social disorganisa-
tion are already a source of painful alarm 11 • 23 The 
law ought therefore, it was argued, to enforce the pay-
ment of debts, as an act of social homage, if for no 
other reason. 
Such an attitude had its precursor in the eighteenth 
century view of social classification. 
in 1772: 
Grosley wrote 
Among the people of London we should 
properly distinguish the porters, 
sailors, chairman and the day labourers 
who work in the streets not only from 
persons of condition, ••• but even from 
the lowest class of shopkeepers •••• 
/je noty the obliging readiness of the 
citizens and shopkeepers, even of the 
inferior sort ••• 24 
Among the "lower order of traders", for whom a few 
pounds might determine annual profit or loss, 25 the 
determination to use the law to recover debts was 
common. The smaller trader had considerable induce-
ments to allow easy credit, and to allow debts to grow 
until they reached a respectable amount like £20. 
Charles Townshend commented that these men: "rarely 
23 Elliott, Credit the Life of Commerce, p. 1. 
24 Quoted by M.D. George, London Life in the 
Eighteenth Century, p. 159. 
25 PR, n.s., xxvii. (1790). 123. Cf. Fraser's 
Magazine, ix. (1834). 574-585. 
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receive money for what they sell, and being as backward 
in their payment for what they owe, find a quick transi-
tion from their shops to a prison. u26 
With such problems, it is no wonder that the shop-
keeper or tallyman saw his ultimate security in a power 
over his debtor's body. He was quick to take legal 
advice to "put the screw on" his debtors, 27 for he was 
nervous because of the wholesaler's demand for prompt 
payment, or else arrest. At the same time he was eager 
to sell more goods (on credit, of course), in order to 
increase his income! It was a never-ending dilemma. 28 
The uncertainties of the economic climate worsened 
this dilemma. Dr William Smith, a compassionate visitor 
to the London debtor prisons, saw the need for a Charity 
which would lend money to such small traders and house-
keepers to tide them over difficult times. 29 Tailors 
and grocers, whose individual sales were so small, were 
in particular need of such aid. Mr Micawber was 
imprisoned by a "revengeful bootmaker. 1130 Lacking any 
other security, such men found refuge in the debtor 
laws, and formed societies to oppose attempted reforms 
26 Quoted by T.S. Ashton,"p. 209. 
27 Broadway, ii. (1869). 309. 
28 PD, Ser. 3, xxvi. 1150; Wade, pp. 127-8; Elliott, 
Credit the Life of Commerce, p. 94. 
29 Smith, Mild Punishments Sound Policy, (1778), pp. 
94-97. 
30 Dickens, David Copperfield, p.187. For all the 
above, cf. D. Davies, A History of Shopping. 
p. 221 and passim. 
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in the law. They also bought copies of the Debtor and 
Creditor Guides, which gave advice as to the many Courts 
of Requests in London, their jurisdictions and their 
fees. Shopkeepers needed a simple statement of the 
law, so they could use it to defend their rights. 31 
Traders were in competition with each other, and the 
first man to arrest the debtor was more likely to force 
payment than the last, when there was no money left. 
Increasing numbers of shopkeepers, which w.er.:e noted in 
London by 1785, worsened this problem, for many of the 
new businesses were inadequately financed. 32 
How many debtors were imprisoned? In the 
eighteenth century, no one really knew. Samuel Johnson 
speculated that twenty thousand debtors were in gaol. 
He calculated that one in every three hundred Englishmen 
so suffered, and including their families, one per cent 
of the nation was directly affected, and the nation los.t 
£300,000 every year through their inabilj_ty to work. 33 
This was a fine piece of • .mercantilist reasoning, and 
Johnson was not the only one to engage in such specula-
tion, in order to condemn the practice. In 1735 an 
estimate of 12,000 to 15,000 debtors was given by the 
Prompter, 34 while the Daily Gazetter in 1736 suggested 






Cf. The Debtor and Creditor's Guide ••• A Guide to 
the Recovery of Debts, (1813), and The Debtor and 
Creditor's Guide Includin Directions for the 
Recovery of Debts in London, 1 25. 
T.S. Ashton, p. 216. 
Idler, no. 38. ( 1759). 
Quoted by LM, iv. (1735), p. 172. 
Ib id, v. ( 1 7 36 ) • 1 8 • 
estimated that: 
Broil such Monkery ••• the author 
computes no less than upwardsof 
seventy thousand such sort of Monks 
••• confined in the several jails 
of England.36 
Other generous estimates of sixty thousand37 and forty 
thousand38 prisoners can only be mentioned. Yet not 
until John Howard began to visit prisons was any 
attempt made to count the prisoners. 
Howard, with methodical zeal, set out to visit 
every prison in England, and examine their conditions. 
The figures he gathered were therefore taken over a 
long period, and they do not provide a completely 
56. 
accurate estimate of the number of prisoners. 
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In subsequent visits he counted 2078 debtors including 
119 women in the year 1779, and 2139, including 139 
women in 1782.40 
36 ill,g_, xxxiii. (1764). 34. 
37 R. Courtville, Arguments respecting Insolvency, p. 9. 
38 Considerations on the Laws between Debtors and 
39 
40 
Creditors, p. 43. 
State of the Prisons, p. 17. 
Ibid, p. 492. Individual Gaols are listed on pp. 
486-491. 
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Such figures were a substantial revision of' 
popular estimates. They indicate that the gaols were 
used more to hold debtors than to hold f'elons. The age 
of' punitive imprisonment had not yet begun. The slight 
decline in Howard's f'igures f'or 1779 and 1782 ref'lects 
the passage of' a bill in 1779 which limited mesne process 
arrest to debts of' £10 and over, rather than the old 
f'orty shilling limit. It is surprising how little this 
af'f'ected the numbers of' debtors, f'or contemporary observers 
thought that the law greatly reduced the prisoners. 41 
In 1792 Parliament f'irst expressed interest in 
compiling a total of' the number of' debtors imprisoned. 
The returns desired by the Select Committee were only 
incompletely supplied by sherif'f's, but they contained 
a valuable analysis of' the nature of' the debts f'or 
which prisoners were held. Tlj._ey may be tabulated as 
f'ollows: 42 
TABLE TWO 
PRISONERS FOR DEBT IN 1792 
Held on Mesne Process Held on Execution 
Debts £10 - £20 326 Debts to £20 110 
Debts £20 - £50 392 Debts £20 - £50 185 
Debts £50 - £100 215 Debts £50 - £100 141 







41 Autobiography of' Francis Place, ed. M. Thale, p. 31. 
42 ~, 1792, Report no. 97, pp. 22-24. Cf'. CJ, 
xlvi, 6 June 1791; ibid, xlvii. 24. 
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The heavy use of' mesne process arrest, especially 
f'or debts below £50 is very noticeable in these f'igures. 
The total number of' debtors is consistent with Howard's 
estimates. The trial and judgement of' debtors was more 
of'ten completed f'or debtors owing larger sums. 
James Neild, the Treasurer f'or the "Society f'or 
the Discharge and Relief' of' Persons Imprisoned f'or Small 
Debts" also produced f'igures f'or every gaol in the 
country. In 1800 he recorded the existence of 2003 
debtors in prison, 43 and he continued to update these 
f'igures. 
The figures given above were estimates of the 
approximate number in gaol at a point in time. In one 
sense such f'igures are deceiving, f'or of'ten debtors 
w.ere . in prison f'or no more than short periods. Af'ter 
1785 Courts of' Requests were not permitted to imprison 
small debtors f'or more than f'orty days. Consequently 
the low f'igure of' debtors on execution f'or debts up to 
£20 disguises a much larger number of' committals. In 
theory all other prisoners could be held f'or lif'e, but 
temporary insolvent acts, and the Lords' Act liberated 
most of those debtors who did not settle with their 
creditors when imprisoned. Some debtors remained in 
prison f'or very long periods, but they were not typical. 
The 1792 Committee recorded the harrowing tale of' the 
woman who died in the Devon County Gaol after forty-
five years' imprisonment for a debt of £19, and it 
commented that debtors were: "of'ten confined for life 
43 Persons Confined, passim. 
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or f'or a very long course of' years," f'or debts of' less 
than £20.44 Certainly Howard and Neild never isolated 
f'or comment any imprisonment of' less than six years, so 
any confinement n'or less than this cannot have been rare. 
The average duration of a debtor's stay in prison 
is a f'igure of little value, given the wide deviations 
f'rom this average. A prisoner relieved by the Lords' 
Act had to serve eighteen months in gaol before he could 
apply for his discharge. The number of committals 
every year was always far above the prison population 
at any particular time. It can be estimated that 
about 5454 prisoners were committed in the year 1800, 
whereas Neild estimated that there were 2003 prisoners 
that could be counted when he visited the gaols in the 
same year. Thus the average period of imprisonment 
must have been something below six months. 45 
Imprisonment for debt seems likely to provide an 
indicator of the economic climate of England. This is 
borne out in statistics which can be collated for the 
committals to prison in England and Wales in the period 
1798 to 1818. Such figures are listed below: 
44 ~, 1792, Report no. 97, pp. 24-25. 
45 The figure for committals was estimated from 
the figure calculated for ninety-nine gaols, 
in Table Three, proportionately increased on 
the basis discussed in Appendix One. 
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TABLE THREE 
COMMITTALS TO NINETY NINE PRISONS 1798-181846 
1798 3,900 1809 5,719 
1799 4,029 181 O 5,943 
1800 4,363 1811 6,274 
1801 4,587 1812 6,198 
1802 4,536 1813 6,905 
1803 4,212 1814 6,459 
1804 4,498 1815 7,279 
1805 4,868 1816 8,625 
1806 5,263 1817 9,204 
1807 5,368 181 8 8,369 
1808 5,030 
Altogether there were one hundred and forty~two 
prisons in England and Wales, and in 1818, the first 
year in which complete figures are available, there were 
10,372 persons committed to them for debt, so these 
figures do not show how many people in England were 
touched by arrest. However these figures do show a 
remarkable growth in the use of imprisonment for debt 
over the period. It had grown out of all proportion 
to the growth in population, until by 1813 the only 
alternative to a permanent Relief Act could be more 
frequent temporary acts, or else the gaols would be 
intolerably crowded. This growth in the numbers of 
debtors suggests a greater recourse to the civil law 
in defence of property. It parallels another sharp 
rise in the increase in criminal prosecutions for larceny 
46 Calculated from the figures in individual gaols, 
in PP, 1819, (237), xvi. 145-183. 
and other offences against property. The morality of 
trade was becoming more pervasive. So it became 
necessary to provide more assistance to the victims of 
trade. 
The annual fluctuations in the committal rate, 
as revealed by this table are also significant. It 
seems logical that the numbers imprisoned would be 
affected by the financial climate. Yet what would the 
effect be? Did insolvencies increase proportionately 
with the worsening economic climate, as shopkeepers 
61 • 
with decreasing turnovers imprisoned those unable to pay 
their bills? Or was the use of legal processes to. 
recover debts always in a fixed ratio to the amount of 
credit available, and thus reduced in times of economic 
depression? It was commonly thought that the first 
kind of relationship existed.47 Debtors constantly 
reiterated that they were in difficulties because times 
were hard~ For example a 1753 pamphlet appealed for 
compassion for debtors, for their plight was caused by 
the consequences of unsettled trade during the .war, 
cattle diseases and natural calamities.48 Again in 
1816, a Parliamentary Committee heard evidence that the 
"general depression of trade" had caused a dramatic 
rise in the numbers of debtors. 49 It was thought that 
the financial crash of 1825-6 led to a huge increase in 
47 Cf. Fraser's Magazine, ix. (1834). 646. 
48 Reasons Humbly Offered for an Act for Relief of 
Insolvent Debtors and Fugitives, p. 1. 
49 ~, 1816, (472), iv. 46/390, 59/403. 
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the number of arrests for debt. 50 
Although there is no evidence for this, some of 
these economic crises may have coincided with increases 
in arrests for debt. The cause for the increases need 
not have been the crises themselves, but rather the 
panic which occurred during such infrequent events. 
With the advent of a national economy, such panic and 
its consequent effect upon the behaviour of creditors 
became more widespread. At all other times when there 
was no emotional reaction to the economic situation, 
the state of the economy was not a factor in the 
decision of the creditor to arrest his debtor. In, 
fact, far from arrests increasing as the economic 
climate worsened, the reverse was the case. 
Statistical analysis reveals that until 1813, 
according to the figures given in Table Three, there 
was a significant proportionate relationship between 
the number of debtors and the prosperity of the business 
world. This is expressed in the equation: 
y = 78.74x - 185.78 (S.D for y = 56.11) 
where y equals Rostow's well known index of the business 
cycles in England, 51 and x equals the extent to which 
the actual number of debtors diverged from the projected 
figure, in any given year. 52 In other words, as is 
~ 
illustrated in Figure Two, the number of debtors tends 
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It should be noted that these results are based 
not on the writs of capias, or even of the numbers arrest-
ed, but only on figures of those imprisoned when unable 
to arrange bail. James Neild's figures suggest that 
only half of those against whom procedure was commenced 
were arrested, and of those arrested nearly half managed 
to arrange bai1. 53 This does not decrease the signifi-
cance of the results obtained. Gayer, Rostow, and 
53 Account of the Society, pp. 40-!~1. 
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Schwartz regard the number of bankrupts as in an inverse 
relationship with the business cycle, but the reverse is. 
true for insolvent debtors. The number of committals 
for debt seems to have been greater when credit was more 
readily available, and when credit was scarce, the rate 
of arrests diminished proportionately. Thus it would 
appear that the smallest shopkeeper varied the credit 
he made available to his customers, according to business 
conditions in the wider world. It would also seem that 
the shopkeeper used arrests as a regular means of enforc-
ing the payment of a proportion of his debts. In 
economic depression, when trade was hard, and credit 
short, his use of arrests actually declined. 
This relationship holds good until 1813. In 
that year the law was changed, and at the same time the 
committal rate changed dramatically. The enormous 
increase in imprisonment for debt after the Napoleonic 
Wars was not caused by the depression~ but by the 
change in the law, for the rise in numbers began before 
1815. This increase only itrflated a sustained rise in 
the number of debtors, that can be traced back to 1798, 
and almost certainly accounts for the increased passage 
of temporary insolvent acts ~n this period. The rise 
was not the result of the growth in population, for when 
the increases recorded between the censuses of 1801, 
1811, and 1821 are absorbed, the debtor figures still 
·increase 59.6% more than them over the twenty one years. 
Even the industrial "take-off" of these years was not 
so dramatic as the "take-of'f" in the committals for 
debt, which is expressed by the formula: 
65 
Y = 4786.15 + 7.1x2 
where y is the number of debtors in any given year 
and x is the year, where 1798 = 1; 1799 = 2 ••• 
s.n of y = 1055.88 
Therefore the increase in commercial' litigation 
must be traced to a change in the behaviour of traders 
and debtors. 
THE SHELTER OF A PRISON 
English law laid down that any person could make 
an affidavit at the office of the county sheriff, in 
order to arrest his debtor. Such an affidavit cost 
between £4 and £6. 54 The sheriff then set bailiffs to 
find the debtor. Thus was begun a tedious legal process 
which would deprive the debtor of his liberty. It is 
necessary to understand what the debtor was thus to 
experience, if the growing opposition to the practice 
is to be appreciated. While it is impossible to 
document the regional variations in the practice here, 
the image which imprisonment had in the public eye is 
of prime importance. 
Nearly half of all debtors upon whom writs were 
issued were not found. Nevertheless bailiffs were 
not lacking in cunning and cruelty in their efforts 
to take debtors. 55 On arrest, the debtor could attempt 
54 
55 
E. Farley, Imprisonment for Debt Unconstitutional 
and Oppressive, pp. 127-131. 
Metropolitan Magazine, x. (1834). 40-43; PP, 
1 831 -2, ( 239) , XXV. 6l-1-. 
66. 
to arrange bail f'or double the sum specified in the writ. 
A statute of' 1803 waived the necessity of' bail if' the 
debtor deposited the sum specified in the writ, and £10 
to cover costs, in the hands of' the bailif'f'. 56 Twenty-
f'our hours at least were allowed to the debtor, to 
arrange bail, bef'ore he was sent to prison. During 
this period he was held in the bailif'f''s house. 
The bailif'f'' s "sponging house" had a notorious 
place in the rogue's gallery of' the English debtor. 
Of' such places, Francis Place wrote that the debtor 
was "seldom allowed to go to Gaol until he had parted 
with his last shilling. 1157 London bailif'f's main-
tained hostels .or hotels of' a kind, although their 
guests were required to pay cash f'or services rendered. 
Henry Fielding's description of' the extravagant f'ees 
levied in such establishments, and the immoral behaviour 
-which occurred there, was only too true. 58 A century 
later nothing seemed to have changed. Such houses 
still provided: "two or three private rooms f'or those 
insolvent gentlemen who chose to pay a guinea-a-day 
f'or the accommodation. 1159 The minimum f'ee was ten 
shillings a day, and debtors unable to pay this were 
sent direct to prison. The law did attempt to control 
the behaviour of' bailif'f's, but such laws were not enf'orced. 
56 43 Geo. III c.46. 
57 Autobiography of' Francis Place, p. 32. Cf'. State 
of' the Prisons, p. 7; Broadway, ii. (1869). 230. 
58 Amelia, pp. 304-5, 494f'f'. 
59 "Behind the Bars", Temple Bar, xii. (1864). 250. 
67. 
The bailiff was not allowed to carry a debtor to a tavern 
against his will, but Smollett's hero, Peregrine Pickle, 
was not alone in suffering such treatment. 60 
Every bailiff's house gained a certain local 
reputation. Readers of English literature will recall 
"Mr Simon's House", "Butler and Co., Stanhope St., Clare 
Market", and "Mr Moss's establishment 11 • 61 The last 
mentioned is famous as the place where Col. Rawdon spent 
an evening at the climax of Vanity Fair, while his wife 
amused herself with Lord Steyne, careless of her husband's 
whereabouts. Ra:wdon's sombre reflection that "she 
grudged me a hundred pounds to get me out of quod1162. 
suggests the kind of impact that arrest could have. 
The sponging house was only a temporary sanctuary, 
and poorer debtors often chose to go straight to prison. 
Mr Pickwick chose this course of action, as did the 
shabby-genteel heroes of Smollett's novels. 
Random: 
Roderick 
refused to go to a sponging house; 
where I heard there was nothing but 
the most flagrant imposition; and a 
coach being called, was carried to 
the Marshalsea, attended by a bailiff 
and his follower, who were very much 
disappointed and chagrined at my 
resolution.6~ 
Other debtors were imprisoned when they had run out of 
money, or when their writs had been returned to the 
sheriff's office. 64 The choice of prison seems to have 
60 2 Geo. II. c. 22; 32 Geo. II. c. 28 s.1. Smollett, 
Peregrine Pickle, p. 522. 
61 Temple Bar, xii. (1864). 249; Metropolitan Magazine, 
ix. (1834). 217; Thackeray, Vanity Fair, ii. 209. 
62 Op. cit,, ii. 226. 
63 Smollett, The Adventures of Roderick Random, p. 367. 
64 Cf. ER, ci. 21-23. Planck v. Anderson. (1792). 
been determined by the county in which the debtor had 
been taken, or the Court of Requests from which the 
writ had issued. Both King's Bench and the Fleet 
were national prisons for their respective courts, 
the entrance fees to which deterred poorer debtors. 
68. 
The debtor could change prisons by writ of habeas corpus. 
Wealthy debtors in London sometimes spent winter in 
the well-heated Fleet prison, and then transferred to 
King's Bench for the summer months. 65 
A prison was the private enterprise of its 
gaoler, and he naturally sought to make it run as a 
profitable business. 66 There were few statutes which 
regulated such prisons, and even those provisions were 
seldom enforced. Debtors were required to be kept 
separate from other prisoners, and female prisoners from 
males. The gaoler's fees were to be displayed in the 
gaol, as was the list of charitable bequests available. 
But there was no requirement until 1778 that medical 
aid be available to prisoners. 67 This was the extent 
of the statutes on prison conditions, and John Howard 
reported how ineffective even these laws were. 68 
Thus in prison the debtor was removed from 
further demands by his creditor, but he was faced 
with new problems. He was expected to provide food 
and bedding at his own expense. 
Scott, Justice Hyde declared that: 
In the case Manby v. 
65 Chambers' Journal, no. 25. (1864). 388. Journal 




s. and B. Webb, En~lish Prisons under Local 
Government, pp. 5-. 
2 Geo. II. c.22; 32 Geo. II. c.28; 14 Geo. III. 
c.59. Cf. Holdsworth, xi. 598-9. 
State of the Prisons, p. 8 and passim. 
If a man be taken in execution and 
lie in prison for debt, neither the 
plaintiff at whose suit he is arrest-
ed, nor the sheriff who took him, is 
bound to find him meat, drink or 
clothes; but he must live on his ovm, 
or on the charity of others: and if no 
man will relieve him, let him die in 
the name of God, says the Law; and so 
say I.69 
Only debtors detained in prison by their creditors 
under the Lords' Act were an exception to this. In 
this case the opposing creditor had to pay sixpence a 
day to his prisoner as "groats". 
Concern for the profitability of their prisons 
led gaolers to divide the debtor ward into two sections. 
On the "master's side", reasonable accommodation was 
provided at a weekly rental. Debtors whose total 
possessions were worth less than £5 were kept on the 
"common side", where the only fees charged were for 
entering and leaving the gaol. These committal and 
discharge fees were supposed to be approved by the 
sheriff', and in 1808 such fees varied from one shilJ.ing 
to £2-7s, and were mostly about ten shillings. 70 On 
the master's side prisoners were "chummed" together in 
cells of' three or f'our prisoners, with their f'amilies. 
Common side prisoners were kept in primitive wards, 
"much more unhealthy ••• than a pigstye 11 , 71 although 
they had the compensation of' right to the charitable 
gif'ts to the prison. 
desperate situation. 




ER, lxxxvi. 786. (1663). 
Account of the Society. pp. 148, 165 and passim. 
W. Smith, quoted by J.L. and B. Hammond, in 
Johnson's England, ed. A. Turberville, i. 324. 
70. 
The extent of his problems varied from county 
to.county. In some cases poor prisoners were so 
abandoned that their very survival was not assured. 
In other cases, county charities at least provided the 
debtor with Christmas dinner, or even a weekly allowance. 
Generalisations would be difficult. James Neild 
recorded details in 1800 of 113 prisons in England and 
Wales where debtors were held. He found that thirty-
nine of them provided no allowance for the debtor at 
all. 72 
The prisons of London usually held about one 
half of English debtors. The rate of imprisonment. 
seems to have been higher in London than elsewhere, due 
to the greater availability of judicial procedure to 
the London creditor, as well as the wealth of the 
metropolis. Also the national prisons of King's 
Bench and Fleet attracted debtors from the counties. 
Newgate was used for debtors as well as felons until 
1815. In the eighteenth century there were also a 
number of smaller debtor prisons in London, including 
the Marshalsea, Giltspur St. Compter, the Borough 
Compter (which was commonly known as "the Clink"), 
the Coldbath Fields prison, the Giltspur St. Ludgate, 
the Poultry Compter, the Tothill Fields gaol, and the 
Whitechapel gaol, each of which served specific parishes 
or liberties. Only the Marshalsea survived into the 
nineteenth century; the others were replaced by 
Whitecross st. prison and Horsemonger Lane prison. 
Because so many debtors were held in London gaols, a 
72 Persons Confined, p. viii. 
71. 
general account of them provides valuable illumination 
on.prison conditions, based on an extensive literature. 73 
Of the two great prisons, King's Bench was much 
larger than the Fleet. In 1800 it held 400 prisoners 
and their families. (The families of prisoners were 
only excluded from living in the gaol in 1816.) Later 
in the century its average number of prisoners was 
about six hundred, with a record number of 937 in 1820. 
A further one hundred prisoners were held in the "Rules" 
of the prison. Consequently King's Bench was a 
community of its own. 74 The same was true of the 
Fl:et prison, which held from 250 to 300 prisoners i_n 
the early nineteenth century, plus about seventy prisoners 
in the Rules. 75 This prison was very crowded, but after 
the change in the law, in 1842 it was closed down, and 
the King's Bench was renamed the 'Queen's Prison' and 
became the national debtor gaol. 
Both King's Bench and Fleet prisons had a 
certain legendary reputation surrounding them. They 
were both the object of attacks by the Gordon rioters 
in 1780. They bore the image of "bastilles"; cruel 




Besides the writings of Howard and Neild, cf. William 
Smith, State of the Gaols in London and Westminster, 
(1775) and the anonymous The Debtor and Creditor's 
Assistant, (1793). Nineteenth century writers 
wrote extensively on the subject, especially W. 
Dixon, The London Prisons, (1850J. A London 
doctoral thesis by I.P.H. Duffey, "Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency in London in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries", (in preparation 
1973) should further illuminate understanding of 
the topic. 
PP, 1826-7, (319), xix. 239ff; Persons Confined, 
pp. 21-3; Account of the Society. pp. 287-306. 
Ef, 1826-7, (424), xix. 251 ff. Account of the 
Society, pp. 204-213. 
insolvents. This must have been reinforced by the 
"begging grate", a kind of' cage projecting f'rom the 
f'ront of' the Fleet, and bearing the inscription: 
72. 
"Pray remember the poor debtors". Common side prisoners 
took turns at being displayed in the cage, and it became 
a symbol of' all the sufferings within. 76 
Yet each prison was fully equipped for social 
lif'e. Master's side prisoners had access to a coffee-
house, a bakehouse, a wine-room, and a public "tap", 
all of which increased the profits of the keeper. 77 
Until Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753, alehouses 
within the Rules of both prisons were the scene of 
"Fleet Marriages", which insolvent clergymen performed 
and recorded in temporary registers, thus destroying 
many young girls' fortunes and virginity. 78 The 
"Rules" was always a notorious region of London. 
In 1793, a guidebook to the two prisons was 
published. The Debtor and Creditor's Assistant was 
an accurate work, evidently written by an inmate, who, 
like some of the prisoners ne mentioned, thought of the 
Fleet as his home. Equipped with its own sports 
ground for its own unique sport, named "raquets 11 , 79 
the Fleet, like the King's Bench, was even the setting 
for dinner parties and hired service. The very wealthy 
usually lived outside the prison in the "Rules", and 
76 J. Ashton, The Fleet 1 Its River 1 Prison and 
Marriages, pp. 328-9. 
77 Debtor and Creditor's Assistant, p. 6. 
78 J. Ashton, :12assim. 
79 0]2. ci t., p. 46. 
other prisoners were entitled to three "day-rules" per 
term, at f'our or f'ive shillings each. 80 
73. 
Thus for some prisoners, the gaol was a sanctuary 
and a resort, rather than an imposition. By the early 
nineteenth century, public servants, hounded by their 
creditors, took leave and went on "the grand tour" 
which carried them no further than St. George's Fields! 81 
Such debtors naturally preferred to be held in the Fleet 
or King's Bench if they could afford the committal fees. 
Mr Pickwick, when he ,was arrested for refusing to pay 
the damages awarded to Mrs Bardell for her action of 
breach of promise, was almost imprisoned in Whitecross 
St., but he was persuaded to move by Habeas Corpus to 
the Fleet, for Whitecross St., with sixty beds to a 
ward, and no privacy at all, was no place for a gentle-
man. 82 
And that was true of most of the other London 
prisons also. The debtors' ward at Newgate was "dark 
and stinking11 , 83 and there were no _regrets when it was 
replaced in 1815. A Select Committee of the House of 
Commons described the prison as quite unsuitable for 
debtors, especially its Common Side. 84 The same 
report also condemned the Giltspur St. and Poultry 
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criticised the Borough Compter in Southwark, and the 
Ludgate, which held debtors who were Freemen of London. 
Whitecross St. prison was erected to relieve these prisons, 
and its inmates were provided with free food and a pint 
of wine a day. Only poor prisoners were allowed into 
the prison, and John Wade wryly commented that the 
"lower order of debtors" were thoughtfully parted from 
the corrupting influence of "those who are called 
gentlemen and swindlers and cheats 11 • 85 The Marshalsea 
prison survived beyond these other prisons, until 1842. 
It too held mainly short-term prisoners. "A Marshalsea 
generation might be calculated as about three months", 86 
wrote Dickens, although he also described the "father of 
the Marshalsea", a grand old man who had been detained 
most of his life there, on legal technicalities. 
The county gaols were far worse than those of 
London. Dr Primrose, Goldsmith's sentimental clergy-
man, found only "execrations, lewdness, and brutality1187 
in the prison where he was held. These conditions were 
often due to the smallness of the gaol. In 1801, sixty-
four prisons out of ninety-nine had fewer than twenty 
committals of debtors, and consequently, like Dr 
88 Primrose, they were rarely separated from felons. 
Scattered among such prisons were poor debtors, like 
Simon Southwood, "a very inoffensive man, but evidently 
85 Wade, Treatise on the Police and Crimes of the 
Metropolis, pp. 254-5. 
86 Dickens, Little Dorrit, p. 73. 
87 Goldsmith, The Vicar of Wakefield, p. 169. 
88 ~' 1819. ( 237), xvii. 145-183, passim. 
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deranged", who had been confined forty years for a debt 
of.£15, when the House of Lords heard of his plight. 89 
County gaols held the majority of such prisoners. 
Some of these gaols were converted castles; for example 
in Oxford, Lancaster and Chester. 
debtors received rough treatment. 
In such gaols, 
As late as 1812, 
the Commons received a petition from Thomas Houlden in 
Lincoln Castle gaol, complaining that he had been 
deprived of the freedom he expected in an English gaol. 
He had been locked in a cell, and later thrust into 
the castle dungeon. Moreover, while the sixty-five 
debtors were confined to fourteen rooms, the gaoler 
kept thirteen rooms for his family's use. 
was upheld by a Select Committee. 90 
The complaint 
Thus the debtor in the counties suffered harsher 
treatment from his gaoler than his counterpart in the 
metropolis. He also received less charitable aid. 
Besides the many prisons that had no allowance for 
debtors, there were prisons which provided sixpence a 
week, or a small loaf of bread a day for poor prisoners. 
In the nineteenth century, these allowances were much 
extended. 
Conditions in prisons became a popular topic 
for discussion in the nineteenth century. The aims 
of criminal imprisonment, and the degree to which it 
should be retributive and remedial were bitterly debated, 
and a number of experimental prisons were built. This 
debate resulted in a number of distorted accounts of 
89 Journals of the House of Lords, 1809, p.191. 
90 CJ, lxvii. 406, 873. 
penal history. All the parties agreed on only one 
point. If the prison was to be more efficient, or 
if it was to be more retributive, and penal labour 
be exacted from felons, then debtors were a hindrance 
to reform. Debtors were not held under the criminal 
code, and could not therefore be treated more harshly. 
Yet debtors were about half of the existing prison 
population. Thus the reform of prisons involved the 
separation or the removal of debtors. 91 
In many ways, debtors came to be regarded not 
so much as part of the prison population, but as an 
append~ge of the poor. In both Poor-house and debtor 
prison were the failures and unfortunates of society, 
but ought they to be blamed for their failure? To 
this creditors retorted that the inmates of the gaols 
were not "poor debtors" but fraudulent cheats, just 
76. 
as the inmates of poorhouses were wantonly irresponsible. 
They proved this by describing gaol conditions. And 
thus the prison conditions became a central issue in 
the debate over debtors. 
THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE PRISON 
Arrest for debt is an occurrence familiar to 
readers of English Novels. Many heroes and heroines 
suffered such a fate, but very few villians. It is 
clear from Pickwick Papers, Vanity Fair and The Vicar 
of Wakefield, to cite a few examples, that imprison-
ment for debt had no moral stigma. Because in normal 
91 Cf. W. Clay, passim; Webb, p. 192. 
life it was impossible to avoid incurring debts, and 
because a variety of unfortunate circumstances might 
make it impossible to repay them, the insolvent man 
was exculpated. 
never criminal. 
He might be unwise or gullible, but 
Sympathy was accorded to the debtor, 
but none was spared for the creditor. At best 
77. 
vindictive or choleric, as portrayed in Roderick Random, 
he might at worst be a villain. In a novel, the 
villain could contrive to thrust heroes like Dr Primrose 
or Mr Pickwick into the debtor gaol on an unjust 
pretext, at the nadir of the plot. 
The device is frequent in novels, and indicates 
the widespread fear of arrest that existed. 92 It 
seems that many literary men, like Smollett and Dr 
Johnson, learnt about the debtor gaol from first-hand 
experience. Quite a part of the literature of the 
period was written in King's Bench prison, 93 and 
William Combe edited The Times while confined in the 
Rules of that same establishment. 94 Charles Dickens 
spent the twelfth year of his life on the debtor's 
side of Newgate, while his father was under arrest 
for debt, and the experience had a profound influence 
on his later concerns.95 In Dickens' novels, prisons 
often are described·, and they become a symbol of the 
restrictions of society in his later works. This 
92 Chandler, The Literature of Roguery, is a useful 
work for tracing such references. 
93 W. Dixon, The London Prisons, p. 120ff. 
94 H. Hamilton, p. 218. 
95 Cf. P. Collins, Dickens and Crime, p. 14; A. Trumble, 
In Jail with Charles Dickens. 
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image of imprisonment for debt coloured the attitudes of 
his readers. 
Writers often described the poverty and want 
associated with insolvency. This is particularly 
noticeable in eighteenth century works. One writer 
noted that although many debtors lived at ease in prison, 
subsidised by friends, it cost about twelve shillings 
a week to live in the Fleet. Consequently: "the 
great bulk [of prisoher..§.7' live extremely hard, and 
seldom know what it is to have a good dinner 11 • 96 
Roderick Random noticed "a number of naked wretches 
assembled together 1197 on the poor side of the Marshalsea, 
whose only entertainment came from sermons expounded by 
an insolvent preacher. Mr Pickwick did catch sight of 
"wretched dungeons" in the Fleet, 98 but nineteenth 
century humanitarians had done much to eliminate the 
worst of the sufferings. The death rate of prisoners 
dramatically declined after food and medical aid was 
provided. In 1813, the Evangelical, Henry Thornton, 
sponsored a bill to relieve the plight of poor prisoners 
in London, 99 and a series of Select Committees later 
scrutinised conditions. Indeed, a later writer felt 
that one of the ironies of the whole principle of 
imprisonment for debt was that: 
96 Debtor and Creditor's Assistant, p. 45. 
97 Smollett, Roderick Random, p. 369. 
98 Dickens, Pickwick Papers, p. 583. 
99 53 Geo. III c. 113. 
here L_board and lodgin.s,7 is forced 
down your throat because you do not 
pay for it. Unparalleled generosity! 
And all this for presuming to be so 
miserably poor! Just retribution!100 
Money was inevitably an important part of the 
life of the prison. 
discovery that: 
To Mr Pickwick it was an amazing 
money was, in the Fleet, just what money 
was out of it; that it would instantly 
procure him almost anything he desired; 
and that, supposing he had it, and had 
no objection to spend it, if he only 
signified his wish to have a room for 
himself, he might take possession of 
one, furnished and fitted to boot, in 
half an hour's time 101 
By law the creditor could not touch this money, and. 
often, threatened with arrest, the debtor preferred to 
save what he had to meet the expenses of prison, 
79. 
rather than attempt to appease his creditors. Naturally, 
the creditor disliked this, but most observers seem to 
have sympathised with the debtor. The insolvent man 
needed a refuge, and like Little Dorrit, often found 
that in the prison: 
We are quiet here; we don't get 
badgered here; there's no knocker 
here, sir, to be hammered at by 
creditors... Nobody writes 
threatening letters about money in 
this place, 102 
was her comment. The imprisoned debtor's only fear 
was that he would run out of money, and be moved to 
the Common Side. "To want /jnonei/ in a prison", one 
novelist wrote, "precludes every idea of comfort or 
100 "Imprisonment for Debt, A True Story", Metropolitan 
Magazine, x. (1834). 140. 
101 Dickens, Pickwick Papers, p. 603. 
102 Dickens, Little Dorri t, p. 71. 
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accommodation; f'or in such a place there is no credit. 11103 
Consequently prison society repnoduced the divi-
sions of' the outside world, except that wealth was more 
signif'icant in determining one's "place", than it was 
elsewhere. The rich, like Mr Pickwick, lived in the 
attics of' the prison, attended by their servants. The 
poor lived in the Common Side basement. Nevertheless 
there was a bonhomie which bound the prisoners into a 
f'ellowship. 104 The "garnish", which every new inmate 
paid to enable the other prisoners to celebrate his 
arrival, was a symbol of' this. A poem called "The 
Humours of' the Fleet" memorably described the new 
debtor's reception: 
Welcome, welcome, brother debtor 
To this poor but merry place, 
Where there's neither bum nor bailif'f' 
Danes to show his f'rightf'ul f'ace. 
Ne'er repine at your conf'inement 
From your children and your wif'e, 
Wisdom lies in true resignment 
Through the various scenes of' lif'e ••• 
But, kind sir, as you're a stranger, 
Down your garnish you must lay, 
Or your coat will be in danger, 
You must strip or pay. 105 
And even poor Dr Primrose f'inanced a drunken party f'or 
his f'ellow prisoners. 106 
Debtors spared no sympathy f'or their creditors. 
Rather, it was f'elt morally justif'iable to make trouble 
f'or the man responsible f'or one's imprisonment. 
Pamphlets were circulated in the prisons, suggesting 
103 Metropolitan Magazine, x. (1834). 36. 
104 Ibid, ix. (1834). 25. 
105 Quoted by J. Ashton, pp. 283-295. 
106 Goldsmith, p. 164. 
legal proceedings, which, ir commenced, would cost the 
creditor hundreds of pounds to derend, at a trirling 
expense to the debtor. Such a pamphlet rell into the 
hands or Sir Samuel Romilly in 1816, and he quoted it 
to the house, as epitomizing all the evil or the exist-
ing law. 107 In prison large debts became a kind or 
status symbol. No longer did the debtor try to pay 
them. Smollett noted that in the Fleet: 
No man scrupled to own the nature or 
the debt ror which he was conrined, 
unless it happened to be some piddling 
arrair; but on the contrary, boasted 
or the importance of the sum as a 
circumstance that implied his having 1 8 
been a person or consequence in lire. 0 . 
In the nineteenth century, debtors as a whole agitated 
for a change in the laws or debt. Mr Micawber was 
81. 
not the only one who drarted a petition to Parliament~ 
It seems that prisoners kept a close watch on parliamentary 
discussion or their plight, 110 and on at least one occa-
sion in the eighteenth century, they burnt an errigy or 
a prominent opponent or the passage of a temporary 
insolvent bill. 111 
If the public agreed about one feature of the 
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inf'luence. Of' those unf'ortunate persons who entered 
its precincts, some lef't with criminal intentions, and 
all lef't with snattered morale. The serialised novel, 
"Imprisonment f'or Debt, a True Story", told the harrow-
ing tale of faithful Edward, who in prison became 
incontinent and a swindler. The writer concluded that 
the prison was a seminary for wickedness. "No person 1; 
he declared, "is ever the better f'or having been in a 
prison, but too frequently the worse". 112 The Fleet 
prison was known as the largest brothel in Europe. 113 
It was little wonder that creditors assumed that most 
82. 
of their debtors were f'raudulent, when they were confined 
in such comp any. 
Life in a debtor prison was of'ten an unsavoury 
experience, yet it was scarcely the punishment that 
creditors wanted it to be. For most prisoners, it was 
unpleasant and uncomfortable, but those very debtors 
arrested by their creditors because they did not have the 
where-withal to pay, were the ones who could af'f'ord 
to live in luxury in prison. If' loss of' liberty was 
not f'eared, ( and the very weal thy prisoners had no need 
to fear this, for they could live in the Rules), then 
only the threat of imprisonment, and not its occurrence, 
aided the creditor. Publicity about prison conditions 
therefore nourished demands to change the law. 
112 Metropolitan Magazine, ix. (1834). 214. 
113 Westminster Review, ix. (1828). 67. 
The period saw a dramatic increase in committals 
for debt. Traders were becoming more litigious, and 
the prisons more crowded, and thus prison conditions 
worse. The static picture of the debtor's lot, which 
has been described here, minimises changes that were 
certainly occurring. Reform, however, came not as a 
result of a change in the conditions, but as a result 





THE LAW ON TRIAL 
On 19 November 1770, James Stephens, a debtor 
in the King's Bench prison, was called before the 
Judges of the King's Bench, including the distinguished 
Lord Mansfield. He had written a pamphlet entitled 
Considerations on Imprisonment for Debt; fully proving 
that the confining of the bodies of debtors is contrary 
to Common Law, Magna Charta, Statute Law, Justice, 
1 Humanity and Policy etc., and the Bench wanted to. 
hear his arguments. They were very radical. Stephens 
had written that the law was a "confused unintelligible 
jumble of words. 112 In court he expounded his views 
for half' an hour, and "insisted on his releasement, 
which he urged was no more than his right. 113 The 
court was disinclined to agree, and Mansfield remanded 
him back to the gaol, stating that there was no other 
legal alternative. Stephens left with a threat on his 
lips, that the prisoners would "do themselves justice. 114 
And this message he carried back to prison. 
There he opened the prison gates, and invited any who 
were willing to claim their rights, to leave the prison 
and to accompany him to higher courts in search of 
1 B.M. 518. h. (4). 
pamphlet. 
I have not had access to this 
2 Quoted by Barrister-at-law, The Rise and Practice 
of Imprisonment, p. 34. 
3 ag, xiii. (1770). 164. 
4 LM, xxxix. (1770). 593. 
• • • 
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justice. Six prisoners were persuaded to leave, but 
they were not so interested in the verdict of the courts. 
When Stephens voluntarily surrendered himself to the 
Marshal later that evening, he had learnt that not all 
debtors had the same faith in the principles of English 
Law that he. had. 5 
In their trial for escaping from lawful custody, 
which took place on 31 January 1771, Stephens, along 
with Robert Leslie, William Thompson, J. Biggs and John 
Mein, - (perhaps the other two had not been recaptured), -
heard a much clearer defence of imprisonment for debt 
by the Court. The judge declared that: 
To doubt the equity of such a thing 
now ••• after a practice of four 
hundred years, would be preposterous, 
and what none but madmen could think 
of; however men ought to be tender 
of the natural and personal liberty 
of their fellow creatures.6 
And there the matter rested. It was not thought worthy 
of record by any of the Law Reporters, and Parliament 
seems to have taken cognizance of the incident only in 
the addition of a clause to the next insolvent act, 
which indemnified the Marshal of the prison from 
liability for the debts of those who had escaped. 7 
Yet it was a symbolic incident, marking the beginning 
of a radical movement which attacked the whole practice 
of imprisonment for debt. Widely reported as the 
incident was, it also inspired others to adopt and 
5 Barrister-at-law, p. 101. 
6 Q.M., xli. (1771). 90. 
7 12 Geo. III. c. 23, s. lviii. 
extend Stephens' arguments. The first such pamphlet 
appeared in 1772, and others swiftly followed. 
for reform would shortly be familiar. 
The timing and themes of this demand were 
significant. As revolutionary ideas began to be 
Demand 
propagated in Europe and America, in England the debtor 
laws were attacked as a threat to civil liberty and 
86. 
the constitution. Did this part of the English campaign 
for reform of the law draw its inspiration f.rom the 
intellectual forces that advocated revolution elsewhere 
in Europe, or was the campaign based on more traditional 
grounds? It is significant that in the year 1772 ~ 
philanthropic Society was set up to aid the debtors, 
and this must have been linked with dissatisfaction 
with the practice. This chapter plots the relationship 
of philanthropy and reform. 
THE THATCHED HOUSE SOCIETY 
By the second half of the eighteenth century, 
many legacies existed for the relief of debtors. 
of these were for the benefit of specific gaols or 
counties. For example, James Neild recorded the 
existence of Pemberton's Charity, for the relief of 
Most 
the poor in Suffolk gaols, and the gift of Dr Hartwell's 
estate to relieve the deb tor s of Durham 18 Frequently 
such legacies were badly administered, or had even been 
mislaid in the passage of time. It was typical of 
8 Account of the Society, pp. 117, 176-7. 
philanthropists in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, that they should seek better organisation and 
definition to this charity. Moreover religious 
compassion which was the primary motive for this 
philanthropy was reawakened in the period. 
A proposal made in 1764 illustrates both the 
religious motivation and organisational aspects of this 
philanthropy. In the pages of the London Magazine, a 
scheme was outlined that year for the formation of 
societies to relieve debtors. They should raise a 
large capital by subscription, and invest it, so that 
the interest could be used to release debtors by paying 
their debts. Blind and deformed debtors, and those 
with large families were to be especially eligible for 
relief. Each such society should employ a Secretary, 
a Treasurer and a Broker. The scheme was recommended 
87. 
by the common late-eighteenth century themes of "improve-
ment" and "social duty". The right to imprison for 
debts was not questioned, but the rich were declared to 
have a responsibility to help the poor, including those 
of the poor who: 
suffer as much cold, hunger and 
thirst /js othery, and who yet 
are detained by locks and bolts 
from asking casual relief from 
instant want.9 
Humanity, Christian compassion and social responsibility 
endorsed the proposal; so also did Mercantilist concern 
at the loss of the earnings of idle debtors. The 
9 "A Humane and Public-spirited Proposal", LM, xxxiii. 
(1764). 14. 
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proposal nicely combined Christian and social duty with 
Protestant fervour. In Papist countries, even "delicate 
ladies" visited prisons, and so, "let us shun their 
superstitions but let us imitate their christianity. 11 
In particular their Religious Orders and Brotherhoods 
should be imitated by English Societies relieving deb tars. 
Each local Society should be called a "Brotherhood of 
Redemption", which neatly suggested imitation of the 
organisation of such Papist bodies, while it cast 
Protestant scorn on Papist theology. Such Brotherhoods 
and Sisterhoods too could be formed in many places 
throughout England. 10 
The scheme did not eventuate. Two correspondents 
to the magazine pointed out that legacies to help 
debtors already existed, but that if they were very 
common, every creditor would send his debtors to gao1. 11 
The proposal was typical of "an age when humanity is in 
fashion"; 12 an age which did see the formation of a 
wide variety of philanthropic organisations. It is 
also noteworthy that when a Society to relieve debtors 
was founded, it was almost identical in structure and 
conception to the Brotherhoods. 
There was no feeling that such a body was urgently 
needed. The next occasion when a relief fund for 
small debtors was suggested was in 1772, in the trans-
lator's preface to an Italian work condemning cruelty 
10 Ibid, p. 15. 
11 Ibid, p. 188. 
12 Sir John Hawkins, quoted by A. Briggs, The Age 
of Improvement, p. 13. 
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to debtors. 13 And perhaps that translator already knew 
of proposals that were voiced that year to set up such a 
fund. For on 23 February 1772, Rev. Dr. William Dodd 
had preached a sermon on the sufferings of debtors in 
the fashionable Charlotte Street Chapel, Pimlico, and 
also in the Bedford Chapel, Bloomsbury. Dodd was a 
celebrated preacher of his day who achieved notoriety 
in 1777 when he was hung for forging bills of exchange 
in the name of the Earl of Chesterfield. In the trial, 
the Treasurer of the Society was called to give evidence 
and identify Dodd's writing, 14 but the Society later 
tried to hide Dodd's association with it. 15 However 
it was his eloquent description of the misery of debtors 
that was the catalyst to the formation of the Society, 
for it inspired a collection of £81~1.0 for their relief. 16 
The sermon aroused public comment, and a number 
of gentlemen formed themselves into a Committee, to 
distribute the money that had been collected. .Among 
these gentlemen were Rev. Weeden Butler, Dodd's 
assistant, and later his successor at Charlotte Street, 17 
and James Neild, a prospering jeweller in St. James St. 
The members of the Committee visited several London 
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and of the immense task facing any who wanted to improve 
conditions. They applied their first £80 to releasing 
thirty-four prisoners who had large families. 18 
Further money was sought by advertisement, and by the 
end of the year, £939.17.9 had been received, including 
a donation of £100 from the Earl of Godolphin. 19 
The committee was encouraged by this benevolence, 
and they set themselves the goal, "under the blessing of 
providence, of making it prosperous, and adding to it 
dignity, stability and success 11 • 20 On 5 May 1773, "a 
numerous and respectable meeting of the subscribers, 
benefactors and friends" gathered in the Thatched 
House Tavern, St. James St, a popular meeting place, 
and adopted a Constitution for the Society, electing 
Lord Romney as its President. The support of the 
"noblemen and gentlemen present" was very important to 
the prosperity of tl~e Society. 21 One week later the 
general account of the Society totalled: 
Benefactions to this day 
Disbursement to discharge 
986 prisoners 
£2922 .11 .1 0 
2892.19. 4 
£29 .12. 6 
These 986 prisoners had between them 566 wives and 
2389 children. Manufacturers, seamen, and labourers 
18 Account of the Society, pp. 14-15; "Memoir of J. 
Neild, Esq., written by himself", in T. Pettigrew, 
Memoirs of J.C. Lettsom, ii. 191ff, reprinted in 
GM, lxxxvii. (1817). 1. 307. 
19 Francklin, p. 13; Account of the Societx, p. 15. 
20 1.£1..!!, p. 17. 
21 AR, xvi. (1773). 99. Cf. Wheatley, London Past 
and Present, iii. 370. 
were among those released. 22 
The tone of the Society for the Relief and 
Discharge of Persons Imprisoned for Small Debts was 
thus clearly delineated, as was the thoroughness of 
its accounting. Statistics were thereafter a regular 
91. 
feature of the quarterly meetings of the Society, and 
these statistics were also widely publicised. 23 The 
Society was soon one of the approved London charities. 
It also gradually extended its work into county prisons, 
though it was never so effective there. It encouraged 
the formation of similar societies in other towns, and 
John Howard recorded the existence of such in Bristol 
and Dublin. 24 
The Rules of the Thatched House Society, as it 
was commonly called, permitted the committee of the 
Society to spend up to £10 to release any debtor by 
paying part or all of his debts and gaol fees. Prefer-
ence was given to the aged and infirm and those with 
large families. Debtors had to complete an applica-
tion form which was available from gaolers, and send 
it post paid to the Society's offices, which for most 
of its life were at No. 7 Craven Street. The applica-
tion had to name two housekeepers as referees, for the 
Society was assiduous in ensuring that only debtors of 
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This note of moral propriety was pursued with 
the caution of good businessmen. The Society also 
preserved its image by carefully chosen officers. The 
first President, Baron, and later First Earl Romney of 
Kent, was a devout man, zealous in metropolitan 
philanthropy. He was a notable colonel in the West 
Kent Militia from 1759, and was the first President of 
the Marine Society. (This Society aimed to apprentice 
all boys discharged from the Royal Navy into the 
Mercantile Marine, or some trade.) Until his death 
92. 
he served as President of the Thatched House Society, 
and after his death in 1793, his son and heir succeeded 
to the position. This second Earl was a more prominent 
politician; he had been a Whig in the Commons, where he 
held a seat for Kent, but in the Lords he was a Tory. 
Lord Lieutenant of Kent for eleven years, he was in 
1801 created Viscount Marsham. 26 
The original Vice Presidents of the Society were 
more prominent men than the President, but none of them 
sat with the Peers. One was Sir Sidney Smythe, a 
Puisne Baron in the Court of Exchequer, and a very 
noted Evangelica1. 27 Indeed evangelical blood ran 
thick in the Society, for another Vice President was 
the wealthy banker and philanthropist, John Thornton, 
the father of Henry Thornton. 28 The other two Vice-
Presidents were responsible for some insolvency legisla-
26 GEC, xi. 85. 
27 Francklin, p. 1. DNB, xviii. 606-7. 
28 E.M. Howse, Saints in Politics, p. 125. 
tion in the House in the seventeen seventies. Lord 
Beauchamp attempted to fundamentally reform the debtor 
laws in ·1780. Nares was also a distinguished Judge of 
Common Pleas. 29 
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In 1808, Beauchamp, now the Marquess of Hertford, 
was still among the Vice Presidents. His colleagues 
were now the Earl of Radnor, a Tory; Philip Pusey, 
Radnor's son; and Charles Middleton, (Baron Barham), a 
very distinguished naval administrator, who served as 
First Lord of the Admiralty in 1805-6, and was a notable 
Evangelical. 30 
The Society therefore had the "dignity" it sought, 
and it also received support from a wide spectrum of the 
community. Released debtors were encouraged to give to 
it, 31 and so also were Members of Parliament. In the 
published lists of benefactors, the names of contributing 
Peers were placed at the head of the appropriate alphabeti-
cal sections, but all other names were mingled without 
regard to persons. The Society listed the names of 
the smallest contribution, and meanest contributor. 
Thus although the bulk of named contributions were from 
gentry, (and a high proportion of donations were anonymous), 
many others contributed, as is revealed by the following 
analysis: 
29 I2!:m., xiv. 91-2; GEC, vi. 511. 
30 GEC, x. 718-9; 112.!.!!, i. 423-4; DNB, xvi. 504. 
31 Exhortation to the Debtor Released, (1780), pp. 
11-12. 
TABLE FOUR 
THATCHED HOUSE SOCIETY SUPPORTERS 32 
Lords and Baronets 29 9.8% 
M.Ps. (identif'ied) 7 2.4 
Clergy 16 5.4 
Doc tor s, Army, Navy 10 3.4 
Gentry (Esg_.) 138 46.7 
'Mr' 40 13.6 
Pseudonymous ~ 18. 7 
295 100.0 
In all the Society was supported by thirty-two 
Peers, including the Duke of' Gloucester, ref'ormers like 
Stanhope and Howard, but none of' the leading Tories. 
Reformers and radicals supported it, including Patrick 
Colog_uhoun the statistician, Dr J.C. Lettsom the Quaker 
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guardian of' the poor, and Horne Tooke. Also very notice-
able were the Evangelicals, including Thomas Raikes, 
George Vansittart, Henry Thornton, Hannah More (who 
also left a legacy of' £100 to the Bristol Debtor Society), 
and William Wilberforce. Lesser men like Mr Trueman, 
the godly shopkeeper in Hannah More's story, were no 
less interested. 33 The Society stood for the traditional 
values of' benevolent charity, but it also had the 
support of' those who desired ref'orrn, and especially of' 
those who preached evangelical religion. 
The f'irst Secretary of' the Society was L.D. Nelme, 
and in 1786 he was succeeded in this menial position by 




Account of' the Society. pp. 582-594. Sample: A-G. 
(Approx. 50%.) The list omitted donations under 
£10 f'rom deceased persons. 
H. More, Works, i. pt. ii. 9. E.M. Howse, p. 125. 
Francklin, (p.1.); PP, 1792, Report no. 97, p. 26. 
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period of confusion, was James Neild who also served as 
auditor, historian, visitor, publicist and stalwart of' 
the Society, until his death in 1814. 35 Indeed, he 
dominated it. 
Neild was born on 24 May 1744, at Knutsford in 
Cheshire. His mother was a linen draper, but he was 
apprenticed to a London jeweller, at the instigation 
of his wealthy farmer uncle. He was also trained by 
the King's goldsmith for a time, but earned renown as 
a jeweller. A jeweller's shop was a meeting place for 
the rich and the great, and Neild was so skilled that 
when he inherited his uncle's wealth, he was able t.o 
open his own shop in St. James Street, and attract many 
clients of his old master to it. 36 
Neild made his fortune as a jeweller. He retired 
in 1792, and when he died in 1814, left an estate of 
£250,000 to his son John Camden Neild, famous to 
Victorians as an eccentric miser. Neild's other son 
was maltreated, and he fled from the family's Chesea 
home to the West Indies. 37 
Neild pursued his interest in debtors especially 
af'ter his retirement, and gained considerable f'ame thereby. 
35 GM, lxxxvii. (1817). pt i. 307. 
36 Ibid, pp. 305-7; DNB, xiv. 169-170. 
37 DNB, xiv. 170-1. The mill, writer, aware of Neild's 
imitation of John Howard, compares the two 
philanthropists in their treatment of their sons. 
But in fact Howard ignored, but did not maltreat 
his child. Cf. M. Southwood, John Howard Prison 
Reformer, passim. 
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A Justice of the Peace in Middlesex, Kent, and Westminster, 
he was also in 1804 High Sheriff of Buckinghamshire, at 
the instigation of the Marquis of Buckingham.38 But 
his visitation of prisoners had begun in more humble 
days, when he visited a fellow apprentice who was held 
in King's Bench prison in 1762. 
that·on this occasion: 
Neild later recalled 
There appeared nothing of what I 
conceived to be a prison except 
the door of admission and high 
walls ••• I had never before seen 
such a number of profligates and 
prostitutes unabashed, without 
fears, without blushes. I thought, 
to be sure, all the wicked people in 
London had got together there. With 
this impression I hastened to his 
mother's, ••• and told her to get 
him out directly, or he would be lost -
he would be ruined for ever.39 
Neild's fears proved justified, and this led him to 
examine other gaols. When he visited France in 1770, 
he sought to inspect the prison dungeons there. The 
formation of the Thatched House Society gave him a 
reason for his visits, which took him on several 
European tours, and. in 1781 caused him to contract 
the dreaded gaol fever.4° 
In later life, Neild much admired his fellow 
Dissenter41 John Howard, and his friends frequently 
38 Edinburgh Review, xxii. (1814). 390-1. 
39 QM, lxxxvii. (1817). pt. i. 306. 
40 Ibid, 307-8; Ibid, lxxv. pt. i. 99. Webb, 
pp. 66-7. 
41 £?' J. A. Babington, The English Bastille, p. 167, 
calls Neild a Quaker, but this is dubious. 
compared the two men. Yet his work and the f'oundation 
of the Society antedated the publication of' Howard's 
great study in 1777 by five years. James Neild was 
a member of' the commercial part of' society, and his 
sympathy f'or the debtor is surprising in some ways. 
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In part he saw the Society as a benef'it f'or the creditor 
also. In a note to the 1774 accounts, he commented: 
5814 Souls benefited; Besides the 
Advantage derived f'rom this charity 
by the several Creditors, many of' 
whom were in very necessitous 
Circumstances.42 
However in the literature of' the Society, the creditor 
was usually described in less sympathetic terms. 
Jewellers were an ~lite among traders, and they could 
af'f'ord sympathy f'or small debtors. 
The work of the Society was primarily the 
release of prisoners for small debts. Over the years 
1772-1808, 29,094 prisoners were released, at a cost 
43 of £66,015.7.7. Over this period, the Society 
never released less than three hundred debtors a year, 
even when a temporary Insolvent Act released most 
of the prisoners. 
42 Francklin, p. 15. 
43 Account of the Society, pp. 595-6. See Table 
Five. 
TABLE FIVE 
DEBTORS DISCHARGED BY THE THATCHED HOUSE 
SOCIETY, 1772-1808 44 
Year Number Discharged Cost 
(To 30 March) 1772 34 £81. 1. 0 
1773 854 2569.18. 7 
1774 838 1871 .17. 6 
1775 996 1724. 1 .11 
1776 673 1842 .13. 3 
1777 877 1729.19. 7 
1778 779 1764. 0.11 
1779 811 1611.15. 3 
1780 628 1288.17. 1 
1781 321 828.15. 9 
1782 389 935. 3. 9 
1783 547 11 21 .12. 0 
1784 535 996.12. 3 
1785 463 904. 9. 1 
1786 339 715. 8 •. 9 
1787 343 749. 0.10 
1788 710 1568. 4. 2 
1789 612 1926.3.4 
1790 798 2303.9.4 
1791 666 1777. o. 6 
1792 460 1297 .14. 7 
1793 568 1870. 1. 5 
1794 540 1844.14.10 
1795 434 1436. 6. 1 
1796 481 1756. o. 5 
1797 490 1606.15. O 
1798 645 2001 .13. 6 
1799 578 1553.14. 5 
1800 648 2106 .16 .1 O 
1801 885 2870.4.4 
1802 1125 2607.11. 1 
1803 927 2892.14. 0 
1804 916 2586. 2. 1 
1805 794 2707.8.3 
1806 657 2283.10. 6 
1807 839 2817. 9. 1 
1808 848 3395.17. 5 
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These ·debtors had between them, 55,241 wives and children, 
so in all 79,335 persons were helped, at a cost of 
£2 • 14. 11 per deb tor. Thus the Society made a substantial 
contribution to the reduction of the gaol population, 
freeing about ten per cent of the debtors committed every 
year. 
44 I21.fi, pp. 595-6; Francklin, pp. 13-14. 
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The function of the Thatched House Society was 
primarily remedial rather than political. It aimed 
to help the debtor to leave prison, rather than prevent 
his committal. Was this its only aim? Edward Farley, 
a bitter opponent of the debtor laws, commented that 
the Society had published dreadful accounts of the evils 
of imprisonment for debt, which were surely an argument 
for abolition, "instead of which they aim at qualifying 
it. 1145 Even this hard remark betrays the existence of 
some political aims. The Society regularly published 
alarming tales of unjust imprisonment. The Secretary 
was "prepared to have stated many instances1146 to the 
1792 Parliamentary Committee of cases where only 
inability to pay the gaol fees had kept the prisoner 
behind the bars. Creditors simply abandoned their 
debtors in gaol, and ceased trying to recover the debt. 
In few cases did the Society ever have to pay more 
than the creditors' legal costs. 47 
These distressing facts were regularly quoted 
by reformers, and there is no doubt that the Committee 
of the Society regarded the current practice as scandalous. 
Thomas Francklin, in a sermon preached in 1774 for the 
benefit of the Society, commented on the injustice of 
a law which threw innocent as well as guilty into "the 
cruel confinement of a loathsome dungeon". He blamed 
"the cruel and unfeeling disr:,osition of their merciless 
creditors," 48 for the debtors' dilemma, and desired 
45 Farley, p. 139. 
46 PP, 1792, Report no. 97., p. 27. 
47 Ibid, p. 27. 
48 Francklin, pp. 3, 8. 
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amendment of the law. Francklin admitted that some 
felt that the Society's benevolence had worsened commer-
cial morality, by encouraging men to be careless about 
repaying their debts, but he felt that the careful 
investigations made into applicants resulted in only 
honest debtors being helped.49 
The Society believed that the honest man had a 
right to civil liberty, even if he could not pay his 
debts. The debtor was informed that the Society: 
"have opened to you the prison gates and given you again 
• • • that most desirable • • • LIBERTY". 5o Neild in his 
Account of the ••• Society advocated certain specif:i-c 
reforms of the debtor laws. He proposed the total 
abolition of gaol fees and room rents. Instead, a 
weekly allowance should be paid to all paupers in prison, 
and medical treatment be provided. 51 These were urgent 
necessities while the law of arrest continued. But 
that law of arrest was the real basis of the problem. 
The existing law was unfair: "Does even the fraudulent 
debtor merit this perpetual, undefined punishment? 1152 
asked Neild. The law was also ineffective. As he 







I think £the effects of the lai7 are 
big with evil ••• the whole of the 
Money seems to be absorbed in Law 
Expenses; there is scarcely, I 
believe, One Creditor in Ten /yhgj 
receives One Shilling of Debt above 
Costs.53 
pp. 3, 7-8, 11 • 
An Exhortation ;;to the Debtor Released, p. 5. 
012. cit., pp. 571-3. 
Ibid, p. 24. 
Journals of the House of Lords, ( 1 809), p. 191 • 
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He did not seek the total abolition of imprisonment for 
the fraudulent, but felt that this should be for a 
limited period, proportionate to the debt. Arrest 
should be allowed for debts over £30, but the person 
.arrested should be summarily discharged unless the 
creditor could argue that the debtor had been fraudulent. 54 
The Society was not the kind of body to campaign 
for total abolition of arrest. But they seem to have 
sought for and supported modifications in the law. 
In 1785 it was a Report and plea by the Society that 
led to a restriction on the duration of impr±sonment 
imposed by the Courts of Requests. 55 The impetus for 
undertaking this task was never left open to uncertainty. 
The Society was inspired by "Christian Philanthropy. 1156 
When Thomas Francklin, the Queen's Chaplain, preached 
his sermon for the benefit of the Society in 1774, 
his aptly chosen text was from the Gospel of Matthew, 
chapter eighteen. It was the parable of the forgiven 
man who failed to forgive his debtor. 
appeal to religious duty. 57 
Such was the 
But what species of religious philanthropy was 
it? As has already been shown, the Society was 
strongly supported by Evangelicals. Ford K. Brown, 
in his curious study of the Evangelical Party, goes 
further than this, and describes the Society as founded 
54 Account of the Society, pp. 34-9, 575-80. 
55 ill.!!, pp. 550-560. 
56 Il21.!!, p • 45. 
57 Francklin, pp. 1-2. 
by the Party, and by 1808 deserted by it, because the 
Society had become too "genuinely philanthropic 11 • 58 
This is a perverse portrait of the Society, which 
ignores the fact that the dissolute Beauchamp, who 
was no Evangelical, was among the founders, and that 
in Neild's Account of the Society, written in 1808, he 
wrote that it· was based on "the benevolent principles 
of genuine Christianity. 1159 In actual fact the 
Society was an organisation of all those who were 
concerned at the effect of the debtor laws. Not 
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least among them were the Evangelicals, who were 
influenced by Wilberforce's conviction "that by regulat-
ing external conduct ••• the hearts of men••• are 
ultimately wrought upon. 1160 The evangelical note 
influenced the publications of the Society. In the 
tract given to the debtor when released by the Society, 
he was exhorted to give thanks to God, for which 
purpose a lengthy prayer was printed. He was exhorted 
to "Sin no more", should he realise that extravagance 
or dissipation led to his arrest. In the future he 
was urged to live carefully; to practise "INDUSTRY" 
and also "the strictest SOBRIETY". It is not only 
his·behaviour that should be reformed, however, for 
the Society is said to desire not only his redemption 
from prison, but also from hell, which is "an eternal 
prison11 • 61 The evangelical message of the tract is 
58 Brown, Fathers of the Victorians, pp. 349-50. 
59 Op. Cit., p. 599. 
60 Quoted by A. Briggs, p. 72. 
61 Exhortation to the Debtor Released, pp. 7, 9, 10. 
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explained by its author. If that was the Rev. John 
Fletcher of Madeley, as a pencil inscription in the 
copy held in the British Museum suggests, it was written 
by one of the most influential and saintly of the early 
Anglican admirers of Wesley. 62 
The Society was a prestigious body, highly 
regarded by reformers, aristocrats and evangelicals. 
But was it a cause or a result of discontent with the 
debtor laws, and was it important in the campaign? To 
this question we now turn. 
INFLUENTIAL VOICES 
It is necessary to trace the origin of the 
demand for a new law. One factor certainly must have 
been better knowledge of what the debtors endured. 
But was it also related to the Enlightenment, which 
critically examined social customs in the light of 
the laws of Reason? 
Montesquieu in his magnum opus written in 1748, 
De L'Esprit des Lois, described the Roman and Greek 
forms of government, and attempted to analyse the 
scientific basis of law. In Book Twelve he devoted 
a chapter to the cruelty of debtor laws in Rome and 
Greece. "Often did those cruel laws against debtors 
throw the Roman republic into danger", 63 he wrote. 
Consequently the later development of the Roman Empire 
saw a relaxation in the debtor laws. Montesquieu's 
discussion of civil liberty must have been noted, when 
62 B.M. 4403. c. 19, (p.1). Cf. DNB, vii. 312-4. 
63 Op.cit., i. 202. 
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his description of English political liberty was so well 
known. 
The first Phi1osophe to turn his attention to the 
theory of punishment was Beccaria, who published his 
Dei delitti e delle pene in 1763. By 1767 it had been 
published in English, and Beccaria was soon a celebrity 
throughout Europe. Chapter Thirty-two of Beccaria's 
work dealt with debtors. However, not until the third 
edition, which was translated into English in 1770, did 
Beccaria propose the abolition of imprisonment for 
honest insolvent debtors. He wrote: 
In earlier editions of this work ••• 
I said that the innocent bankrupt 
should be kept in prison in pledge 
of his debts or be made to work like 
a slave for his creditors. I am 
ashamed of having written in such a 
way ••• I offended against the rights 
of man, and nobody complained.64 
Now Beccaria castigated the rich and greedy for institut-
ing laws that were only for their private benefit, 
rather than for the public good. The fraudulent debtor 
should, he agreed, be charged with forgery; to punish 
other debtors was ''barbarous reason". 65 
Beccaria's opinion seems to have carried some 
weight, for in 1772 a small pamphlet was published in 
London, translated from Italian. The translator 
tentatively attributed the work to Beccaria, though 
this is unlikely to have been correct. 66 There was 
64 A. Manzoni, The Column of Punishment, prefaced by 
Cesare Beccaria 1 s Of Crimes and Punishments, p. 75. 
65 Cf. c. Phillipson, Three Criminal Law Reformers, 
p. 66. 
66 Im risonment for Debt considered••• Translated 
from the Italian, preface, pp. xi-xii. 
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certainly little besides their alleged author to commend 
the arguments of the pamphlet. It declared that the 
debtor was the very opposite of an offender, for he 
restored to society the money that the creditor had 
been hoarding! Thus Liberty, Reason, and the 
Prosperity of the State all supported reform. The 
pamphlet was at least accurate in placing Beccaria on 
the side of the reformers, a fact which John Howard 
mentioned also. 67 
The opinions of the philosophes were not unremark-
ed in England. However the opinions of Englishmen like 
Samuel Johnson and John Howard were far more influenthl. 
Johnson's condemnation of the law became legendary over 
the next fifty years. He had brought prison conditions 
into the open. This was one of the lesser achievements 
of Johnson, but it became the single task of that 
remarkable man, John Howard. Howard did not publish 
comments on the laws that put men in prison, but his 
exposure of the hidden world of English gaols was used 
by others to support their attempts at reform. Howard 
wrote about the conditions of both debtors and felons, 
but he stressed the sufferings of poor debtors, and 
also emphasised that the likelihood of disease -;i_n. gaols was 
greatly increased by the way they were crowded with 
the families of debtors. 68 In his descriptions of 
foreign prisons, their treatment of debtors was care-
fully noted. In France, Portugal, and Russia, he 
67 Ibid, pp. 18-19; State of the Prisons, p. 85. 
68 State of the Prisons, p. 17. 
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observed limitations on the right of civil arrest. The 
Paris Parlement often intervened to protect the debtor, 
and force the.creditor to accept a low composition. In 
Holland he found ~ew debtors in the prisons, and he 
commented that there: 
You do not hear in the streets as you 
pass by a prison, what I have been 
rallied for abroad, the cry of poor 
hungry starving debtors. 69 
Although Howard urged reform of the regulations 
governing debtors in prison, he did not publish any 
condemnation of civil arrest. 
pondence, however, he wrote: 
In his private corres-
I heartily wish that such an alteration 
were made in our laws with respect to 
confinement for debt, that none should 
undergo it, but dishonest and fraudulent 
debtors. Such are criminals and ought 
to be treated accordingly. 70 
This opinion was not public knowledge, but others read 
his volumes, and reached similar conclusions. Howard's 
work directly resulted in new laws on gaol supervision. 
More important, by creating for the first time public 
sympathy for debtors, he provided the necessary climate 
for reform. The Thatched House Society preceded him, 
but Howard attracted public attention to its work, and 
himself left money to it. 71 His contribution had more 
influence than that of Beccaria or Montesquieu ever 
had. And the theoretical basis for reform was largely 
the work of another Englishman, Jeremy Bentham. 
69 .!!2.ig, p. 45. Cf. J. Howard, Lazarettos, p. 72. 
70 J. Field, Life of John Howard, p. 162. · 
Cf. Southwood, p. 121. 
71 Account of the Society. p. 589. 
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THE RADICALISATION OF COMPASSION 
Howard turned the compassion of many people into 
new paths, but the wave of compassion itself was rooted 
in the greater movements of the age. A profound change 
of attitude was taking place. As Lord Mansfield said, 
"A mistaken compassion had of late years got such possession 
of the minds of men. 1172 He noticed it in attitudes 
to the debtor laws, although it was true in other areas 
of public social concern. By the year 1800 the debtor 
laws were almost universally regarded as bad. This 
was compassion of a kind that challenged the law. The 
development of this new type of compassion is worth 
tracing. It is reflected in a growing literature, 
which seems to have been widely read, for the pamphleteers 
were aware of each other's arguments. Increasingly 
authors tended to advance specific proposals for reform, 
and they appear to better understand the legal issue. 
Potentially much of the criticism of the debtor laws 
verged on a radical verdict upon the entire constitutional 
structure of Britain. 
James Stephens, the King's Bench prisoner, had 
reached such conclusions in his psaudo-legal arguments. 
He wanted to overturn the traditions of Common Law and 
revive Magna Carta. Thomas Haillie Delamayne revised 
these legal arguments in a pseudonymous work published 
in 1772. He feared lest Stephens' "rapidity of temper" 
prejudice the case for reform. After a long and 
technical study, he triumphantly concluded that 
72 PH, xxii. 628. 
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"statutes are the great victors f'or the debtor. 1173 He 
realised that the "barbarous" practice was f'irmly accept-
ed by the Courts, so his solution was less simplistic 
than that of' Stephens. Let the f'ieri f'acias be restored 
as the execution f'or non-payment of' debts, and imprison 
only the f'raudulent, he proposed. Parliament should 
pass a permanent Insolvent Act to accomplish this. 
To encourage Parliament, Delarnayne made his plea: 
We have drawn the drooping Debtor, 
the weeping Wif'e, distracted Family, 
Law-deluded Creditor Morality, Trade, 
Commerce, Policy, the insulted Legisla-
ture all in one group bending suitors 
to you, 74 
he wrote, and certainly in the next decade there was 
increasing pressure on Parliament. The Thatched 
House Society was one suitor. 
William Smith. 
Another was Doctor 
Smith was a medical doctor with a passion f'or 
helping the poor, who in 1778 published a book entitled 
Mild Punishments Sound Policy. He was already well 
known, f'or John Howard had mentioned his work among 
debtors in the Ludgate, which was supported by a 
Westminster Charity, 75 and in 1776 Smith had published 
a report on the conditions of' London prisons, entitled 
The State of' the Gaols in London, Westminster and the 
Borough of' Southwark. His philanthropic work continued 
into 1779, f'or in that year he petitioned the House of' 
Commons f'or compensation f'or the £566 he had expended 
73 Barrister-at-law, p. 27. 
74 I£1.£1, p. 103; Cf'. pp. 91-5. 
75 State of' the Prisons, p. 226. 
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in caring for more than a thousand prisoners who received 
no other medical attention. His petition was opposed 
by the Justices of Middlesex and Surrey, who were no 
doubt reacting to his published condemnation of their 
gaols. In response to this opposition, nearly every 
prison in London presented a petition in favour of Smith. 76 
In his book, .Smith considered both types of 
prisoners, and berated the severity of the Criminal Law. 
He felt that a police force was necessary to restore 
order in the metropolis. Sensitive awareness of the 
life of the lower orders in London distinguished the 
book, and this extended to their experience of the 
debtor laws. He graphically portrayed: 
the poor honest, though unfortunate 
debtor ••• torn from his homely 
habitation, and hurried, with unfeel-
ing insolence, to a loathsome prison, 
there to languish under oppression, 
extortion, hunger and disease.77 
Smith proposed that all such injustice be removed by 
enactment of a sixty-six clause bill which he had drafted. 
He proposed that in the first instance a debtor should 
be imprisoned for forty days. During this time, he 
was to advertise his confinement in the Gazette, and 
any creditor might then notify his intention to oppose 
the discharge on grounds of fraud. Such a charge was 
to be heard by a jury. The bill was heavily weighted 
against harsh creditors. 78 Smith also suggested the 
76 CJ, xxxvii. 493, 503, 513, 514, 809, 869. 
77 Smith, Mild Punishments Sound Policy~ p. 10. 
D.M. George used this work as the basis of 
her description of insolvency; George, pp. 297-302. 
78 Smith, pp. 65-93. 
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establishment of a charity to lend money to small traders 
who were, as he realised, badzy affected by the existing 
deb tor laws. 
William Smith's proposals did not include the 
abolition of imprisonment on mesne process. The author 
of Considerations on the Laws between Debtors and Creditors 
had read Smith's book, but he wanted a more radical 
reform. He wanted Parliament to pass an "Act to enable 
Creditors to recover Effects of Debtors and preserve 
the Liberty of the Debtor". Commissioners were to 
supervise these provisions, which sought execution against 
property rather than the person. 79 
This series of legislative suggestions fed a grow-
ing Parliamentary concern at the laws. The sessions 
of 1779 and 1780 saw a major attack on the law by 
Viscount Beauchamp, a Vice President of the Thatched 
House Society. In 1779 revelations on the condition 
of small debtors led to the passage of a bill banning 
all arrests for debts below £1 0. There was sharp 
opposition to this bill from corporations and parishes 
80 in the City of London. Even less popular were 
the reforms Beauchamp proposed in 1780. A great 
flood of petitions were received in opposition to 
Beauchamp's bill from merchants and traders all over 
England. They argued that the bill was "of a most 
dangerous and destructive Tendency", and that it would 
weaken public credit. Criticism of such peti ti.ons by 
79 Loe. cit., (1779), pp. 39, 45. 
80 CJ, xxxvii. 426-7, 434-5. 
the Fleet debtors is understandable. 
that the merchants were: 
They observed 
sheltered from the Horrors of a Prison 
by the Friendly Aid of the Bankrupt 
Laws, be their Debts ever so Large. 81 
Another defender of the bill was Edmund Burke, at this 
stage member for Bristol. His constituents were not 
1 1 1 • 
at all happy with his opinions upon the subject, and he 
had to justify his behaviour in a speech delivered at 
the Bristol Guildhall prior to the election later that 
year. The five thousand electors of Bristol included 
all freemen and freeholders, and consequently the small 
traders were a powerful political bloc. These men• 
thought that Burke had betrayed their interests, and 
he was defeated. 82 
Nevertheless Burke's statement of the case for 
reform was memorable. He declared that the existing 
law of debt was faulty, for it as~umed that any debtor 
should be able to pay his debts whenever the bailiff 
might demand them. This gave the individual creditor 
too much power. Burke described the operation of the 
· 83 old law as "so savage and so inconvenient to society", 
and he looked forward to more enlightened legislation. 
Burke's opinions were to be much quoted in later 
years. So also were the opinions of Sir James Bland 
Burges, a Bankruptcy Commissioner who was later a member 
81 CJ, xxxvii. 612, 630. 
82 Cf. L. Namier and J. Brooke, (eds), History of 
Parliament: The House of Commons 1754-1790, 
i. 283-290. 
83 Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, ii. 384-6. 
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of' the Commons. In an essay published in 1783, and 
entitled Considerations on the Law of' Insolvency with a 
Proposal f'or Ref'orm, Burges strongly criticised the manner 
in which creditors treated their debtors. "Is a man to 
be tried, to be condemned, to be punished without a 
knowledge of the accusation brought against him? 11 , 84 he 
asked. 
change. 
Here was a very well informed supporter of 
RESISTANCE TO REFORM 
Despite the excellent logic of' its advocates, 
Beauchamp's 1780 bill was lost. For the next ten years, 
the only statute passed was one limiting the period of 
committals by the Courts of Requests. 
temporary insolvent acts were passed. 
Not even any 
Why was there this unusual legislative inactivity? 
In part a result of the economic malaise of the times, 
it was also a tribute to the skill of the advocates of 
reform. The work of John Howard, and of the Thatched 
House Society had raised the treatment of debtors to a 
matter of some importance. That in itself did. not 
persuade creditors to support reform. By challenging 
the whole system of the law, including both its harsh 
provisions and its acts of clemency, the reformers only 
persuaded creditors that all temporary insolvent acts 
were bad, on the good grounds that they upset regular 
credit. Burke was very strongly opposed to temporary 
relief, which he described as neither humane nor politic, 
but only a matter of expediency, in order to clear the 
84 Quoted by C~ Fane, Bankruptcy Reform: In A Series 
of Letters addressed to Sir Robert Peel, p. 51. 
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gaols. 85 The Earl of Abingdon told the Lords that he 
would only support permanent and not temporary relief, 
and the preambles of bills presented to Parliament 
mirrored this sentiment. 86 Thus the persons who 
formerly would have guided temporary insolvent bills 
through the House now sought only more lasting reforms, 
and temporary bills lost supporters. But why were the 
permanent bills rejected? 
Given the widespread attitude of men of the 
eighteenth century towards the English Law and Constitu-
tion, that it was the best of all possible laws, perhaps 
this is not surprising. The opinions of lawyers w.ere 
commonly thought to dominate Parliament. Yet we need 
also to look beyond Parliament to the merchant and trad-
ing classes, who reacted so fiercely to Beauchamp's bill. 
The petitions that crowd the pages of the Journals of 
the House of Commons represent a substantial amount of 
opposition. In the Bristol electorate, a public meet-
ing was held and a former Sheriff was sent to London 
armed with a petition to present to Burke, who was 
regarded as defiant of his electorate's opinion. 87 
Merchants and employers feared that the mutual 
trust which had to undergird credit would be destroyed 
by a permanent relief act. It was widely commented by 
pamphleteers that creditors had become tougher than 
85 Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, ii. 386. 
86 EE,, n.s. xi. 253; PP, 1788, Bill 551. 
87 Correspondence of Edmund Burke, iv. (ed. Woods). 
231-2. P. Magnus, Edmund Burke: A Life, p. 94. 
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they had been in the past. "There is now in the nation", 
wrote Edlll'B.rd Farley, "a spirit of' qualif'ying 11 , 88 which 
made creditors resist any major concessions to debtors. 
Before this is too quickly identified as a nascent 
laissez-faire attitude, .it should be borne in mind that 
it was the reformers who claimed to detect greater 
resistance to statutory change. Adam Smith made no 
comments on the debtor law, and thus what the reformers 
called new was in part only the usual eighteenth century 
trader's attitude, expressed in new circumstances. Yet 
there is some evidence that the seventeen-eighties saw 
the expression of a new voice of trade. This can be 
given an economic justification. There was a growing 
sense of insecurity among the commercial classes in the 
less stable and more national economy of the late 
eighteenth century. There was great concern in the 
period at the increase in the number of bankrupts. 89 
The role of paternalism by the justices in determining 
food prices that would not harm the poor, was tending 
to decline. 90 There was a growing gulf between those 
who were traders and those who were not. A petition 
from Gloucester merchants in 1780 protested that 
Beauchamp' s bill would "open a Door for crafty and 
designing Men to draw in and defraud the Unwary and 
fair Trader". 91 On the contrary it was the duty of 
88 Farley, p. 141. 
89 GM, lii. (1782). 138. 
90 E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English 
Crowd in the Eighteenth Century", Past and Present, 
1. (1971). 89ff. Cf. B. Inglis, Poverty and 
the Industrial Revolution, pp. 32ff. 
91 CJ, xxxvii. 612. 
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law to protect commerce. 
The great defender of the existing law was William 
Paley, the Archdeacon of Carlisle. In his Moral and 
Political Philosophy. written in 1785, Paley defended 
imprisonment for debt against the charge that it was 
unjust. He described the capias procedure as a "public 
:punishment" which was eminently reasonable. Frauds 
ought to be punished, and the creditor was an appropriate 
person to apply the retributive treatment: "No 
discretion is likely to be so well informed, so vigilant 
or so active, as that of' the creditor, 1192 wrote Paley. 
In law, imprisonment for debt was not regard_ed as 
a punishment, but only as an inducement to pay. This 
trader's rnorali ty: expressed by Paley: relied upon the 
coercive f'actor in the law, although Paley also feared 
that the poor would suff'er from a change because less 
credit would be given. Moreover many traders also 
would suffer; f'or they had to buy on credit bef'ore they 
could sell. The suffering of' a few was necessary f'or 
the good of' all. It was: 
more eligible that one out of a 
thousand should be sent to jail by 
his creditors than that the nine 
hundred and ninety-nine should be 
straitened and embarassed, and 
many of' them lie idle by the want 
of credit.93 
Such an attitude was heartily endorsed by the commercial 
petitioners to Parliament. Debtors were not to be 
trusted, and who had ever met an honest one? On such 
92 Paley, Works, p. 34. 
93 Ibid, p. 34. 
themes the opposition to reform became increasingly 
vocal. 94 
ATTITUDES IN THE ERA OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WARS 
116. 
In a massive study, E.P. Thompson has traced the 
development of a working class consciousness in England, 
during the period of the French Revolutionary Wars.95 
His thesis that a single thread runs through working 
class and radical politics has not gone unchallenged, 
and it is therefore interesting to test attitudes to 
the debtor laws against his thesis. In broad terms 
they do seem to fit together. During the early part 
of the era, the supporters of insolvency reform seem 
to have been more radical in political stance than at 
any other time. Rather than assume that the British 
Constitution was the best in the world, they chose to 
see the debtor laws as a typical part of a statute book 
written and enforced by those who desired to repress 
the poor. The craftsmen and shopkeepers who were a 
large part of the debtor population were not truly a 
working class, however, and one cannot describe the 
debate over the debtor laws as part of' a class conf'lict, 
However Hardy and the men of the London Corresponding 
Society were also craf'tsmen and shopkeepers. 
94 CJ, xxxvii. 734; cf'. QM, lxxiv. (1804). 704. 
95 Thompson, The Making of' the English Working 
Class. 
Edward Farley's book, Imprisonment for Debt 
Unconstitutional and Oppressive, was an early example 
of such radical literature. Written in 1788, its 
117. 
radicalism looks back to Wilkes, rather than forward to 
-the French Revolution. 96 He defended the theory of 
the British Constitution, although his understanding of 
that theory was original, for he believed that unreason-
able or unnatural legislation was automatically void. 
Freedom was his great theme: "Liberty sweetens life 
and protects property; it is the birthright of all 
mankind. 1197 Farley examined the legal procedure for 
imprisonment of debtors, and he pronounced that th~y 
were evil. Not only had the courts failed, so too had 
Parliament. It should produce equity, it only served 
to· "work iniquity". 98 And who could wonder at the 
carelessness of Parliament, when its members were 
immune from the operation of the law. Members: "muEt 
be indulged in it because they know too much". 99 As for 
the bailiffs who grumbled that they could be accused of 
breach of Parliamentary privilege should they mistakenly 
arrest members, Farley harl. no more sympathy for them 






both houses of Parliament ••• walk 
in slow procession, once a year at 
least, from Westminster-hall to 
Whitechapel Church, that the gentle-
men of the bum might be able to 
identify their persons.100 
0]2. ci t., p.ii. 
Ibid, p. 19. 
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The basis for Farley's demands was both traditional 
and radical. 
on religion. 
Reform should be based on reason, but also 
He reprobated a nation where "Molock had 
more influence in Par'liament than the Bible". Yet he 
i:i.lso supported the prisoners who chose: "the wise 
method of blowing up the walls of the prison". He 
ended with a warning that a society where: "the nobility 
and gentry keep saucy footmen to drive away the distress-
ed", Was "knee-deep in the blood of innocence", and 
was on the point of collapse. So he appealed not to 
Parliament but to the people to return to God, and 
change the law. 101 
Farley' s book was widely read, and apparently 
influenced later attitudes. E.P. Thompson refers to 
radicalism in the debtor prisons during the nineties. 
In 1793 two hundred signatures were collected in King's 
Bench prison for a petition for Parliamentary reform. 
Government spies were recruited there also, but Thompson 
calls the prisons "finishing schools for radicals. 11102 
Such radicalism not unnaturally expressed itself 
in opposition to the debtor laws. On 17 December 1793, 
Patrick William Duffin and Thomas Lloyd were tried in 
court for a seditious libel, "that fthei} were wiclced, 
seditious, and ill-disposed persons, and greatly dis-
aff'ected to the King and the government and constitution. 11103 
They were debtors who had attached a notice to the door 
of the Chapel of the Fleet prison where they were held. 
It read: 
101 ~' pp. 144, 145, 157-8. 
102 Thompson, pp. 132, 692. 
103 Rowell's State Trials, xxii. 318. 
This house to let; peacable possession 
will be given by the present tenants, 
on or before the 1st day of January 
1793; being the commencement of the 
first year of liberty of Great Britain. 
The republic of France having rooted 
out despotism, their glorious example 
and success against tyrants, render 
infamous bastiles no longer necessary 
in Europe. 1 OL~ 
Duffin and Lloyd conducted their own defence, 
addressing the jury in fervent language. They made 
119. 
little attempt to persuade the Court of their innocence, 
but rather argued that the debtor laws were totally 
illegal. They seem to have been part of a radical 
"club" of prisoners. The jury showed no sympathy, and 
they were sentenced to the pillory, but the mob acclaim-
ed them as heroes. 105 
Thus there was a gap between the attitudes of 
freeholders and of the masses. The defence had asserted 
during the trial that the popular attitude was firmly 
against the law, for in a riot there were always attempts 
to release the debtors, ash ad been the case in 1780. 
Informed opinion was also turning against the law, and 
it was particularly influenced by the Report of the 
Parliamentary Select Committee of 1791-1792. This 
Report into the debtor laws clearly stated the bad 
consequences of the law in its comments and published 
evidence. The report stressed that the law was often 
disadvantageous to creditors, for debtors: 
104 ~' c. 320. 
105 AR, xxv. (1793). pt. ii. 7-8. 
conduct themselves as Men who think 
that they have no longer any interest 
in being honest, and know that the 
Law, by imprisoning their Persons has 
spent its Force against them.106 
120. 
Evidence had even been gathered from prisoners at King's 
Bench, so these comments had the support of observa-
tions, and the Report also acknowledged the suf'ferings 
of some debtors. 
Critics of the law used the Report to demonstrate 
that Parliament itself condemned the procedure. For 
example a handbook for debtors discussed this Report, 
and also mentioned the reports of the Society and 
Burges's comments. 107 The cautious author of this 
handbook looked to the Judges for reform. This and 
108 other works implied that others besides the Radicals 
were beginning to oppose the laws. Even some creditors 
began to distrust them. Radical opinion was fed by a 
rewriting of Farley's book by a certain Mr King in 
1804. If anything, King's opinions were more extreme 
than those of Farley, but they were presented with less 
rhetorical skill. 109 Another writer emphasised the 
baneful effects of the practice, especially on foreigners. 110 
The most impassioned cry for reform came from Walter J. 
106 PP, 1792, Report no. 97, p. 40. 
107 The Debtor and Creditor's Assistant, pp. 81-2. 
108 E.g. P. Coloquhoun, A Treatise on the Police of 
the Metropolis, (1795), p. 589. 
109 J. King, Remarks on Imprisonment for Debt. 
110 Remarks on the Operation ••• of the Laws for the 
Recover~ of Debts, reviewed in European Magazine, 
1. ( 180 ) • 4 7-9. 
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Baldwin, a prisoner in King's Bench. In 1813 he published 
a pamphlet entitled Imprisonment for Debt alike injurious 
to Creditor and Debtor, which was excerpted from his 
larger volume entitled Punishment without Crime. Baldwin, 
who also petitioned Parliament for release, felt that he 
had been unjustly imprisoned. In an incoherent and 
agitated argument, he endeavoured to persuade creditors 
that they were never aided by the existing law, which, 
he claimed, was: "the original and final cause of that 
which it is said to be intended to provide against, of 
the non-payment of debt". The only persons who profited 
from the law were: "a blood-sucking train of imposters, 
swindlers, lawyers, jailers [sii7 and their adherents. 11111 
Some of these pamphlets must only have had a very 
limited circulation, and added together, they all 
probably did less to influence public attitudes than 
did a series of articles written by James Neild of the 
Thatched House Society, and published fun the Gentlemen's 
Magazine from 1803, to 1813. Written in the form of open 
letters, introduced by the comments of John Coakley 
Lettsom, they aroused considerable public interest. 
In 1812 all the reports were brought together in the 
folio volume, The State of the Prisons in England, 
Scotland and Wales. 
Neild, on his retirement in 1792, had recommenced 
his visits to prisons, and he was especially disturbed 
by the debtor's lot during the agricultural depression 
of 1799-1800. He therefore visited all the gaols to 
111 Op. cit., pp. 3-4, 20. PD, xxvii. 419. 
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discover whether debtors were provided with food. His 
findings, which were published in 1801, revealed that 
thirty-nine prisons provided no allowances to their 
debtors, and in twenty-five there was no knowledge of 
the existence of the Thatched House Society. 112 Thus 
the seventy-seven letters he published in the magazine 
were part of a publicity campaign. They dealt not 
only with debtors, but with the general conditions of 
every prison in the Kingdom. In the first five years 
of their publication, when they were given pride of 
place in the magazine, they had a large audience. 
William Wilberforce spent time with Neild discussing 
the question in 1804. 113 A favourite theme of the 
letters, which no doubt Wilberforce approved of, was the 
need f'or "pious counsellors" and regular religious 
services in gaols. 114 There were also lists of' the 
numbers of debtors in every gaol, and Neild, like 
Howard, declared that the poor debtors were the most 
pitiable of all prisoners. In Letter LIV the 
practice of imprisonment for debt was condemned, 
with supporting quotations from Howard, Beccaria, 
Johnson, and Voltaire. 115 
The whole correspondence was very influential. 
In part this was no doubt due to Lettsom's prefaces, 
f'or he was a well-known Quaker doctor, a friend of John 
112 Persons Confined, p. viii; GM, lxxxvii. (1817), 
pt i. 308. 
113 Life of' William Wilberforce, iv. 82. 
114 GM, lxxiv. (1804), 99; ibid, lxxv. (1805), 299. 
115 Ibid, lxxvii. (1807), 25; ibid, lxxvii. (1808), 
777-780. 
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Howard, foundation President of the Philosophical Society, 
and a notable humanitarian. 116 Neild, within a short 
time of the first of the articles, detected that they: 
have produced and are producing 
incalculable advantages; more than 
I have in thirty years been able to 
ef'f'ect, has hence b·een brought about 
in twelve months. 117 
This change in attitude is noticeable in several contexts, 
not the least of which was the House of' Commons, which 
in 1811, at his bidding, amended the insolvency bill to 
include debtors on the Isle of Man. 118 
In his writings, Neild betrays a tendency to 
regard himself as Howard's successor, and his admirers 
often compared the two. In truth he was more meticulous, 
but far less perspicacious than the great prison visitor. 
Lettsom's remark that: 
Howard never imagined what the pervading 
eye of Neild detected, that the court of 
a prison should be moistened with the 
depth of twelve inches of f'oul water, 
whilst the prison was denied the possess-
ion of' this necessary fluid in its pure 
state,119 
whilst intended to be flattering, unwittingly establishes 
this point. Nevertheless, the public enjoyed reading 
the minute details about prisons. When in 1808 Neild 
published the seventh edition of the history of the 
Thatched House Society, it included nearly five hundred 
pages of detailed descriptions of gaols. His 1812 
116 GM, lxxxv. (1815). pt. ii. 469f; DNB, xi. 1013-5; 
Southwood, p. 46ff. 
117 GM, lxxv. (1805). 691. 
118 Ibid, lxxxi. (1811), pt. i. 387, pt. ii. 129, 424. 
119 Ibid, lxxiv. (1804). 4. 
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volume was an expansion of this work, and was hailed as 
an important social document. 120 
Such publicity had a profound effect upon legisla-
tion concerning debtors. It led also to exaggerated 
admiration for Neild, reflected in a poem inscribed in 
a copy of his 1808 work: 
Who in the steps which Howard trod, 
Still seeks the prisoner in his drear abode, 
Who whispers to the Debtor, Friend, Go forth, 
And be a glad inhabitor of earth. 
Who to the Wife and Children pleas'd restores 
The hope and comfort of their smiling hours 
Who must in labours but to Howard yield, 
Friend to the friendless - and his name is 
Neild. 121 
- which is not very good poetry, but it is excellent 
documentary evidence. 
THE THEMES OF REFORM LITERATURE 
Thus by the end of the eighteenth century there 
was widespread acceptance of the need to revise the 
deb tor laws. Unpopular with the lower orders, they 
were, as Patrick Coloquhoun pointed out, tacitly 
acknowledged by others to be erroneous and inhumane. 122 
Yet there was little agreement on the specific nature 
of the needed reform. Some, like William Smith, had 
drafted suggested legislation, but the content of these 
drafts varied from the abolition of the capias process 
against the person, to a permanent system of relief for 
120 Edinburgh Review, xxii. (1814). 385-400. 
121 Account of the Society, inscription in the title 
page of the Kashner (A.N.U.) copy, signed Rev. 
James Plumpton. 
122 Coloquhoun, p. 589. 
prisoners. Consequently, Parliament only tinkered 
with the law. Members of' Parliament f'elt the obliga-
tion to make some changes, f'or they too had been 
influenced by the literature of' ref'orm. The themes 
qf' that literature had become unanswerable in the 
intellectual climate of' the period. 
Pity f'or the .debtor was f'oremost among these 
125. 
themes. Even Archdeacon Paley conceded that to pursue 
"a suf'f'erer" f'rom insolvency was "repugnant not only to 
humanity but to justice", 123 if' mi sf'ortune had brought 
him to this state. Compassion was not a new social 
doctrine, but the extension of' it to the gaol was. One 
of' Howard's biographers claims that his great achieve-
ment was to show that society had a duty to the inmate 
of' the debtor's or f'elon' s cell. 124 Others shared 
in that achievement. 
If' the suf'f'erings of' the prisoners were exposed -
and most of' the literature recounted various sad tales, -
so also was the waste of' the creditors' money behind the 
prison walls. Burke and Burges stressed that the laws 
needed to be revised, if' only to protect the creditor's 
interests. Such an argument was important, f'or those 
who accepted Adam Smith's stress on the rights of' 
commerce were inclined to be unhappy at ref'orm. If' 
laissez-f'aire is in any sense a theme of' the age, then 
the reformers themselves were good laissez-f'aire men, 
in wanting to see the end to the temporary Insolvent 
123 Paley, p. 34. 
124 W. Dixon, John Howard and the Prison World of' 
Europe, p. 2 O. 
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Acts which so disrupted credit arrangements. Yet they 
were more than this. They turned their moral scrutiny 
to the creditor's treatment of his debtor. A creditors' 
handbook published in 1789 stressed that the creditor 
was answerable for the debtor's well-being. 125 Creditors 
ought not to lend if they doubted whether they would be 
.d 126 repa1 • And those who failed to pay should be 
treated compassionately. 
Paul in 1784: 
In the words of Sir George 
As Debtors, they have broken no moral 
law, offended no positive institution. 
Doomed, by folly or misfortune to be 
the necessary sacrifices to commercial 
faith, they claim an abundant share of 
our pity and attention.127 
In part these changed attitudes reflected the 
much larger debate on the poor laws. Those who wanted 
a more "scientific" poor, and those who opposed it, 
had their rough parallel in the supporters and 
opponents of the proposal to stop the waste and loss 
occasioned by imprisonment for debt. 128 
The issue may seem one of economics. This was 
not how eighteenth century men viewed it. To them it 
was primarily a constitutional and legal question. In 
an age which venerated English Law as the basis of 
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like Edward Farley, delve back into Saxon Law, and find 
that the "Constitution" declared that "the body of' the 
debtor shall always be free, that he may serve the King 
in his wars, cultivate the ground, and maintain his 
family. 11129 But it was a supreme insult to find, as 
Johnson did, "a superiority for Scotland over England 
in one respect, that no man can be arrested there for a 
debt merely because another swears it against him. 11130 
And others made favourable comments on the law in 
Portugal, Holland, and France compared to that of 
England. Thus campaigners for reform ceased to argue 
from the ancient constitution. Veneration of the law 
was replaced by bitter rejection of it. Instead of 
arguing that imprisonment for debt was illegal, 
Bentham, among others, complained: "No, the great 
grievance is - not that it is illegal but that it is 
legal. 11131 
Consequently the reformers, of both "traditional" 
and less romantic viewpoints, condemned "Judge and Co. 11 
.as "leeches11132 and "a blood-sucking train of imposters. 11133 
Others had noticed the dominance of lawyers in society, 
and in Parliament, where the;f were the second largest 
professional group, 134 but opponents of the debtor laws 
had special reason to dislike this situation. King 
129 Farley, Title Page. 
130 Boswell's Life of Johnson, iii. 77. 
131 Bentham, "Rationale of Evidence", Works, ed. 
Bowring, vi. 180. 
132 Rowell's State Trials, xxii. 339. 
133 Baldwin, p. 3. 
134 G.E. Judd, Members of Parliament 1734-1832, 
pp. 51-2. 
wrote: 
THIS IS THE AGE OF LAWYERS; the 
country is law-ridden ••• the 
chicanery of attornies and the 
sophistry of counsel have involved 
every subject in litigation.135 
128. 
Thus opposition to the insolvency laws drew on the great 
themes of a period of profound intellectual reappraisal. 
WIDER FORCES 
The movement to change the debtor laws could not 
have occurred independently. It is intelligible only 
in the context of a wider shift in opinion. Reform of 
the laws governing the well-being of society, which 
characterised. the period of the early and middle parts 
of the nineteenth century, has often been linked with 
the increasing political strength of the middle classes, 
with their distinctive commercial ethic. A commercial 
ethic is no explanation for the reform of the debtor 
laws. The opinions of the trading classes about 
imprisonment for debt became increasingly confused and 
defeatist. Explanations for the change of the law are 
better provided by the forces of Evangelicalism and 
Benthamite·Radicalism. 136 These two forces are in 
some senses opposites, and although Dicey noted how 
they shared common ground in an individualistic 
philosophy, 137 individualism less characterised the 
reformers of the law than it did their opponents. 
135 King, pp. 9-10. 
136 Webb, p. 67. 
137 between Law 
the 
Evangelicals were prominent in all aspects of 
prison reform. Thomas Fewell Buxton who succeeded 
Wilberforce as leader of the campaign to abolish the 
slave trade, wrote a book in 1818 on the need for 
changes in the prison~ including aid for debtors. 138 
Henry Thornton introduced the 1813 Act which provided 
for the debtors in London prisons. The Clapham Sect 
organised a "Society for Educating the Children of 
Confined Debtors" in 1796, the Conductors of' which 
included Thornton, Wilberforce, Burdon, Barclay, and 
129. 
Clarke. This Society, which had the warm commendation 
of James Neild, sought to preserve children from the 
licentious environment of' a prison, by employing 
"serious and exemplary characters" to run schools within 
the walls. 139 And, as has already been shown, the 
evangelical emphasis in the Thatched House Society was 
also marked. 
It has sometimes been thought that the 
Evangelicals were never seriously interested in reforms 
in England. This is misleading, if' the insolvency 
laws are a typical example. Wesley had, many years 
before, after preaching in a debtor prison, remarked 
that it was: "a nursery of' all manner of' evil. 0 
shame to man, that there should be such a place, such 
a picture of' hell upon earth. 111 4° Furthermore imprison-
ment f'or debt was described by Stanhope as "the White 
138 Buxton, An Inguiry ,Whether Crime and Misery are 
produced or prevented by our Present System of 
Prison Discipline. 
139 GM, lxxiii. (1803). 72-3; ibid, lxxiv. (1804). 197. 
140 J. Wesley, Journals, ii. 246. 
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Slave Trade 11 , 141 and the same kind of' concern was shown 
towards the two evils. The Evangelicals sought f'irst 
to make the debtor laws tolerable, by improving prison 
conditions, and aiding the release of' individual 
debtors, but they were prepared to alter the laws, if' 
relief' proved unworkable. 
Thus Evangelicals and other religiously motivated 
persons played an important role in awakening concern 
f'or debtors. 
ref'ormation. 
They wanted not so much ref'orm, as moral 
This is made clear in the tract of' the 
Religious Tract Society that was distributed to debtors. 
It eulogised liberty, and stressed that the loss of', it 
was a great misf'ortune, f'or which the debtor was not 
necessarily to blame. But its exhortations were 
particularly addressed to those who had off'ended, 
upon whom it urged a more moral lif'e, with no more 
gambling, and no more parties on the Sabbath. 142 
One would not expect demands f'or reform in such 
a tract, and indeed the debtor was urged simply to endure 
his situation. Reform was the responsibility of' a 
higher class, not even the traders of the middle class, 
but the aristocracy. However, there is no simple 
division of' the supporters and opponents of ref'orm 
on the basis of' their "class". Jeremy Bentham was 
a lawyer, a member of' the middle orders, and an 
advocate of' laissez-f'aire. Yet he saw no virtue in 
, 
the insolvency law. It failed as a means to compel 
141 Quoted by H. Jemmett, A Letter to ••• Peel, p. 27. 
142 The Debtor's Friend, (1813), pp. 1-2. 
payment, it failed as a punishment; it was: 
"unjustifiable in every imaginable point of view. 111 43 
Bentham did not seek total abolition of the 
weapon, but that: "in the case of insolvency, punish-
ment ought to be applied to him, and him alone, on 
whose part there has been blame. 111 44 He desired the 
abolition of' mesne process imprisonment, and its 
replacement by a summary judgement and an immediate 
sequestration of the debtor's goods. Insolvents 
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should be compelled, on pain of' death, to hand over 
their property, and either when rashness or extravagance 
was proved, or until it was disproved, they should be 
imprisoned. 145 Bentham's reforms were designed 
specifically to assist the creditor, but as compensa-
tion to the imprisoned debtors, he suggested that their 
prisons should be painted white, whereas those for 
petty criminals were to be painted grey, and those of 
felons, black. 146 
Bentham's specific proposals were thus sympathetic 
to the trader's interests. 147 However these proposals 
were in many cases not published until af'ter the ref'orm 
of the law, so it was Bentham's rational approach to 
the Law, and not his actual insolvency propositions 
that were influential in nineteenth century jurisprudence. 
143 Bentham, vi. 177. 
144 I!2..!,Q;, vi. 182. 
145 Ibid, vii. 389; 1!2JJ!, iii. 352. 
146 - Ibid _, i. 429-431. 
147 Cf. c. Phillipson, p. 187. 
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This is crucial to the understanding of those pressures 
which moulded Parliamentary action. 
For it was in Parliament that the constitutional, 
philanthropic and commercial arguments were put to the 
test. And it was there that the cries of the traders 
were slowly over-ridden. It was the triumph of 
compassion, not of theory, but that compassion had 
sought and found philosophical buttresses. 
133. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE JURY FALTERS 
Law reform was not a popular pastime of eighteenth 
century Parliaments. Parliamentary procedure was so 
tedious that it discouraged private members from promot-
ing general bills. The attitude of back-bench members 
reinforced what procedure implied. Many county members 
wanted to reduce the apparatus and expense of govern-
ment, and they therefore opposed reforrns. 1 Insolvency 
bills as a temporary expedientwere unavoidable, but the 
organisation of permanent facilities for relief was 
distasteful. 
If anything, members from popular and urban 
constituencies were even more opposed to reform. The 
franchise in Bristol, York, London, and Westminster 
included the shopkeepers who were the most frequent 
users of imprisonment for debt, but did not usually 
include the artisans who suffered from it. The members 
for these constituencies were obliged to listen to 
commercial opinion, and consequently even members like 
John Sawbridge, who were Radicals on other issues, 
were heard in ardentsupport of the existing laws. 
Most members considered that the bankruptcy 
laws were more important than those for insolvency, 
for bankrupts were the cream of debtors •. The commercial 
desirability of insolvent bills was an important factor 
1 s. Lambert, Bills and Acts, p. 189. 
1]4. 
to relatively few members, but others had equally good 
grounds for opposing them. 
LA.TE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 
Most eighteenth-century attempts at reform sought 
to extend the provisions of the Lords' Act. Inflation 
provided an economic justification for extending the 
act beyond debts of £100. Such extensions were not 
universally popular, but they avoided the appearance 
of innovation. 
The first attempts to extend the Lords' Act were 
made in 1774 and 1775. About them little is known, 
for they were not reported in any of the unofficial 
records of the debates, so it is necessary to rely on 
the Journals of the House. Herbert Mackworth, the 
member for Cardiff, and Richard Whitworth of Stafford 
brough introduced their bill in the 1774 session as late 
as 3 June. The bill, which was designed to punish 
fraudulent debtors and not to relieve them, required 
prisoners seeking relief to state on oath how much 
money they had spent in gaol. One of the great 
complaints of creditors was that debtors when imprisoned 
suddenly "lost" all their property, by transferring it 
to a relative. By the end of the session the bill 
had been reported back from the committee, and the 
·. 2 
maximum daily expenditure set at sixpence. 
2 ~, xxxiv. 756-7, 803-7. PP, 1731-1800, viii. 
Bills nos. 252, 253. 
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In the 1775 session Mackworth and Whitworth had 
additional support from the members for Reading and 
Bodmin for the bill which was presented on 6 April. 
In this bill the eligible daily expenditure was set at 
one shilling, and some controls were also placed on 
executions by the creditor. The groats were raised 
to four shillings a week, and debts of up to £500 were 
to be eligible for the Lords' Act. This bill was far 
more generous to the debtor, but it got no further than 
that of the previous year. 3 
There was no great enthusiasm for these bills in 
the House. But in 1779 Lord Beauchamp, a Vice 
President of the Thatched House SocietY, added his voice 
to those seeking reform. He seems to have desired a 
total change in the debtor laws. Beauchamp, who 
held the pocket borough seat of Orford, supported 
North's Ministry, and was a Lord of the Treasury between 
1774 and 1780, although he voted with the Whigs after 
1783, and was an opponent of Pitt.4 His proposal in 
1779 to end the use of Mesne Process for debts between 
forty shillings and £10 had the support of the Attorney 
General and the Solicitor General. Nevertheless it was 
very fiercely opposed outside the House. It is 
difficult to estimate what percentage of arrests were 
for such small debts; it may have been one third. 
Petitions were presented to the Commons by many traders 
3 CJ, xxxv. 235 et. seq. 
Bill no. 269. 
4 GEC, vi. 511-2. 
PP, 1731-1800, viii. 
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who opposed the bill. The householders of Stepney and 
Hackney complained that all credit would be destroyed 
by the bill, and that they would be forced to use the 
Superior Courts, with their more expensive proceedings. 
The small traders of Westminster and the Sheriff of 
London also complained. Court officers from inferior 
courts complained that the business of these courts 
would be greatly reduced, In the third reading, 
members from Norwich and London tried to secure immunity 
for their districts. 5 However the bill, which noted 
in its preamble how the practice: "is found by 
experience to be attended with much oppression to 
great numbers", was amended only in minor details 
concerning court procedure, and a last-ditch conserva-
tive amendment was lost by twenty-nine votes to sixty-
6 four. 
This act (19 Geo. III c. 70) set free thousands 
of debtors, and it also drastically reduced the business 
of inferior courts like the Marshalsea Court, in which 
Francis Place's father had served as a bailiff. Place 
described in his autobiography how his father lost his 
post when three quarters of the business of this London 
Court ceased. 7 Small debts became subject only to 
imprisonment on execution, and the greater proportion 
of such actions were transferred to the Superior Courts 
at Westminster. 
5 CJ, xxxvii. 414-7, 425-7, 430-5. 
6 Ibid, 434. 
7 Autobiography of Francis Place, ed. Thale, pp. 31-2. 
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This measure was only the first stage of Beauchamp's 
strategy for reforming the law. In the next session 
he proposed a fundamental alteration of the Lords' Act. 
His bill allowed the release of any prisoner after a 
brief period in prison, as soon as he had surrendered 
his property by an oath. The prisoner could only be 
remanded if he was suspected of concealing his property, 
instead of the previous unlimited power of the creditor 
to remand. The teeth of the bill were its require-
ments that all debtors be either released or remanded 
under its provisions. Thus honest and industrious 
debtors who could not afford to seek release were to be 
discharged, unless the plaintiff would pay groats. 
Prisoners with debts of up to £200 were eligible, and 
only those held for debts over £100 had to render account 
of their expenditure in prison. 8 The bill was far 
more than an extension of the Lords' Act, for it applied 
to prisoners on Mesne Process. Based upon the Scottish 
principle of cessio bonorum, it would have made imprison-
ment for debt a fearful thing only for fraudulent debtors. 
This was the very aspect of the bill which 
disturbed traders throughout the country. The bill 
was "of a most dangerous and destructive tendency", 9 
in the words of the Middlesex traders' petition, for 
it would remove the fear of imprisonment. On 28 February 
1780, the representatives of the London traders 
appeared before the House. They described their 
opposition as a defence of the Ancient Constitution. 
8 PP, 1731-1800, viii. Bills nos. 346, 347. 
9 CJ, xxxvii. 612. 
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Had: 11 the people now living • • • grown wiser than their 
· · 1 O 
ancestors?", asked Mr Lee, the counsel f'or Westminster. 
The ref'ormers might well have retorted that the Ancient 
Constitution gave no such powers to creditors. It was 
-further complained that the bill would weaken trade, 
and that it was considered desirable because it was 
based on "humanity" and "imagined ••• inconvenience", 
whereas in f'act creditors were rarely so unjust as to 
keep their debtors in gaol without reason. 
The bill had a rough passage through the House, 
and af'ter recommittal, was eventually withdrawn. There 
were several reasons f'or this course of' events. 
Firstly, it was not the only bill on debtor-creditor 
relations bef'ore the House. In addition to a 
contentious bill seeking the ref'ormation of' the Halif'ax 
Court of' Requests, another bill was under discussion 
which proposed the removal of' the right of Courts of' 
Requests to imprison on execution. This bill was 
introduced on 7 March by Robert Vyner, the member f'or 
Lincoln City, and another f'lood of petitions were 
presented to the House to answer it. Supporters of' 
the old law were unhappy enough with the ref'orms of 
1779; the prospect of' so many other changes horrif'ied 
them. 
A second reason was the series of' procedural 
delays that the supporters of' the bill permitted. 
Edmund Burke, a careful student of' the insolvent 
10 PH, xx. 1396. 
1 1 · 
laws, and a supporter of the bill, urged that it be 
tactfully recommitted, so that he might have time to 
appease the angry traders in his Bristol constituency. 
Then the sickness of the Speaker, Sir Fletcher Norton, 
led to an adjournment of the House for a fortnight in 
April. Burke blamed the failure of the bill on these 
delays. 12 
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A third reason for the failure of all of the reform 
measures lay in the Gordon Riots, which began on 2 June. 
Only the bill affecting the imprisonment of small 
debtors was still viable at this stage, but it was 
overshadowed by a glut of Protestant petitions. Lord 
George Gordon had declared his strong opposition to 
Beauchamp's bill on 28 February, when he had criticised 
Members of Parliament, because they knew nothing about 
trade, and sympathised with debtors only because they 
were debtors themselves. 13 
The House was deeply divided over the bills. 
Most members seem to have felt inclined to be sympathetic 
toward the debtors, but Burke, C.J. Fox of Westminster 
and Charles Turner of York City supported the bill in 
the face of strong opposition from their constituents. 14 
No doubt other borough members were not so independently 
minded. The House seems to have disliked the arguments 
11 Cf. Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, 
ed. Fitzwilliam and Bourke, iv. 524. 
12 Writin sand S eeches of Edmund Burke, ii. 383-4; 
Correspondence of Edmund Burke, iv. ed. Woods). 
231·-2. 
13 PH, xx. 1405-6. 
14 PR, Ser. 1. xvii. 170-180. 
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of reformers, for their noise drowned out Mr Bearcroft, 
who was the Counsel in favour of the bill. 15 The legal 
phraseology of the bill was also amiss, and the final 
draft was three times the length of the origina1. 16 
Both Beauchamp's bill and that of Vyner failed, 
and the latter bill was even more notorious with small 
traders. However, the publicity of the Thatched House 
Society was engendering sympathy, especially for the 
small debtor. Changing the small debtor's lot seems 
to have been a main aim of the Society at this stage, 
and five years later, in February 1785, it awoke a 
public outcry by publishing details of abuses in the 
London prisons, in the report To the Lord Romney 
President ••• and other Benefactors to the Society. 17 
Apparently the Society also prepared the draft of a 
bill to correct these abuses. 18 The bill was intro-
duced into the Commons by Beauchamp, a Vice-President· 
of the Society, and supported by M.A. Taylor, the member 
for Poole, and Sir Joseph Mawbey, the member for Surrey. 
Noting the differing powers of London Courts of Requests, 
and how in some such courts, the debtor could be 
detained for many years, it proposed.the curtailment of 
imprisonment to one day for every shilling of debt, 
with a minimum period of twenty days. The bill also 
abolished the payment of gaol fees by small debtors. 
15 Q:M, 1. (1780). 452. 
16 Writings and B£eeches of Edmund Burke, ii. 384. 
17 B.M. 64. 95K. 3(2). I did not have access to 
this Report. 
18 er. State of the Prisons, p. 229. 
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It was a moderate reform, which encountered little opposi-
tion in either House, and received the Royal Assent on 
4 July. 19 (25 Geo. III c. 45.) In the next session, 
the Act was extended to the whole of England. (26 Geo. 
III c. 38.) 
Thus Beauchamp, who had in 1780 sought to drastically 
change the insolvency laws, succeeded in limiting the 
duration of imprisonment for small debts. Why was he 
so unsuccessful? Beauchamp himself' blamed "the lowest 
class of men belonging to the profession of the law, 1120 
when he spoke to the House in 1781, and certainly the 
lawyers were an important group in the Commons. Also 
Beauchamp shared many of the attitudes of his opponents. 
All the speakers in the House agreed that creditors 
should not be too harsh to their debtors, and all 
condemned fraudulent actions by insolvent men. One 
of the toughest sections of Beauchamp's bill was the 
provision for the punishment of debtors concealing their 
property or refusing to surrender it. (It is doubtful 
whether these clauses would have been found to be work-
able by the Courts.) Therefore it is not surprising 
that no temporary insolvent bills were passed between 
1781 and 1793, for Beauchamp and his opponents all 
regarded such bills as harmful, and as an incitement to 
fraud. In 1783 mov.es to introduce such a bill failed. 
In 1784, 1785, and 1787, such bills were passed by the 
Commons after a struggle, though in 1787 the House 
19 Cf. Account of the Society, pp. 550-560; 
CJ, xl. 939 et. seq. 
20 .EE, ser. 2. iii. 608. 
divided 61 to 46 over the measure, which was strongly 
resisted by London members. 21 These measures all 
failed in the Lords. 
behind locked doors. 
Meanwhile the debtors remained 
A PRIVATE CAMPAIGN IN THE LORDS 
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The House of Lords was more uniformly suspicious 
of law reform in the late eighteenth century than was 
the House of Commons, and inso~vency bills were frequently 
challenged there. Yet for thirty years, from 1781 to 
1813, one Peer kept up a lonely vigil in support of 
reform of the debtor laws. Such consistent advocacy, 
unequalled in the Commons, was the act of Francis 
Rawdon-Hastings, the Earl of Effingham, who in 1783 
became Baron Rawdon of York, and in 1793, on the death 
of his father, Earl Moira. In 1808 the title of Marquess 
of Hastings passed to him from his mother. 
Rawdon's greatness was not founded upon his 
Parliamentary career. He is remembered as Lord 
Hastings, Governor of India from 1813 to 1822, and 
also for his military prowess in the American War of 
Independence, at the Battle of Bunker H:±11, in the 
French Revoiutionary Wars, and in the expansion of the 
Indian Empire. 22 In the Lords, he took little part in 
debates, 23 except on this one issue. Rawdon was at 
21 PR, ser. 2. xxii. 60-61. 
22 Cf. Ross, Lord Hastings, pp. 14-15, 209-218. 
23 DNB, ix. 118. 
times the sole supporter of insolvency bills, and he 
sought to formulate a permanent relief bill which was 
acceptable to the House. 
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Rawdon's family were from Yorkshire, but they had 
.settled in Ireland in 1641, and the earldom of Moira was 
an Irish title. As heir of the Hastings title, he also 
belonged to one of the most distinguished of English 
f'amilies. His maternal grandmother had f'ounded "Lady 
Huntingdon's Connexion 11 of' Evangelical chapels. In 
1787 he quarrelled with Pitt, and thereaf'ter voted 
with the Whigs, in 1806 entering the Privy Council 
as Master of Ordnance in the Ministry of All the Talents. 
But he was not a Foxite, and in 1797 he made himself' 
the object of ridicule by privately proposing that he 
should lead a Ministry which would exclude Fox, Pitt, 
and Portland. 24 A taciturn man, his political 
significance stemmed solely from his friendship with 
the Prince of Wales. (In 1795, on the occasion of 
the Prince's marriage, he proposed in the Lords that 
the celebrations should include the liberation of all 
debtors, for the Prince had declared himself in favour 
of insolvency relief. 25) 
Rawdon first showed his concern for debtors in 
1783, shortly after he entered the Lords. On this 
occasion he drew attention to the cries of distress from 
the prisons, and introduced a temporary insolvency 
bill into the House, also announcing that he intended 
24 Ross, pp. 30-31. Cf. The Farington Diary, ed. 
J. Greig, vii. 115. 
25 PR, ser. 2. xiii. 393, 453; ~' vi. 377-8. 
to introduce a bill which would totally transform the 
lot of debtors, in the next session. 26 Over the next 
thirty years his approach to the problem varied, but 
his persistence did not. Initially Rawdon spent much 
144. 
of his effort on promoting temporary insolvency bills, 
which he justified on the grounds of humanitarian concern 
for the "multitudes of unhappy men now starving in our 
prisons. 1127 He soon lost his faith in temporary bills, 
although during his time in the House,the Lords 
initiated such bills more often than did the Commons; 
in 1793, 1794, 1797, 1801, 1806, 1811 and 1812, 
compared to the Commons bills of 1804 and 1809. 
reversed the trend that had previously existed. 
This 
Rawdon saw such bills as a poor alternative to permanent 
relief, and although he was prepared to support them, 
he introduced few himself. 28 The reforms he desired 
were to be based "not upon the mere loose principle of 
humanity", as temporary bills were, but on "public 
justice". 29 Rawdon promoted permanent bills of various 
kinds in the years 1792, 1793, 1796 and 1808; he sought 
a Select Committee on the subject in 1784 and 1797, and 
' 
gained one in 1809, and he also encouraged others to 
introduce bills. 
Rawdon, compared to other members of the House 
of Lords, was very radical in the reforms he advocated, 
although such views were more common outside the House. 
26 PR, ser. 1 • xi. 247, 253; PH, xxiii. 1098-1103. 
27 PH, xxiii. 1098. 
28 Cf. PD, vi. 368; ibid, vii. 154-7. 
29 PR, ser. 3. xvii. 393-4. 
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He described the "present system 0 as "a mass of' rubbish 
and of' oppression that ought to be entirely removed. 1130 
There was no reason why the creditor should have power 
over his debtor's body. 
a punishment f'or f'raud. 
Imprisonment should only be 
He cited the reports of' the 
Thatched House Society to show the injustice of' a 
practice which was based on "a principle of' rigour 
and absurdity. 1131 His most comprehensive bill, that 
of' 1793, proposed the abolition of' Mesne Process arrest 
f'or debts under £20, and required all other arrests to 
be justif'ied bef'ore a judge, and security given, bef'ore 
the debtor could be taken. 32 But f'rom year to year 
he varied his approach in the light of' what he thought 
would be most likely to pass. Only in 1793, when both 
the Lords and the Commons were voicing deep concern at 
the treatment of' debtors, did he demand complete 
ref'orm, or nothing at a11. 33 Ten years bef'ore this, 
he claimed to have received one hundred and f'if'ty letters 
on the subject, 34 and demanded the right to bring 
witnesses bef'ore the House. Rawdon never became 
skilled at Parliamentary tactics, but he learnt the 
expediency of' making allies and encouraging them to 
introduce legislation. His public reputation neverthe-
less remained higher than his Parliamentary one, f'or 
his approach closely conf'ormed top:>pular attitudes. 
30 PD, ser. 1 • xix. 1170. 
31 PH, xxx. 647. 
32 .Bl, ser. 2 • xxxv. 235. 
33 ill£, p. 236. 
34 PH, xxiii. 1098, 1101 • 
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He was praised by Horne Tooke, and also by the writer of 
the Parliamentary Register, who admired: "the manly 
sentiments of liberality which are ever the characteristics 
of his nature. 1135 The public always liked a soldier. 
In these years the Lords were to initiate some 
permanent reforms. In 1786 Rawdon persuaded the Lord 
Chancellor to extend the Lords' Act to debts of £200. 
(26 Geo. III c. 44.) 36 In 1793, as a concession to 
Rawdon, Loughborough, the Lord Chancellor, introduced 
a bill which further extended it to debts of £300. 
(33 Geo. III c. 5.) In 1801 an important act was 
passed enabling the creditor to release his debtor from 
prison without surrendering his claim to the debt. The 
old law had long been an obstacle to compassion. In 
1808 the former Lord Chancellor, Ellenborough, promoted 
a bill which allowed the release of all prisoners owing 
less than £20 after twelve months' imprisonment. 
Although Rawdon criticised this act as ungenerous, it 
was an important concession to small debtors. 37 
Insolvency law had in the past usually been 
' made at the initiative of the Commons, so Rawdon 
achieved a great deal in these changes. They must, 
however, be balanced against the fierce resistance to 
any fundamental reforms. Although the Lords' Select 
Committee of 1809 actually condemned the whole practice, 
the Lords opposed any major legislative alterations. 
35 PR, ser. 2. xi. 253; A. Stephens, Memoirs of 
John Horne Tooke, ii. 403. 
36 AR, xxix. (1787). 138. 
37 48 Geo. III c. 123; PD, ser. 1. xi. 252-3. 
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The public impression was that the great lawyers of the 
Upper House were absolutely opposed to any change. 38 
This resistance to reform, other than in minor 
details, was led by the great legal figures of the age. 
Lords Thurlow and Mansfield opposed Rawdon in the 
seventeen-eighties. 
that: 
Mansfield's damning comment was 
a mistaken compassion ••• had of late 
years got such possession of the minds 
of men, that the edge of the law was 
frequently turned against the honest 
and deserving creditor.59 
During the era of the revolutionary wars, the Chancellors, 
Loughborough, Ellenborough and Eldon ensured that the 
reactionary attitudes of the Ministry included opposi-
tion to all insolvent law reform. Eldon, according 
to the writer in the Dictionary of National Biography, 
devoted his whole energy to defeating any changes in 
the laws concerning the slave trade, catholic relief 
and debtors. 40 Such opponents in 1793 tore Rawdon's 
bill to shreds in Committee, after welcoming it in the 
first reading. They were, they said, prepared to permit 
reform, but only when the Judges of the Superior Courts 
drafted it; and the Judges' idea of reform was an 
ungenerous temporary act.41 
Rawdon found compensation in a number of 
supporters at various periods. 
38 Cf. A. Stephens, ii. 403. 
39 PH, xxii. 628-9. 
In the early seventeen-
40 Op. cit., xvii. 990. Horace Twiss, Life of Lord 
Chancellor Eldon, ii. 5, erroneously suggests 
that Eldon supported reform. 
41 PR, ser. 2. xxxv. 281, and passim. 
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eighties, Walsingham, who held positions in the Ministries 
of' both North and Pitt, supported the abolition of' "the 
whole ab.surd and impolitic system from the beginning to 
the·end. 1142 Later in that decade the newly created 
sixteenth Duke of' Norfolk, Charles Howard, also co-
operated with Rawdon to aid ref'orm,for he was a zealous 
advocate of any expansion of personal liberties. In 
1804 the Duke of Clarence assisted Norfolk in shepherd-
ing the insolvency bill through the House, in the 
absence of Rawdon. Above all, in the first decade of 
the new century, Henry Richard Fox, the third Baron 
Holland showed great sympathy with Rawdon's campaign. 
Holland, who was on some occasions the only representa-
tive of' the Whigs in the Upper House, 43 in 1806 intro-
duced a reform bill at a time when Rawdon could not do 
so, and like Rawdon, he expressed his dissatisfaction 
with temporary acts. Thus although only a few Peers 
were interested in commercial questions, the Lords 
were less conservative than the Commons on this 
question in the period of' the Revolutionary Wars. 
The new commercial mentality had touched the attitude 
of' the Commons, but not the Lords. It is therefore 
not surprising that the permanent law of' 1813 was 
initiated in the Lords. 
Noble Lord introduced it. 
42 PR, ser. 1. xi. 249. 
43 DNB, vii. 568. 
It is more surprising which 
1 Lj.9. 
THE COMMONS' SELECT COMMITTEE 
The era of the Revolutionary Wars was thus a time 
of vigorous activity in Parliament, which found itself 
more divided on the issue than previously. This can be 
compared with the campaigns for abolition of the slave 
trade, and for Catholic emancipation. In each case a 
few minor alterations were made to the law, tacitly 
implying that the old law was capable of abuse, but it 
was only these abuses which Parliament would correct. 
The fundamental rights of the creditor over his debtor, 
like those of the trader over his cargo, were sacrosanct. 
New standards were enforced in gaols and in ships, and 
they eliminated much of the physical suffering, but 
that was all. This attitude was particularly evident 
in the Commons, where commercial pressures were felt by 
more members. 
It is significant that it was the period 1788 to 
1790 before the French Revolution was widely condemned, 
which saw the last great attempt in the eighteenth 
century to change the law by persuading the House of 
Commons to support it. The-proponent of reform was 
James Burges who had already published a pamphlet on 
insolvency reform, and who had also written in support 
of Rawdon's efforts. 44 His bill was introduced when 
Rawdon had temporarily abandoned his efforts. 
Burges was well qualified to speak on the subject. 
The son of a famous soldier, he had both legal and 
University qualifications, and had served as a Bankruptcy 
44 Burges, A Letter to the Earl of Effingham on his 
lately proposed Act of Insolvency, (1783). B.M. 
6405. b. 9, 
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Commissioner. He was an acquaintance of' Pitt, to whom 
he gave £1,000 to help pay his debts. Later a 
Commissioner of' the Privy Seal, he was also an 
enthusiastic supporter of' Wilberf'orce' s campaign to 
abolish the slave trade. Consequently when he became 
the member f'or Helston in 1787, he was a natural leader 
of' the advocates of' ref'orm.45 
His bill, presented in each of' the three years 
f'rom 1788, was more extensive than any that Rawdon had 
yet of'f'ered. 46 The bill aimed at bringing insolvency 
law into line with the bankruptcy statutes. It required 
the creditor to give security of' £100 bef'ore arresting 
a debtor. 
creditor. 
This was an onerous requirement f'or the 
It was balanced by provisions which were 
to end the status of' the prison as a privileged 
community. Instead the creditor was to be permitted 
to proceed against the debtor's property while his 
person was in gaol. None of' the "Rules II or liberties 
of the gaol were to be continued, and a special gaol 
dress was to be compulsory. The debtor could either 
avoid this fate by paying a bond to prevent imprison-
ment, or he could seek relief after two months in 
gaol, if' he could pay ten shillings in the pound. 47 
These were drastic proposals. Burges claimed 
that a number of lawyers supported the bill, including 
"one high character", 48 but few lawyers spoke for it 
45 ~, iii. 305-6. 
46 Q:M., lviii. (1788). 417. 
47 fil:, 1731-1800, Bills nos. 551, 575-7, 596. 
48 PH, xxvii. 158. Was this person Lord Mansfield? 
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in the Commons. The bill was co-sponsored in 1788 by 
Sir William Dolben, the member for Oxford University, 
and it had the backing of Sir Joseph Mawbey, the member 
for Surrey, who was not worried about the absence of 
support from lawyers,: "That the lawyers were against 
it, Sir Joseph said, he thought a strong reason why 
the gentlemen of the House of Commons should be for it. 1149 
Initially the bill split the commercial members 
from the legal and conservative vote, and united them 
with those who supported the bill on compassionate 
grounds. Its provisions appealed to those who wanted 
to swiftly release the honest debtor, and also those 
who wanted to punish the fraudulent. However several 
speakers against the bill ended this alliance, when 
they pointed out that the "lower order of traders" 
wouldmt be able to afford to lodge the £100 bond required 
of creditors, and thus would be unable to recover their 
debts under such legislation. Moreover the Judges' 
opposition to the bill was reported to the House. 50 
The supporters of the bill won the first division, but 
after it had been condemned by Mr Mainwaring of London, 
and the Sheriff of the City, it was defeated. In 1790 
a further attempt to pass the bill was ended on the 
understanding that abuses in gaols should be investiga-
ted. 51 Thus Burges' s bi 11 prepared the ground for 
the Select Committee of 1791-1792. 
49 PR, ser. 2. xxiii. 494. 
50 PR, ser. 2. xxvii, 114, 123. 
51 Ibid, pp. 123-4. 
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It was not Burges, however, who sought the appoint-
ment of a Committee into the Practice and Effects of 
Imprisonment for Debt on 12 May 1791. The motion was 
proposed by the Whig Charles Grey, the member for 
Northumberland, (the future Earl Grey of the Reform Act). 
Burges's voice was not heard in the debate, and he was 
not appointed to the Committee. 
The use of select committees to investigate 
problems, rather than hear evidence on bills, was an 
innovation made in the Commons in the middle of the 
eighteenth century.52 It ~uickly became a favourite 
procedure. In this case the Attorney General, Sir 
Archibald MacDonald, supported the proposal, agreeing 
with Grey that there was widespread criticism of the 
laws, and that they were not always fair either to 
debtors or creditors. 
one day be altered. 53 
He hoped that the laws would 
Further support was expressed 
by Edmund Burke, who said he had always desired to 
promote reform himself, but never found the time to do 
so. Debtors, Burke declared, were really slaves. 
The fault of the law was that it treated the interests 
of debtor and creditor as irreconcilable. Burke 
supported this Whig motion only days after he had 
broken with Fox, for he had not abandoned his belief 




P.D.G. Thomas, The House of Commons in the 
Eighteenth Century. p. 265. 
PR, ser. 2. xxix. 406-9; PH, xxix. 510-3. 
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The motion to appoint the Committee was carried 
unanimously, and its membership was named, and included 
all the .merchants and lawyers of the House. Burke, 
Fox, Pitt, Grenville, North and Sheridan were among the 
members, as were Barham, Henry Thornton, Wilberforce 
and Beauchamp, who were subscribers of the Thatched 
House Society. 55 The Committee immediately embarked 
upon its industrious investigations, including research 
into the number of persons who were suffering imprison-
ment. The next session of Parliament continued the 
Committee, which tabled its report on 2 April 1792. 
Evidence for the Report had been gathered fr.om a 
number of sources, including the keepers of several 
gaols, and from prisoners in King's Bench during a visit 
there by the Committee. The witness whose evidence 
was the most influential was Richard Grasswell, the 
Secretary of the Thatched House Society. His enumera-
tion of sufferings caused by the old law was repeated 
almost verbatim in the Report. 56 
The Report contained a careful summary of the 
law, and a description of its effects. While not 
specifying what reforms were needed, it emphasised how 
unsatisfactory the existing practice was. The 
scandalous possibility of imprisonment for life, and 
the immunity of a confined debtor's property were both 
55 CJ, xlvi. 560. 
56 "Report ••• into the Practice and Effects of 
Imprisonment for Debt", PP, 1792, Report no. 97. 
pp. 26-8, 87-92. The Report was reprinted in 
CJ, xlvii. 641-673. 
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stressed. So also was the failure of the law to deal 
with fraud: "Nor is a fraudulent Insolvent Debtor, as 
such, the Object of public Punishment 11 , 57 the first part 
of the Report concluded. The compassion of the Committee 
was stirred by the "utmost extremity" that many prisoners 
experienced. They noted that "Many of the Prisoners 
~re stated to be in a Situation of extreme Poverty and 
Want. 1158 Thus the Report catalogued the plight of 
ordinary debtors, rather than only describing the 
exceptional cases which were so often recounted by 
reformers. The estimate of the number of debtors and 
the debts for which they were confined ac.tually increased, 
rather than decreased alarm at the situation. 
Yet no decisive action followed. Grey felt 
unable to prepare any legislation so ·late in the session, 
and he looked to Rawdon, with whom he was no doubt in 
close contact. 59 The Lords showed less sympathy, 
except to allow the passage of a temporary bill, -
an expedient that the Report had criticised. The Report 
became part of the folklore of opponents of imprison-
ment for debt, but it bore no legislative fruit. Grey 
himself was so discouraged at the reaction of the House 
that he abandoned the whole guestion. 60 In the next 
two decades the Commons only supported one permanent 
reform, and that was an attempt to increase the creditors' 
powers under the Compulsory Clause in the Lords Act. 61 
57 Ibid, p. 16. 
58 Ibid, pp. 21, 36. 
59 PR, ser. 2. xxxii. 154-5; ibid, xxxiii. 17. 
60 Ibid, xxxviii. 172. 
61 IT, 1801-2, (16) i. 35, 49,261. 
The Upper House rejected this proposal; for once 
Commerce was deadlocked against Conservatism, and the 
poor deb.tor escaped without injury. 
THE REDESDALE ACT OF 1813 
By the close of the Napoleonic era, the English 
Parliament had begun a long debate on the amendment of 
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the Criminal Law. In the Commons the learned approach 
of Samuel Romilly brought pressure on the Administration. 
Romilly owed much to Bentham, but he also co-operated 
with Tories like Wilberforce. He particularly sought 
to reduce the statutory limitation of capital punish-
ment, but his reforming zeal covered a wider range of 
issues. Imprisonment for debtors under the Civil Law 
was one such issue. Romilly considered that the 
existing debtor law was undesirable, but he felt that 
advocating reform was "entertaining hopes and encouraging 
expectations which could only end in disappointment. 1162 
Even seeking a reduction in the use of capital punish-
ment was not so futile an endeavour. 
Nevertheless Romilly sought some minor reforms. 
As Solicitor General in the Ministry of All the Talents, 
he determined to reform the bankruptcy laws, at least 
in part. In this he was successfu1, 63 and.he next 
turned to the issue of the liab_ili ty of the estate of a 
62 Memoirs of Sir Samuel RomillY. ii. 209-210. 
63 Ibid, ii. 156; (46 Geo. III c. 135.) 
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deceased man for his debts. Such a reform, by increas-
ing the alienability of property, was regarded as a 
threat to their interests by the landed classes. The 
sacredness of property was a cardinal principle of 
English politics, and consequently Romilly's bill 
failed, for, said Sir William Grant, it was based on 
the principles of the French Revolution. 64 A similar 
reform was rejected by the Lords in 1813. Yet such a 
reform, and a similar one increasing the alienability 
of the property of living debtors, was a pre-requisite 
to the abolition of the capias procedure. Until 
creditors gained the power to seize all of a debtor.' s 
estate and property, they would not abandon their power 
over his person. 
eighteen-thirties. 
And such reforms came only in the 
Romilly was defeated in this attempted reform, 
and although he retained intentions of spending his 
"first leisure" in endeavouring to devise satisfactory 
legislation o~ insolvency, he only succeeded in extend-
ing the benefits of the Lords' Act to prisoners for 
Costs in Equity Courts. There were few such prisoners, 
but Romilly vowed that "if I can procure liberty for 
only two or three persons every year, I shall be well 
satisfied. 1165 He despaired of achieving anything more 
comprehensive, and little realised that he would play 
a vital role in the passage of a bill that would set 
thousands free. 
64 Ibid, 185, 192. Cf. Public Characters of 1808-9, 
pp. 335-340. 
65 M~moirs of_Si~ Samuel Romill~• ii. 268. 
Cf. C. Phillipson, pp. 305-. 
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As Solicitor General, Romilly had not been an 
important officer of state. He and the more senior 
Attorney. General were legal officers for the Crown, but 
they were not in Cabinet or the Privy Council, and so 
their judgements were not necessarily endorsed by the 
Ministry. Thus Romilly had little advantage in promot-
ing reform over Viscount Folkestone who was a son of 
Radnor, the Vice President of the Thatched House 
Society, and a relation of its President. Folkestone 
in 1812 secured the passage of two slight amendments 
to the Lords' Act for the benefit of creditors. 66 
The Attorney General had the legal expertise to dr~ft 
bills, but although his opinion might be influential 
over backbenchers, there was no such support in 1813. 
It was fitting that successful measures for 
reform should be introduced in the Upper House. The 
Peers had tended to show more compassion than the 
Commons Men, for they continued to feel responsible for 
the wellbeing of poor debtors while trading opinion in 
the Commons only complained of the immorality of the 
poor. The Thatched House Society was strongly supported 
by a wide ranging group of Peers and country gentry, 
excluding only "Ultra" Tories. From the Lords had 
come a number of minor reforms in the previous two 
decades, and also most of. the temporary insolvent acts. 
And in 1809 Rawdon achieved what he had long desired; 
a Select Committee to convince the Lords of the evils 
of the system. 
66 (52 Geo. III c. 13; 52 Geo. III c. 34.) 
c.J 9 lxvii. 84. 
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Rawdon chaired this Committee, and he seems to 
have drafted its Report. In its investigations the 
Committee heard a limited amount of evidence, from 
gaolers, from the Secretary and Treasurer of the Thatched 
House Society, and from experts on foreign law. Its 
Report uncovered injustice in the treatment of debtors, 
which made the imprisonment of felons seem mild punish-
ment. The chief objection of the Report was even more 
fundamental; that: 
In the procedure towards a defendant 
on Mesne Process, there is a total 
Abandonment of the attention to 
personal Liberty, which is the most 
marked Featur-e in the Administration 
of British Justice.67 
This was a strong complaint, and the Report proposed 
remedies in three areas: court approval of Mesne Process 
arrests, the provision of relief after three months' 
imprisonment on execution, and a more summary procedure 
to deal with small debts. Those who undertook such 
reforms, they concluded, "are likely by their exertion, 
to prevent a greater Degree of Human Depravity or of 
Human Misery" than in any other field. 68 
It was one thing for Rawdon to persuade a small 
Committee to propose such reforms. It was quite another 
thing to enable a bill incorporating such drastic changes 
to pass. But on 6 July 1809, from a most unexpected 
67 "Report of the Committee on the present state of the 
Practice of Imprisonment for Debt", Journals of the 
House of Lords, (1809), p. 184. 
68 Ibid, p. 188. 
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quarter, one "of the most strenuous enemies to innovation 
6 ••• Lord Redesdale" 9 rose to address the House on the 
deb tor laws. He intimated his intention of promoting 
legislation in the next session which would restrict 
the power of arrest, and provide permanent relief for 
debtors, and trial by jury for small debts. 70 And in 
the upshot, although all these proposals were not 
finally achieved till 1845, in 1811 a Frivolous Arrests 
Bill was passed which limited Mesne Process Arrest to 
debts above £15, (51 Geo. III c.124), and in 1813 
another bill passed which established a permanent 
procedure to release any debtors after three months' 
imprisonment. (53 Geo. III c. 102.) He had evidently 
adopted the Committee's prescription. 
There was considerable irony in this situation. 
The acts for which Redesdale was responsible did not 
abolish imprisonment for debt, but they limited its 
scope, and prevented permanent imprisonment at the whim 
of the creditor. Thus they earnt the support of James 
Neild, who had earlier appeared before the Lords 
Committee. 71 Redesdale did not see these reforms 
as the first stage to the abolition of imprisonment for 
debt; he rather sought to introduce the Scottish 
formula of a cessio bonorum; the release of the 
debtor from gaol in exchange for the surrender of his 
t ft t . . d f . . t 72 proper~ a er a cau ionary perio o imprisonmen. 
69 Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly, ii. 297. 
70 PD, ser. 1. xiv. 888. 
71 GM, lxxxiii. (1813). pt. 2. 437f. 
72 PD, ser. 1. xiv. 888. 
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Yet the act was by its very inadequacy to prepare the 
ground for later reforms, and the fierce opposition 
to it b;y Eldon and Ellenborough was because they 
realised this would occur • These opponents argued 
. that from the creditor's point of view it would be 
fairer to extend the availability of the old law, than 
reduce it. 73 As for providing permanent relief for 
imprisoned debtors, Ellenborough questioned whether it 
was: "reasonable that debts generally contracted other-
wise than criminally should be subjected to so small 
a degree of punishment. 1174 But sympathy for debtors, 
not creditors, motivated the bills. 
Why did Redesdale take issue with his Tory 
friends on this subject? He had in the past opposed 
Romilly's reform bills, and he continued to be regarded 
as an "Ultra" Tory. In many ways his background was 
very similar to that of Eldon and Ellenborough, for 
like them it was to his legal abilities that he owed 
his seat in the Lords. He had been created Baron 
Redesdale in 1802, after being named as Lord Chancellor 
of Ireland. Called to the bar in 1777, a Tory member 
in the Commons from 1788 to 1802, Solicitor General, 
Attorney General, and then in 1801 Speaker of the House 
of Commons, he had slowly risen in political signifi-
cance. As Solicitor-General he took part in the 
prosecution of Hardy and Horne Tooke. His bitter and 
undiplomatic opposition to Catholic Emancipation while 
73 .Il219:., xvii. 644. 
74 .Il219:., xix. 1169. 
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in Ireland led to his dismissal by the Ministry of All 
the Talents. It was this able if inflexible man who 
introduced the reform measures. 75 
Redesdale was a very active member of the Lords. 
Normally a staunch Tory, his motive on this occasion was 
not a desire to upset existing laws, or cause innova-
tions for the sake of them. He sought reform because 
he believed creditors were not generous enough to their 
debtors, and especially because he wanted a more uniform 
legal procedure than the confused procedures that 
existed. 76 His only previous comment in Parliament 
on the insolvency laws had been in 1800, when he 
supported a bill in the Commons to allow for trial by 
jury in the London Courts of Requests. 77 This was 
one of the changes he advocated in 1809, although he 
never introduced a bill to effect it. Apart from 
this, his conversion to reform seems to have been an 
unexpected consequence of the Lords' Select Committee. 
It was the fact that a Tory Lord should advocate 
such measures that greatly aided their passage, espec-
ially through the Upper House. This did not earn 
Redesdale any love from the leaders of the House, who 
remained implacably opposed to reform. Ellenborough 
told Romilly: "As for Lord Redesdale ••• he ought to 
be put in a straight waistcoat. 1178 With such 
75 Lord Redesdale, Memories, pp. 22-3; ~' x. 759-760. 
76 PD, ser. 1, xxiii. 321; cf. !!21.£, xviii. 1238. 
77 PR, ser. 3. xii. 138. 
78 Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly, iii. 120. 
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opponents, it does seem remarkable that the 1813 act in 
particular was passed by the Lords. Romilly sensed 
this and he retorted to Ellenborough that he had only 
himself to blame for the success of the bill. 
Ellenborough' s reply was curious: 
He said he had suffered it to pass 
because he was weary of opposing such 
bills; .and he had been given to 
understand that all the defects in 79 
it were to be removed in the Commons. 
It was certainly true that first Rawdon's, and then 
I 
Redesdale s persistent demands for reform must have 
grown tiresome. Redesdale introduced his bills for 
four years in succession, and among their supporters 
were men who sensed the strangeness of the alliance; 
Holland and Rawdon especially, but also "citizen" 
Stanhope, the Earls of Rosslyn and Suffolk, and the 
Scottish Lords Melville and Erskine, who interpreted 
the bill as a tribute to their own laws. Such a 
group could certainly make Ellenborough weary. 
Yet it is quite certain that Ellenborough and 
Eldon could have mustered sufficient opposition to 
defeat the measures. Instead they let the Mesne Process 
bill pass so late in the session of 1810 that the 
Commons could not consider it, but early enough in 1811 
to allow its passage. The more important bill for 
permanent relief of imprisoned debtors faced a harder 
struggle. In 1810 it was voted down, and in 1811 
withdrawn by Redesdale, perhaps on condition that the 
other bill was passed. In 1812 it was voted down on 
79 Ibid, pp. 120-1. 
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the second reading, but in 1813 it was passed through 
the Lords early in the session. Why was this allowed? 
It is apparent from the comments of its supporters 
over the four years that few of them thought it a totally 
satisfactory measure. Rawdon, though he defended it, 
himself wanted more radical reforms, including the 
abolition of arrest. 80 The bill proposed to set up 
a court to handle relief, but the legal status of this 
court was unclear, and Stanhope disliked.the requirement 
of three months' imprisonment before a prisoner could 
81 be released. But the Whig Lords played a shrewd 
game, not .· altering the bill against Redesdale' s will. 
Moreover, although Eldon and Ellenborough opposed the 
bill, they tried to appear not overly hostile to it, 
and smoothed the path for a temporary act in 1811 and 
1812, when the permanent bill seemed set for failure. 
Ellenborough said that "he would prefer a temporary 
inconvenience to a general and lasting evil. 1182 It 
is more likely that the sustained increase in the 
number of prisoners forced him to take some such action, 
but essentially these temporary bills were palliatives 
to an unhappy Redesdale. Ellenborough implied to 
Romilly that similar reasoning lay behind the passage 
of the permanent bill through the Lords in 1813. 
Ellenborough preferred to arrange for the bill to be 
80 PD, ser. 1 • xix. 1171 • 
81 Ibid, xix. 362-3. 
82 Ibid, xxiii. 323; cf. ibid, xx. 323. 
defeated in the Commons, because if a prominent Tory 
like Redesdale was forced too often into Whig lobbies 
over such a bil1, the result might be undesirable. 
In referring it to the Commons, Ellenborough 
was confident that this would be the end of it. 
Either the Lower House would reject the bill, or they 
would so substantially amend it that the Lords would 
have just cause to throw it out. 83 After all, the 
bill was scarcely satisfactory in the form in which it 
had left the Lords. 
Unfortunately for Ellenborough, he had left 
Samuel Romilly out of his reckonings, and Romilly had 
formed a shrewd suspicion of the intentions of the 
Ministry. The bill was guided through the Commons 
by William Kenrick, the government member for 
Bletchingly, and on 14 May he proceeded to add a 
number of clauses in committee to increase the harsh-
ness of the bill, including heavy fines for conceal-
ment of property, and capital punishment for the 
fraudulent. 84 Romilly himself would have liked to 
have made the bill more generous, but he realised that 
any changes would be foolish. He tl'"frefore praised 
the Upper House for its liberality, and stressed that 
Eldon and Ellenborough had supported it. He admitted 
that the bill had been criticised, but, as he told the 
Commons: 
83 Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly. iii. 108-9. 
Cf. A.S. Turberville, The House of Lords in the 
Age of Reform, p. 214. 
84 ili[, lxviii. 483-5. 
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The bil1 bef'ore the House had been 
called an innovation. It was 
undoubtedly so, but it proceeded 
f'rom those who were pretty generally 
the decided enemies of' innovation, 
and came theref'ore with a double 
claim upon the attention and def'er-
ence of' the house.85 
This was shrewd polities, and at Romilly' s behest all 
the main amendments were withdrawn. Al though the 
Common Council of' the City of London expressed opposi-
tion to the bill, Romilly even tried to dissuade its 
representatives f'rom their stand. At last he could 
proudly conclude: "In the meantime ... the Bill has 
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f'ortunately escaped the amendments both of' enemies and 
of f'riends 11 , 86 and the Tory Lords were obliged to allow 
it to become law. (53 Geo. III c. 102.) 
The chicanery of' the Ministry had rebounded 
against it. However they were not so easily def'eated. 
In July, Eldon advised Romilly that he was unable to 
appoint a Commissioner to administer the provisions of' 
the act, f'or neither his salary nor his duties were 
specified in the statute, and it was thus quite unwork-
able. He told this to Romilly because "all the odium 
of' the measure remaining inef'fectual ••• would 
undeservedly fall on him ffildon7' 11 , 87 when there was a 
legal explanation for it. This was a case of winning 
whatever the outcome, and Romilly told the Lord. 
Chancellor that his objections to the act were trivial. 
85 PD, ser. 1. xxvi. 30L~. 
86 Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly, iii. 111. 
87 112.i£!, p. 112. 
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Nevertheless three months later no Commissioner had been 
appointed. The Act seemed destined to lapse. 
The Ministry did not accomplish this, but their 
acquiescence was scarcely graceful. On 24 September 
Arthur Palmer was appointed. Commissioner after urgent 
representations from Redesdale. 88 Before tha½ Liverpool 
and Sidmouth had connived at delay, their reason being 
that the salary of the Commissioner was uncertain, and 
a suitable appointee unavailable. 89 Such reasons 
deserve speptical treatment, for Romilly had months 
before mentioned to Eldon that Cooke, an expert on 
bankruptcy law and a moderate Tory, was available for 
appointment. Eldon had not been interested. 90 
Arthur Palmer was selected for more acceptable 
qualities; staunch support of the Ministry, and 
lethargy in his work. Only on 26 November did he 
begin to hear petitions from debtors, and then only 
at the rate of twenty a day. At this point further 
problems arose from unco-operative court and prison 
officials. Redesdale complained: 
Where some officers attended the 
Court, whilst others chose to dis-
obey the orders of the Commissioner 
••• it was clear that a disposition 
existed somewhere to thwart the 
execution of the act.91 
88 PD, ser. 1. xxvii. 101-2. 
89 Ibid, xxvii. 77-8. 
90 Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly. iii. 112-3. 
91 PD, ser. 1. xxvii. 207; cf • .il21Q, cc. 76, 177-8. 
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It was a case of delaying till Parliament met, 
and then repealing the act. In the new session 
Government spokesmen explained that for technical 
reasons the act would be suspended, but out of generosity, 
the Ministry would expedite the passage of a temporary 
bill to free the expectant prisoners. From this course 
of action they were forced to withdraw by the continued 
pressure of Redesdale and the Whigs, as well as an 
outcry from petitioners. In a compromise arrangement, 
both the temporary bill (shorn of its clause repealing 
the permanent act) and an amendment to the permanent 
act were passed.92 In the Commons William Best, the 
member for Petersfield, made a last attempt to amend 
the bill out of existence. Best, a future Chief 
Justice of Common Pleas, was a recent addition to 
Tory ranks, and his sudden objections were overridden, 
so he determined to present his own bill in the next 
session. 93 In this grudging fashion Parliament 
adopted the Redesdale plan. 
THE AFTERMATH 
"I learnt last summer", wrote Basil Montagu 
in 1815, "that many respectable merchants in the 
provincial towns had expressed great dissatisfaction 
at the Insolvent Debtors' Bill. 1194 Montagu was a 
friend of Romilly, and his observations are trust-
worthy, for he was a prolific writer on bankruptcy 
92 54 Geo. III c. 28; 54 Geo. III c. 23; PD, ser. 1. 
xxvii. 181-4, 205-7, 222-3. 
93 
94 
Ibid, xxvii. 256-264. 
B. Montagu, Enquiries Respecting the Insolvent 
Debtors Bill, p. 514. 
reform, and a supporter of the new law. 95 Members of 
Parliament soon discovered the same discontent when a 
large number of petitions were presented to the House 
by merchants and traders. In 1815 the petitions came 
like a flood; in 1816 like a torr.ent. They alleged 
that the bill was ruining the commercial well-being 
of the country. Its consequences included: 
most extensive frauds, highly injurious 
to national morals, destructive of those 
habits of industry and of that good 
faith and mutual confidence for which 
this country has so long been 
distinguished.96 
So ran the petition from the Lord Mayor and Common 
Council of the City of London. The chief complaint 
of the petitioners was that any debtor could ignore 
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the demands of his creditors, declare that "a Redesdale 
will pay you 11 , 97 and in three months have his freedom, 
no matter how dishonest he was. Traders were horrified 
at such a law, and they demanded the abolition of the 
Insolvent Debtors Court, which administered the relief. 
Great pressure was placed on -Members of Parliament; 
so great, that Romilly concluded that repeal was inevit-
able. His only hope was that the experiment would be 
enlightening to any future reformer. 98 
Yet the Court survived. It was a closely-run 
contest, in which the good tactics of reformers were 
95 DNB, xiii. 662-5. 
96 Ql, lxx~ 79. 
97 PP, 1816, (472), iv. 24/368. 
98 Memoirs of Sir Samuel Romilly, iii. 233. 
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decisive. Romilly was prepared to accept an imperfect 
Court rather than no Court at all. He was supported 
by James Abercrombie, a Scottish Membe½ in his attempt 
to offer sufficient concessions to satisfy opponents, 
while pre:13erving the substance of the Act. This 
practical approach contrasted with the folly of the 
friends of the Court in the Lords. With Rawdon's 
departure to India as Governor General, and Redesdale 
silent (apart from attempting reforms in the Courts of 
Requests in 182099 ) only Stanhope remained, and he had 
more theoretical notions of reform. In 1814 he sought 
the total abolition of arrest on Mesne Process, and on 
the occasion of the visit of the King of Prussia to 
-
the House he interrupted proceedings and demanded that 
d b t t . t ' b d 1 OO S h . d 1 · 1 e or pe i ions e rea. uc i ea ism on y 
endangered the existing reforms. 
In 1815 William Best offered an alternative 
measure to the Commons. In his bill, imprisoned 
debtors were not to be allowed to seek relief until 
they had been in gaol for a period which varied accord-
ing to the composition received by creditors. Those 
able to pay fifteen shillings for every pound of debt 
would be released after three months; those paying 
ten shillings after twelve months; and the majority 
of debtors, who could repay even less, were to suffer 
two years of confinement. This bill was so badly 
99 
100 
PD, ser. 2. i. 742. 
Ghita Stanhope and G.P. Gooch, The Life of 
Charles Third Earl Stanhope, pp. 214-8; 
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drafted that it had to be withdrawn, 101 but it was only 
a prelude to the attack on the bill in the 1816 session. 
The first premonition of the disputes about the 
Court in this session was the number of petitions 
before the House, many of them apparently organised by. 
a "Society for Preventing Frauds in Trade". 102 Then 
on 14 March John Ingram Lockhart, the Lord Advocate of 
Scotland, sought leave to introduce a bill suspending the 
Act. Romilly, Abercrombie and Henry Brougham sought 
to divert the anger against the Act into a Select 
Committee. By a vote of 82 to 71 the Commons decided 
that the bill should continue, but that a Committee 
should also be set up to report on the operation of 
the Act. 103 This Select Committee was the means by 
which suspension of the Redesdale Act was prevented, 
for to it were passed all subsequent complaints. The 
second reading of Lockhart's bill was delayed while 
the Committee heard evidence from members of the 
Society for Preventing Frauds on Trade and from other 
traders and lawyers; from Charles Runnington who was 
the new Commissioner of the Court, and from Richard 
Grasswell, the Secretary of the Thatched House Society. 
Most of the evidence was critical of the Court. Every 
wholesaler in London was said to be against the Act, 
and prices were said to have risen by ten percent as 
101 1!2ll, xxx. 493-8, 1001. Cf. Metropolitan 
Magazine, xi. (1834-5). 111. 
102 er. Ef, 1816, (472), iv. 20/365. 
103 Ql, lxxi. 195; PD, ser. 1. xxxiii. 287-292. 
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a result of it. 104 Debtors, it seemed, saw Court relief 
as an alternative to the payment of debts. The creditor 
was no longer the only one who could afford to bargain. 
In the face of such evidence, the Committee 
seemed likely to pnopose suspending the Act. 
prisoners were unhappy with Lockhart's bill. 
Only the 
On 13 June, 
when the Committee met to draft its conclusions, 
Romilly attended and argued against suspension with 
all the eloquence of which he was capable. Romilly 
felt that he turned the tone of the meeting, 105 for the 
Committee only recommended that a bill be passed which 
allowed the Court to refuse relief to any "grossly 
unjust" debtor. It recommended that more extensive 
alterations be carried out in the next session. 106 
Thus late in the session the suspending bill 
was dropped, another bill was rushed through both houses 
to effect the suggestion, (56 Geo. III c. 102), and the 
Court was saved. The sessions of 1817 and 1818 saw 
no discussion of the Act at all. 
The Redesdale J\ct was due to expire in 1819, 
and inevitably this reopened the debate. The Attorney 
General proposed the establishment of another Select 
Committee into the Court, and the flood of petitions 
recommenced. In the House a chief critic of the Act 
was Robert Waithman, Member for London, who was a 
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His complaint was that the bill was fundamentally 
Here was fifteen millions of' property 
all taken from the profits of' the 
most honest, the most industrious, 
the most laborious and the most moral 
part of his majesty's subjects. 
(Hear, hear!)107 
Waithman was defending his kith and kin; that he 
should be so defensive is an indication of the differ-
ence in mood from that of 1816. He pleaded that the 
membership of' the Committee should include others than 
lawyers, who had little interest in the real needs of 
creditors. (It is curious that the old complaint by 
debtors that lawyers and creditors were in league was 
thus inverted.) Further appeals from creditors were 
organised by a "Mutual Communication Society for the 
Protection of' Trade. 11108 However a careful examina-
tion of' the petitions on the subject reveals that at 
least a third were prepared to see the Court continue, 
as long as its constitution was ref'ormed. 109 The 
Committee heard a large number of submissions, and 








to express the most decided approbation 
of' the principle, on which they conceive 
the Laws f'or the Relief' of Insolvent 
Debtors were founded. ••• But it must 
be observed that ••. the provisions of 
the law are so defective, and the 
practice of' the Insolvent Debtors Court 
has been such, that in its practical 
operation it has hitherto been productive 110 
of' considerable injustice and inconvenience. 
ser. 1 • xxxix. 181. 
CJ, lxxiv. 194. 
ibid, 239, 25L~, 266, 270, etc. 
"Report••• on Acts respecting Insolvent Debtors", 
1819, (287), ii. 3/324. PP, 
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The Committee, which included Waithman, believed 
that alterations in the procedure of the Court could 
overcome previous problems. They felt that the new 
act should increase the number of Commissioners in the 
Court to three. This would enable closer examination 
of the debtor's honesty, and the debtor was to be 
required to produce a schedule of his property within 
fourteen days of his imprisonment. 
This wise Report was largely the work of Viscount 
Althorp, the able and fairminded Whig Who was later to 
be important in the reorganisation of his Party. 
Althorp promptly introduced a revised bill incorporating 
the Committee's recommendations on 20 May. Unfortunate-
ly this bill took a month to proceed through the Commons, 
and in the Lords opposition was so fierce, and time so 
short before the end of the session, that with the 
consent of Eldon, Redesdale, and Auckland, the bill 
. 111 was on 7 July voted down. 
The Lords were quite prepared to temporarily 
continue the Redesdale Act, although there was adivi-
sion in the Commons over this move. Before the 
revised act, (1 Geo. IV c.119), was finally passed, in 
the second session of 1821, there had been a brief 
interim in which the Insolvent Court had to be 
suspended because the act had expired. This brief 
period, when relations between debtors and creditors 
reverted to their basis before 1813, demonstrated how 
universal was revulsion now at the old law. In 
Althorp's comment, it was now unthinkable that the 
imprisonment of the debtor should be at the discretion 
111 ill, ser. 1. xl. 1557. 
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of the creditor. 112 
The reforms of these years did not abolish 
imprisonment for debt. But they challenged the 
fundamental principle of the old law - the absolute 
right of the creditor over his debtor's body. Changing 
this law was a slow process. A.V. Dicey characterized 
the period from 1800 to 1830 as a time of legislative 
quiescence, and although Henry Parris has challenged 
many aspects of Dicey's interpretation, he does not 
contest this one./11 3 This reform is an exception to 
that generalisation, but the generalisation helps to 
explain the fierce resistance that even so moderate. a 
reform encountered. 
Given the nature of the resistance it is perhaps 
surprising that the bill passed at all. Until 1821 
traders were vociferously opposed to change, and their 
opposition was better organised than the reformers ever 
were. Despite this, Parliament acted to curtail the 
powers of creditors. In the Lords the reformers were 
an assortment of ~Whigs and Tories moved by paternalism 
and compassion. In the Commons law reformers, influenced· 
by Bentham, though few in number exerted an influence. 
Above all, popular attitudes to imprisonment for debt 
eventually became Parliamentary attitudes. On the 
other hand, the Morality of Trade found few spokesmen 
in the House, with the exception of the most radical 
112 PD, ser. 2. i. 605. 
113 H. Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy, p. 262ff. 
members who often owed their seats to the support of 
small traders, and of the more conservative members 
who would defend any aspect of the old law. Hence 
Trading Morality gave way to Humanity and Liberty, 




REACHING A VERDICT 
The Redesdale Act of 1813 set in motion a 
series of alterations to the debtor laws that gradually 
reduced imprisonment to a brief and relatively painless 
excursion to gaol. These changes diminished the 
effectiveness of such confinement as an inducement 
for the payment of debts. The changes did not destroy 
objections to the principle; indeed reformers became 
more absolute in their condemnation as peripheral 
abuses were removed. Thus the period till 1840 was 
characterised by increased public debate on the issue. 
Trading opinion found it had no chance of bringing 
about a return to the old law, and no satisfaction 
with the new, and its objections to further changes 
were less and less respected. 
Yet the acts of 1838, 1842, and 1844 did not 
result solely from one political debate, and they were 
not Party policy as such, for the first act was passed 
when the Whigs were in power, and the others when the 
Tories were. Institutional and administrative problems 
greatly reinforced political motives. The whole field 
of mercantile law was under pressure in the early 
nineteenth century. There was a great increase in 
resort to law for the enforcement of contracts, and 
not just the recovery of debts from individuals. 
Indeed bailable process, (that is, arrest of the 
person on Mesne Process) accounted for only one-third 
of actions brought by creditors in the year 1813; and 
serviceable procedure two-thirds. 1 Moreover the 
cumbersome nature or the procedures laid down in the 
Redesdale Act ror the relier or debtors, itselr 
necessitated rurther changes in the law. 
THE TEMPLE TO SEEDINESS 
The Court ror the Relier or Insolvent Debtors, 
in Portugal Street Lincoln's Inn, had an unsavoury 
reputation. Charles Dickens in his rirst popular 
serialised novel described the Court as it was seen 
by contemporaries. Crowded with "destitute shabby-
genteel" debtors, the ":Lorty room, ill-lighted and 
worse ventilated", smelt or beer and spirits. The 
attornies there were greasy and mildewed; the wigs 
or the barristers poorly powdered. It was, Dickens 
concluded, "a temple dedicated to the Genius or 
Seediness. 112 
The Court was the product or the 1813 Redesdale 
Act. Berore 1813 release or debtors had been a 
responsibility or the Justices. Arter the passage 
177. 
or a temporary insolvent act, they used to hear petitions 
rrom large numbers or debtors. They proceeded with 
more haste than caution, and remands were probably rew. 
The total cost or his release to the debtor was some 
two or three guineas including court costs. 3 A 
1 pp, 1831-2, ( 239), XXV • 12 • 
2 Dickens, Pickwick Papers, pp. 611-2. 
3 W. Jones, Observations on the Insolvent Debtors Act, 
(1827), pp. 7-8. 
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permanent relief system would have overburdened the 
Justices, and therefore the 1813 act set up a Court. 
Also the permanent act was established not simply to 
clear the gaols, as its predecessors were, but also to 
provide selective relief for debtors willing to satisfy 
their creditors. Consequently a more professional 
administrative and investigating body was necessary. 
The Court therefore housed a Commissioner, who 
heard petitions for relief, and assessed opposition 
from creditors. Responsible to him were assignees 
appointed for each prisoner, who supervised the equal 
distribution of assets to the creditors. The 
Commissioner could bring in a verdict of fraud or 
deceit, or concealment of assets, and remand such 
offenders for up to five years, unless their creditors 
subsequently released them. 4 The Justices continued 
to perform some of these duties for county prisoners, 
to relieve the Commissioner, who was stationed in London. 
There was a dramatic increase in the numbers 
of imprisoned debtors during the early period of the 
Court's existence. Al though some observers blamed 
this increase on the economic crisis of the post-war 
years, it can be largely attributed to the legal 
changes, which aided the existing rise in debtor 
numbers. Indeed at least five percent of the increased 
committals were actually prisoners transferring by 
habeas corpus from country prisons to London, where 
the Court was near at hand. 5 As has been shown, 
4 53 Geo. III c. 102, ss. 1-ii, viii-x, xiii-xv. 
5 PP, 1819, (287), ii. 178/498. 
before 1813 the number of debtors was proportionate to 
the economic environment, but from 1813 to 1818, in 
four years this relationship was inverted. 6 The 
period after 1811 was economically very unstable. 
Rostow recorded deep troughs in 1811 and 1816, and so 
perhaps the situation was too abnormal to conform to 
statistical predicti.ons. Yet the existence of the 
Court does seem to have initially inclined creditors 
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to imprison their clients in the hope of thus being 
paid, and in the longer term debtors were induced to 
seek arrest and subsequent relief as a solution to their 
financial troubles. As the Keeper of Lincoln Castle 
told the 1816 Parliamentary Committee: 
Whenever we discharge a score, they 
only go and tell their necessitous 
neighbours the way in which they may 
obtain similar relief; and a great 
many are imprisoned at the suit of 
relstions.7 
Debtors began to seek a "friendly arrest" by arrangement 
with some "creditor" who was no creditor at all. In 
these circumstances, gaolers sensed that a far wider 
range of persons was now being imprisoned than had 
previously been the case, and these included many of 
the "humbler characters in life. 118 By 1819 this 
trend was even more evident, and in consequence both 
the debts for which debtors were imprisoned and their 
capacity to pay had diminished. The Clerk of the 
Insolvency Court told the Parliamentary Committee in 
6 Cf. Appendix Three. 
7 PP, 1816, (472), iv. 58-9/L~02-3. 
8 Ibid, p. 50/394. 
that year that: 
the greater body of' persons who apply· 
now under this act of' parliament are 
certainly poorer than they used to be; 
their schedules contain9much less both 
of debits and credits. 
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This is partly explained by the many cases where debtors 
"gave" their property to a relative to hold in trust 
while they were in prison, but the decrease in listed 
debts suggests that the increase in litigation to 
recover debts reached its nemesis with the advent of 
the Insolvent Debtors Court. 
Complaints about the Court from traders led to 
statutory alterations to its powers and organisation. 
In an 1814 act, (54 Geo. III c. 23), the powers of the 
Court in the counties were more carefully defined, and 
the Quarter Sessions given some duties. In an 1 81 6 act, 
(56 Geo. III c. 102), debtors "guilty of gross injustice 
toward their creditors" were made liable to severe 
punishment by the Court. The problem of debtors who 
were distant from London troubled the Court officials. 
When the Redesdale Act expired in 1819, the new act, 
(1 Geo. IV c.119), increased the number of Commissioners 
to three, two of whom were to itinerate separately 
through the counties. Not every Member of the House 
of Commons wanted a larger Court of this kind, with 
the expense it entailed, 10 but efficiency triumphed 
over economy, and the machinery of the Court was enlarged. 
9 PP, 1819, (287), ii. 56/376. 
10 PD, ser. 2. i. 868-9. 
The same need led to further Government legislation 
in 1822, (3 Geo. IV c. 123), and 1824, (5 Geo. IV 
c. 61 ) , which amended the main act. The former 
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statute established a Provisional Assignee as an 
.employee of the Court, empowered to receive the property 
of debtors. The right of the Court to invest 
unclaimed money was acknowledged, and it was 
permitted to build a court-house in London. The 
latter act abolished all the powers of the Justices 
in insolvency cases, and instead appointed Examiners 
in every county, who were to scrutinise petitions and 
advise the Commissioner when he arrived to hear the 
cases. Thus the Court grew larger. 
In 1826 when the main act again expired, further 
revisions were made to it. The new statute, (7 Geo. IV 
c. 57), consolidated the experience of previous years. 
It also allowed debtors to seek relief immediately after 
they entered the prison, instead of waiting three 
months. This act was subsequently renewed with few 
changes in 1830, (11 Geo. IV c. 38), in 1834 (2 Will. 
IV c. 44), and in 1837, (6 & 7 Wil1, IV c. 44). By 
1837 the Court was an institution, the powers of which 
had grown greatly, as had its staff. The Court was 
therefore a candidate for what Oliver MacDonagh has 
called "an administrative or governmental revolution. 1111 
Insolvency legislation can be explained to fit 
MacDonagh's thesis that there is a "model" for the 
growth of Government Offices, with their expanding 
11 o. MacDonagh, "The Nineteenth Century Revolution 
in Government", Histor:iml Journal, i. (1958). 52. 
competence and sphere of interest. Admittedly the 
"first stage" of his model, which is the realisation 
of a social evil and first legislation, would have to 
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be dated earlier than in his examples, for such legisla-
tion for the relief of insolvent debtors was passed 
in the eighteenth century. However it was not until 
the nineteenth century that the second stage; the 
realisation that previous legislation was inadequate, 
and the third stage; the appointment of executive 
officers in an Insolvent Debtors Court, took place. 
This suggests that the nineteenth century did indeed 
see revolutionary new patterns of government. Only 
in the nineteenth century was a permanent relief system 
administered by Government officials advocated for 
debtors. Redesdale's Act, though it only slipped 
through Parliament, began efficient control of the 
problem. 
MacDonagh's fourth stage, ·where a central body 
is established and proceeds to formulate its own 
regulations and legislation, and lli.s fifth stage of 
consolidating legislation and a self-sustaining 
bureaucracy, both fit insolvency legislation well. 
The increased number of Commissioners, and the 
appointment of Examiners, enabled greater centralisa-
tion; the 1826 consolidating act with its extended 
powers and reduced period of imprisonment shows the 
legislative aspect, and thus MacDonagh's model is 
vindicated. 12 Moreover the same period saw an 
12 For all the above, cf. ibid, pp. 58-61. 
extension of the new law to Ireland. After 1801, 
Irish insolvency bills had normally accompanied those 
for England through the House. The 1813 Redesdale 
Act was modified in a statute of 1814, (53 Geo. III 
c. 138), for Irish debtors, although rather than set 
up a new court, it operated through the Irish assizes. 
In 1821 however, an Insolvency Court was set up in 
Ire land, ( 1 &2 Geo. IV c. 59), and thereafter English 
legislation was quickly duplicated for Ireland. Thus 
the nineteenth century revolution in government saw 
greater uniformity introduced into the administration 
of debtor relief throughout the United Kingdom, for. 
the reforms brought English practice nearer that of 
Scotland. 
Nevertheless the administrative development 
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of the Insolvent Debtors Court was not always straight-
forward. And although the purpose of MacDonagh's 
model is to explain the development of administration 
apart from the social philosophies in vogue at the 
time, the development of the Court was not determined 
solely by the pragmatic decisions and regulations of 
the officers of the Court. Instead, the Court 
remained the subject of controversy, and in 1838 
and 1842 its area of administrative duties was sharply 
curtailed. These changes were the result of a 
publicity campaign, and of Radical Utilitarian pressure 
in Parliament concerning the whole basis of debtor 
legislation. Their effect was a new cycle of 
administrative developments directed from the Bankruptcy 
Court, and not the Court in Portugal Street. 
Thus there is one weakness of the MacDonagh 
model in this case. It succeeds in organising 
administrative developments into a pattern, but, as 
Henry Parris has commented, 13 it leaves no room for 
the influence of public opinion, especially of the 
Benthamite variety. In this case public opinion 
mainly influenced the Court from outside, for it 
commented on the general question of the rights of 
debtors. But it seems also true that the compre-
hensive aims of the officers of the Court were natural 
only because of the prevalent concept of efficient 
government. 
Unlike the examples MacDonagh cites, the 
problem of debtor relief was not a product of the 
Industrial Revolution. It was a much older problem 
than this, and the basis of the nineteenth century 
answer to it was two-fold. Firstly there was the 
number of debtors involved. A tremendous rise in 
the number of committals for debt in the first decade 
of the century forced Parliament either to face 
passing annual temporary insolvency acts, or to pass 
a permanent act. That the latter was passed, despite 
strong opposition, is a sign of the second aspect of 
the basis. This was the interest of the Commons and 
the Lords in "permanent" solutions to social problems. 
These two factors continued to affect the Court, and 
cause its expansion, elaboration, and finally its 
dissolution! Table Six indicates the changing amount 
13 H. Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy, p. 268ff. 
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business in the Court: 
TABLE SIX 
PETITIONS BY INSOLVENT DEBTORS 
TO THE COURT, 1813-1846. 14 
1813 1447 1830 5185 
1814 2464 1831 5261 
1815 3344 1832 5535 
1816 4060 1833 5086 
1817 3970 1834 5116 
1818 3909 1835 4624 
1819 3919 1836 4757 
1820 5183 1837 5206 
1821 5611 1838 5254 
1822 5587 1839 3076 
1823 4738 1840 4667 
1824 4503 1841 5103 
1825 4309 1842 5352 
1826 4490 1843 4461 
1827 5665 1844 2905 
1828 4571 1845 1292 
1829 5117 1846 1461 
The numb.er of debtors seeking relief through the 
Court rose until 1821, but thereafter stabilised. 
After 1838 a series of bills progressively stripped 
the Court of its clientele. Within those years 1813 
to 1838, the Court in Portugal Street attracted many 
comments, most of them unfavourable, both from 
supporters and opponents of change~ 15 At issue were 
the powers of the Court and the justice of its 
procedure. Its attornies, its fees, its remands 
and its distribution of property to creditors were 
all disputed. 
14 .£1:, 1847-8, (120), li. 172. 
15 Cf. PP, 1831-2, (239), xxv. 54. 
Palmer. 
The first Commissioner of the Court was Arthur 
His administration appears to have been 
dilatory, and by the time of his death in April 1815 
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there was a long backlog of petitions. His successor, 
appointed in June of that year, was Charles Runnington, 
and he took a casual attitude to his duties, rarely 
. 11 · t d d b t t th . t f d · t 1 6 w1 1ng o reman e ors a e ins ance o ere 1 ors. 
Runnington instituted a scale of fees, which were the 
subject of sharp criticism from the Select Committee 
of the House of Commons in 1819. "The Commissioner 
did not state any particular inconvenience to have 
occurred during the time of his predecessor from such 
fees not having been established", they noted, and 
contrasted his allegation that the fees were necessary 
to supplement the salary of the Chief Clerk with the 
fact that "a considerable share of them he has 
appropriated to himself". Runnington was paid a 
salary of £2000 per year, which the minimum fees of 
£1.5s per debtor handsomely supplemented. 17 The 
Commissioner defended the fees as necessary to control 
proceedings in the Court. 18 He was eventually 
relieved of his post. 
A scale of fees, albeit reduced, remained after 
his departure, and remained contentious. A further 
much criticised fee was added; it was paid to the 
Provisional Assignee for witnessing the debtor's 
16 Cf. PP, 1819, (287), ii. 153/473. 
17 Ibid, pp. 5-6/325-6. 
18 Ibid, p. 148/468. 
schedule. One commentator set the total expenses of 
relief, including lawyers' fees, at £25. 19 This 
estimate was probably too high, but the 1831 Royal 
Commission estimated costs of £10 per debtor, and 
popular writers complained that they were excessive. 20 
In 1827 the issue of fees was aired in an exchange of 
pamphlets between the Marshal of King's Bench prison, 
William Jones (who had his own reasons for wanting the 
gaols to be full), and Henry Dance who was the capable 
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Provisional Assignee of the Court. Jones, distrustful 
of any new-fangled administrative revolution, claimed 
that the Insolvency Court existed only to make profits 
from debtors, and should be abolished. 21 Henry Dance 
insisted that Jones exaggerated the fees, and claimed 
that the Commissioners were eager to reform the 
procedures of the Court. 22 
This dispute was really about the revolution in 
the administration of debtor relief and its motives. 
Associated with it were complaints about the new breed 
of agents who represented the debtors in the Court. 
Jones called them "harpies", who charged £6 even to 
consider a case, and he estimated that there were five 
or six hundred of them. 23 Certainly the 1819 Committee 
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had no legal training but were themselves discharged 
insolvents. 24 The trained attornies who did act as 
agents constantly agitated to have all others excluded 
f'rom the Court. They blamed on other agents all the 
grievances of' the insolvents. While such II low 
attornies" dominated the Court, few qualified lawyers 
would enter it. However, it required little legal 
expertise to represent a debtor in Court, and remands 
were for such vague offences as "gross injustice to 
creditors 11 • Besides this, regular attornies thought 
it "not respectable" to visit the debtor prisons to 
solicit cases and prepare schedules. 25 
Dickens had a low opinion of the attornies in 
26 the Insolvent Debtors Court. He also f'elt that the 
Court could scarcely be expected to fairly determine 
the guilt or innocence of a debtor. Many other 
observers f'elt that this was a chief' f'ault of' the 
Court. It had so many petty rules and requirements 
that it would be impossible f'or a debtor to prepare 
the required schedule of his debts and property to the 
Court's satisfaction, unless he kept an hourly diary: 
"It is hardly possible f'or any Insolvent to take the 
benef'it of it, without being guilty of perjur;x:. 1127 
Meanwhile the Court failed to detect serious offenders 
24 ff, 1819, (287), ii. 183/503. 
25 Ibid, pp. 31-3/352-4, 40-2/361-3, 51-3/372-4. 
26 
27 
Dickens, Pickwick Papers, p. 612. 
W. Jones, p. 21. Cf. H. Jemmett, A Letter to 
Peel, p. 16; R. Gordon, p. 37. 
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who had obtained credit through fraud, or who had 
concealed their property. Between 1813 and 1817, 8634 
debtors were discharged and only 412 were remanded. 
Embezzlement and undue preference to one creditor 
were among the main causes for remand, and no-one was 
remanded for not paying Court fees, despite allegations 
of this. 28 Over the years about five percent of 
petitioning debtors were remanded, and the average 
remand was for six months. 29 
These statistics provide little ground for 
criticism of the Court, but they fail to show what is 
revealed by other figures; that few creditors were 
successful in opposing the discharge of their debtors. 
Some Credit Associations were eventually set up to 
organise opposition to the release of the fraudulent, 
but their efforts seem to have been largely wasted. 
Consequently many traders refused to waste their 
money on defending their rightful interests in the 
Court. 30 They only grumbled when the Court failed 
to use its own initiative in remanding. In effect 
the Court simply absolved petitioners of their debts. 31 
28 PP, 1819, (413), xvi. 89. 
29 PP, 1822, (276), xxi±. 322-3. 
30 PP, 1816, (472), iv. 67/411; ~' 1823, (187), 
xv. 207; J.H. Elliott, Credit the Life of 
Commerce, p. 62. 
31 "Imprisonment for Debt and the Insolvent Debtors 
Court", Fraser's Magazine, ix. ( 1834). 649; 
Article IV, British and Foreign Review, v. (1837). 
86; Imprisonment for Debts Bill: Two Sides, 
( 1 837) , p. 8. 
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Discharge through the Insolvency Court did not 
end liability for debts in the sight of the law, but it 
did reduce the power of the creditor to force his debtor 
to pay. And thus the Court was anomalous in concept. 
Why should only the debtors who petitioned the Court 
for relief be punishable for fraud? What of the 
fraudulent debtor who chose to remain in the liberty 
of the Rules, and not seek relief?32 And why should 
the Court be empowered to sentence a man to three 
years' imprisonment without the aid of a jury and 
without right of appeal?33 
All these faults which traders saw in the Cpurt 
faded before one more monstrous than the rest. The 
Insolvency Court was supposed to discharge debtors 
when they surrendered their assets for distribution 
to their creditors. In fact creditors very rarely 
received any composition from the Court. Till 1817, 
of the £8,863,969.13s.4d owed by the 8634 debtors who 
had been discharged, only £4,788.12s.7d had been 
received to be distributed to creditors. 34 Despite 
later amendments to the machinery of the Court which 
were designed to ensure the seizure of the debtor's 
property, even in its best year the Court received an 
average of only £4 in property from each debtor. Most 
of those who petitioned for relief declared on their 
schedules that they possessed no property beyond the 
32 Article III, Westminster Review, ix. (1828). 60. 
33 R. Gordon, pp. 39-40. 
34 PP, 1817, ( 138), xvi. 91 • 
personal effects they were permitted. When property 
was admitted, administrative costs were deducted by 
the Court before creditors received anything. 
Mercantile opinion regarded the minuteness of 
this dividend as a scandal. Alderman Thompson told 
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the Commons that if this continued, traders would soon 
be absolutely ruined. 35 Others complained that they 
scarcely received a farthing in the pound •. 36 They 
demanded that the law should be reformed, so that the 
debtor's property could be seized as soon as he entered 
the gaol, giving him no time to conceal it. Many 
wished to make the duration of the confinement of the 
debtor proportionate to the extent of his debts that 
he was able to pay. Proportionate imprisonment 
became a favourite suggestion of many mercantile 
commentators. In the Commons Henry Bright, and 
also D.W. Harvey of Colchester and later Southwark, 
advocated it. 37 Traders were convinced that this 
would force the debtor to pay, or else make him more 
cautious in buying on credit. Even a member of the 
Thatched House Society advocated such a proposal, 
but in his version the period of imprisonment was 
also graduated against the amount of the debt. 38 
35 PD, ser. 3. xxiv. 229. 
36 Runnymede Secundus, The Prison House Unmasked, 
p. 26; B. Hawes, The Abolition of Arrest and 
Imprisonment for Debt Considered, (1836), p.34. 
37 PD, ser. 2. viii. 612; ibid, xxiv. 233. 
38 PP, 1819, (287), 11. 36/356; cf. Imprisonment 
for Debts Bill: Two Sides, p. 14. 
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That trading opinion should be bitter about the 
Insolvent Debtors Court is understandable. By provid-
ing a summary procedure which relieved debtors after 
only a short confinement in gaol, the Court reduced 
the coercive power of the old law, without also criminally 
prosecuting the rraudulent. However the traders 
tended to idealise the old law, and ignored the disruptive 
effect of temporary insolvent acts. Traders were also 
wrong to conclude that debtors must have been wasting 
their property in prison, or concealing it, for 
dividends to be so low. At least half of the debtors 
who were confined never went through the Court, for_ 
they were able to offer their creditors acceptable 
compositions. ("Acceptable" meant as low as five 
shillings in the pounds.) The insolvents who did 
petition the Court were naturally those who had so few 
assets that they were unable to offer acceptable 
compositions to their creditors. 39 It seems probable 
that the Assignee and Examiners of the Court were as 
effective as could reasonably have been expected in 
securing property. The interests of creditors were 
probably far better guarded by the Court than by the 
old law. 
If the traders disliked the Court, so too did 
debtors and popular opinion. Reformers accepted the 
need for such a Court, but they did not like the actual 
Court which tried to meet those needs. 40 The Court 
39 Cf. ~, 1831-2, (239), xxv. 54. 
40 Cf. H. Jemmett, p. 25ff. 
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was "looked on with abhorrence and disgust" by popular 
writers, who always sympathised with debtors, and it 
was attacked by the Press, except for The Times. 41 
Mr Dease told the Commons that the Court was "so odious 
that he should willingly support any measure which 
would have the effect of getting rid of it forever. 1142 
Some of its victims were willing to compare the 
Court to the Star Chamber of Stuart England, and there 
was little understanding of the reasons for its 
establishment. In 1833 the Solicitor General was 
forced to admit that the Court "has, without reason, 
become exceedingly unpopular in this country. 1143 
In Parliament, however, opinion was more evenly divided. 
Peter Moore declared that two hundred Committees on 
the Insolvent Debtors Act had been unable to remedy 
its evils. 44 .He, like many re:presentati ves for 
boroughs, repeated the fears of traders that the act 
had relaxed "the stern :principles of commercial 
morality. 1145 Yet Peel, who was not alodf to the 
interests of the commercial community, declared that: 
"he really was not prepared to alter, off-hand, the 
most important laws of the country1146 meaning the laws 
of debtor-creditor relations. Peel in the late 
eighteen-twenties introduced or supported a number 
of bills seeking to establish a more efficient system 
41 British and Foreign Revi~w, v. (1837). 86; 
Imprisonment for Debts Bill: Two Sides, p. 14; 





PD, ser. 3. xxvi. 570. 
1!2.19:, xviii. 788. 
It2.1,g,, ser. 2. viii. 609. 
J.H. Elliott, A Remonstrance addressed to Lord 
Brougham, (1838), p.11. 
46 Ell, ser. 3. i. 129. 
of small debtor courts, but in 1838 he opposed the 
abolition of Mesne Process arrest.47 There may have 
been some Tory opposition to the establishment of the 
Insolvency Court, but many Tories came to regard it as 
the only acceptable kind of reform. 
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The Court in Portugal Street was an institution 
that relieved debtors from prison rather than prevented 
their entry to prison. It therefore reduced the call 
for the older philanthropic institutions while not 
completely eliminating their function. The Thatched 
House Society continued for many years to provide relief 
for honest debtors who owed only small amounts, and. 
whose unfortunate c~rcumstances were proven to the 
Society's satisfaction. Representatives of the 
Society feared that the Insolvent Debtors Court, which 
did not place such a high priority on honesty, had made 
many debtors less willing to pay their debts, and less 
honest also.48 No longer were many debtors desirous 
or deserving of the Society's help, and the Society 
simply assisted those that were through the Insolvency 
Court. 49 Over the fifty-seven years of its existence 
until 1829 the Society had relieved 43,390 debtors at 
a total cost of £147,ooo, 50 but in the period after 
1813 its beneficiaries may well have been largely Court 
of Requests prisoners, who were not eJ.igible for relief 
47 Ibid, ser. 2. xix. 433-4; ibid, ser. 3. xxvii. 1054. 
48 PP, 1816, (472), iv. 62/406; ibid, 1819, (287), 
ii. 36/356. 
49 Ibid, 1816, (472), iv. 62/406; ibid, 1819, (287), 
ii. 13/333, 19/339. 
50 Cited in PD, ser. 2. xx. 443. But cf. J. Wade, 
A Treatise on the Police and Crimes of the Metropolis, 
pp. 132-3. 
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by the Insolvency Court. By 1840 the Society appears 
to have been defunct, for its existence was not record-
ed in the Index to the Reports of the Charity 
Commissioners. One Debtor-Creditor Guide listed the 
Insolvency Court in pride of place among the philanthropic 
organisations concerned with debtors, 51 and with such 
competition it is little wonder that the Thatched 
House Society declined. 
The Insolvent Debtors Court had turned compassion 
into a business, which like every Government-run 
business desired a monopoly. The structure of the 
Court was apparently thought well suited to commercial 
practice, for in 1831 the old system of administering 
bankruptcies by Commissioners and Chancery was 
replaced by a Bankruptcy Court. This new Court, 
with its structure of Commissioners and Accountants 
was almost certainly modelled on the Insolvency Court. 52 
In later years the close relationship of the business 
of these Courts was realised by the Legislature, and 
in 1842 the Bankruptcy Court was assigned. some 
responsibilities relating to insolvent debtors. In 
1861 it absorbed the Court for the Relief of Insolvent 
Debtors altogether. The reproduction was more 
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Article IV, British and Foreign Review~ xvi. 
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On bankruptcy reform, cf. Select Essays in Anglo-
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THE ABOLITION OF MESNE PROCESS IMPRISONMlill':rT 
In 1838 Parliament passed a bill to abolish 
arrest on Mesne Process, only reserving the procedure 
to the discretion of Judges. This measure succeeded 
because there was no direct conflict between the old 
law and the reform proposals. Because the Insolvency 
Court already provided relief for those who were 
imprisoned for debt, Mesne Process arrest was rio 
longer such an effective incentive for the payment 
of debts. The Legislature had already recognised 
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the right of debtors to be speedily released from gaol; 
it seemed a small step to curtail the right to imprison. 
Consequently there was no direct Party struggle 
over the issue of reform. Even Lord Eldon was quoted 
in condemnation of the power of a·rrest, which he 
called "permission to tear a father from his weeping 
children, the husband from the distressed wife, and 
to hurry him to a dungeon, to linger out a life of 
pain and misery. 1154 If in retrospect Eldon condemned 
the old law, then Tory opposition to reform was not 
inevitable. Indeed in the eighteen-twenties many 
reformers looked to Peel for le~dership. Henry 
Jemmett addressed his comments to Peel, on the basis 
of his "known liberality of mind II and his support 
for Scriptural principles. 55 Peel disappointed these 
hopes. His only interest was in small debtor courts, 
54 
55 
Quoted by Fraser's Magazine, xvii. (1838), 174; 
cf. PD, ser. 3. xxvi. 1165. 
Jemmett, p. 4. 
and he strongly objected to the total abolition of 
imprisonment for debt. 56 But he and other opponents 
emphasised their sympathy for debtors, instead of 
advancing only the interests of traders. 
The case for reform, as stated by nineteenth 
century Radicals, had evolved some distance from 
eighteenth century arguments. There was inevitably 
less stress on the sufferings of debtors. Henry 
Thornton's 1813 act had greatly reduced the likelihood 
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of debtors starving in gaol. Only the emotions and the 
reputations of debtors were now vulnerable. Their 
worst dangers were those of inebriation, moral cor_rup-
tion and family distress. "Thousands are broken down 
in mind under these oppressive legal proceedings", 
declared a WTiter in Fraser's Magazine, 57 but he 
apparently knew none broken down in body. It is 
significant that reform was sought on principle, and 
not simply because of the sufferings the system caused. 
Eighteenth century philanthropy had sought to remedy 
sufferings within the existing structures of society. 
In this they succeeded, but in the process demands 
to alter the structures themselves were aroused. 
In part traders joined in this cry. They 
wanted more recourse to the property of the debtor, 
and criminal prosecution for the fraudulent. Traders 
and reformers essentially differed over the empirical 
issue of whether most debtors had been unable to pay 
56 Cf. also PD, ser. 2. xvii. 231-2. 
57 Loe. cit., ix. (1834), 653. 
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the debt when it was contracted, or whether subsequent 
unf'ortunate circumstances had caused this. The trader, 
assuming the f'ormer, wanted to inculcate in the debtor 
shame at his wickedness; 58 the ref'ormer, assuming the 
latter, was shocked that traders could imprison 
unf'ortunate men. 
J.R. Mcculloch, the author of' the popular 
Commercial Dictionary. supported the abolition of 
imprisonment for debt, 59 but he was more of a 
humanitarian than many economists of the period, and 
was criticised for his attitude. In general the 
literature of reform adopted a different attitude to 
commercial obligations than that taken by the traders. 
This theme had eighteenth century precedents; but 
another traditional theme, criticism of the harshness 
of lawyers, had now evaporated. In the nineteenth 
century reform was promoted by lawyers in legal 
terminology. There were still a few complaints at 
lawyers who used the law to harm the interests of 
debtors, but virulent attacks on lawyers are only to 
be found in the writings of traders. 60 The commercial 
classes were the only remaining defenders of the old 
law, and they in themselves had not the influence to 
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The movement to abolish imprisonment for debt 
was in some senses a campaign against the rights of 
traders to determine their own mercantile law, and it 
was more influenced by European examples than trading 
opinion. Reformers cited the examples of Scotland, 
Portugal, France, and the United States, where there 
had been recent changes in insolvency law. English 
use of arrest for debt was, in the words of a 
Benthamite observer, "a greater hardship than was to 
be found in any christian or heathen country. 1161 
Foreign influence may well have had more influence 
on many English reforms than is usually allowed. 
The constitutional rights of the debtor were 
still stressed by nineteenth century reformers. 
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These rights were derived from the principles of Liberty 
and Equality. The Law was old and archaic and 
therefore the time to alter it had arrived. The 
argument from Magna Carta so beloved to the eighteenth 
century reformer was now too conservative a basis on 
which to promote change. 
Such generalisations serve the most prominent 
part of the nineteenth century literature of reform. 
Close scrutiny reveals the existence of a less 
articulate group of reformers, who revived and continued 
eighteenth century arguments which others dismissed as 
61 Westminster Review, ix. (1828), 55. Cf. British 
and Foreign Review, v. (1837), 79-80; PP, 1831-2, 
(239), xxv. 55ff, L. Leone "On the Abolition of 
Imprisonment for Debt", (1874), p. 310. 
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antiquated. For example, a writer in Fraser's Magazine 
in 1838 mounted an attack on both the debtor laws and 
the Whigs. He wrote: 
Every true Conservative must feel his 
honour 'concerned for Magna Charta and 
the laws' and by firmly demanding that 
it be forthwith restored in its purity, 
a new era in let±slation will be 
established, by which every proposed 
enactment will be referred to principle; 
it will constitute an impenetrable 
bulwark against headlong republican 
reforrn.62 
Reform, for this writer, was only a return to the 
ancient law. It was a curious argument, very similar 
in logic to the comments of "Runnymede Secundus", who, 
as his name implies, regarded Magna Carta as the 
Constitution of England. Runnymede called himself 
a "follower of Bentham", but his descriptions of the 
sufferings of debtors, and his condemnation of the 
Rich and the Papists are gui te unlike the practical 
emphasis of Benthamite argurnents. 63 Runnymede looked 
to the Queen, the Church, and the Constitution. 
Although he mentioned the Insolvency Court, his real 
argument was based on humanitarian grounds. In many 
senses it was an extension of the earlier Evangelical 
arguments, and indeed another example of such criticism 
of the laws can be cited from a Victorian evangelistic 
magazine, and still others from Tory jonrnals. 64 
62 ,Loe. cit., xvii. (1838), 186. 
63 Runnymede Secundus, Magna Charta 5hown to have been 
Violate,g] (1837), p. 1. 
64 "The Cork Literary Victim of Imprisonment for Debt", 
Mariners Church Gos el Tern erance Soldiers and 
Sailors Magazine, ii. 3. 18 , 1-:53ff; Cf. "On 
Imprisonment for debt" Q:.M., xci. (1821), pt. 1. 
589-590. 
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Most of those who published arguments for reform 
in the nineteenth century were intellectuals of the 
Radical party. The Westminster Review in 1828 declared 
itself on the issue; it went further than Bentham in 
proposing the entire abolition of the practice. 65 
Abolition was a minor part of the Radical programme. 
Runnymede Secundus and his friends were very suspicious 
of such advocates of "republican reform". They thought 
that there was an alliance between Radicalism and 
Trade and that there could be no sincere desire for 
reform from such a group. And indeed the Radicals 
were divided over the question. J. S. Mill in 1848. 
complained that reform of the debtor laws was "an 
affair of humanity only, not of' justice 11 , 66 and such 
belated complaints seem to have had sufficient pre-
cursors to make those who used traditional arguments 
doubt if the Radicals cared about the common man. 
In actual fact the campaign to abolish the 
practice was won over the legal issue used by Radicals, 
and not over the traditional arguments. All of 
Runnymede's descriptions of the horrors of imprison-
ment, (" a refinement of cruelty exceeding the 
ingenuity in torturing of' a New Zealand savage 1167 ), 
had no effect, compared to the legal arguments of 
Brougham. And it was Brougham, not Peel, who sponsored 
65 Loe. cit., ix. (1828), 68. 
66 J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Econom~. p. 907. 
67 Runnymede, The Prison House Unmasked, p. 28. 
the re:form. The campaign Brougham mounted attacked a 
legal sub-division of the debtor law: arrest on Mesne 
Process. 
The demand :for the abolition o:f arrest on Mesne 
Process was first voiced in Parliament one year after 
the passage of the Redesdale Act. 
by Matthew Stott was presented: 
In 1814 a petition 
praying that an Act may pass to 
abolish :forever by Law Imprisonment 
for Debt on Mesne Process, or that 
some check may be put to the exist-
ing power of the :fictitious creditor, 
by means o:f which the civil liberty 
o:f the subject may be most grossly 
violated.68 
A series of similar petitions :followed during that 
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session. In the Lords they were taken up by Stanhope, 
who suddenly demanded total reform. He declared that 
justice was sold in England, and that "the too great 
increase in credit was one o:f the greatest curses" 
o:f the country. 69 Stanhope and the petitioners 
mistakenly thought that the Redesdale Act indicated 
Parliamentary readiness to rewrite the debtor laws, 
But Stanhope in the Lords and Sir Francis Burdett in 
the Commons were the sole advocates of such a move, 
the unpopularity o:f which was evident in the reaction 
of the Lords to Stanhope's bill, 
In the public mind, re:form o:f Mesne Process 
was seen as an important goal. It proved easier to 
argue that arrest should not be allowed without court 
68 CJ, lxix. 330. 
69 PD, ser. 1, xxvii, 420. 
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approval than to demand an end to imprisonment on execu-
tion. All reputable political economists thought 
that the law should enforce contracts, but the plaintiff 
might use Mesne Process arrest when no contract had ever 
existed. 
Thus in 1838 the Lords' Committee deleted the 
section abolishing imprisonment on execution from 
Cottenham's bill, but passed the remainder which abolish-
ed arrest on Mesne Process. The campaign had really 
only stressed the latter aspect. Among the lower 
orders, criticism of Mesne Process imprisonment was 
spread by John Wade, in his notorious Black Book and 
later works. Wade, a journalist who had co-operated 
with Joseph Hume, found a great deal to criticise in 
the state of English society, and the law of arrest 
was not lowest on his list. He described it as an 
attorney's plot, and he encouraged debtors to take 
revenge on their creditors by various legal expedients. 70 
If Wade persuaded the lower orders, then Brougham 
in his speech of 7 February 1828 persuaded Parliament. 
Brougham's subject was the Courts of Common Law, and 
he outlined all the illogicities and absurdities of 
the Common Law in his five hour address. In his 
discussion of the debtor laws, he argued that imprison-
ment should only be allowed when criminal or fraudulent 
acts were involved. 71 The Commission that was formed 
70 J. Wade, The Extraordinary Black Book, (1831), 
pp. 263-5; A Treatise on the Police and Crimes 
of the Metropolis, pp. 119~34. 
71 ~, ser. 2, xviii. 234, 192-4. Cf. c. New, 
The Life of Henry Brougham, i. 397-8. 
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to consider the subject matter of his speech reached 
similar conclusions. 
Brougham's great speech aroused political interest 
in the administration of the civil law, but it must be 
seen in context. It was not the first occasion on 
which these abuses had been drawn to the attention of 
the House. Like the debtor laws, the other subjects 
of Brougham's speech had been discussed separately on 
other occasions. His achievement was to make the 
House consider them as aspects of one problem. A 
year prior to this speech, on 3 April 1827, Joseph Hume, 
another Utilitarian Radical, had proposed the abolition 
of arrest on Mesne Process, and asked that a Select 
Committee investigate the problem. 72 He was seconded 
by Hobhouse, another Benthamite, and member for 
Westminster, who had condemned the law in the House in 
1823. 73 When they were rebuffed, Hume introduced a 
bill co-sponsored by Brougham and Kannedy which would 
have replaced Mesne Process arrest by the use of a 
serviceable writ on the authority of a judge. Arrest 
would only be permitted by the judge if the flight of 
the debtor was anticipated. More effective processes 
against the debtor's property were to secure it for 
the creditor after a few months, and imprisonment on 
execution would only occur if the debtor prevented 
the seizure of this property.74 
72 PD, ser. 2. xvii. 223-8. 
73 Ibid, ix. 376. 
74 PP, 1826-7, (357), ii. 55. 
This may be taken as 
the Radical rormula ror rerorm, which also emulated 
Scottish laws rairly closely. 
In the upshot an act was passed that session 
curtailing the power to arrest, although Hume cannot 
alone be credited ror it. For when the House came to 
examine Hume's bill it was round that the act passed 
in 1811 to limit Mesne Process arrest ror debts over 
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£15 had expired unnoticed in 1824. Thererore only 
debts under £10 were now immune. Peel had been only 
willing to orrer Hume an inquiry into the state or the 
debtor prisons, but this discovery rorced him to admit 
the need ror legislation. 75 At this very time negotia-
tions were continuing ror the rormation or the Canning 
Ministry. The responsibilities or Attorney General 
were passed rrom the Tory Sir Charles Wetherell to Sir 
James Scarlett, a Whig, who was personally willing to 
ban all arrests below £10o. 76 The new Ministry, in 
an attempt to appease liberal opinion, introduced a 
bill limiting the power or arrest to debts or £20 and 
above. {7 & 8 Geo. IV c. 71.) There was general 
satisraction at what was described (inaccurately) as 
a compensation for inflation. Only the Westminster 
Review was unhappy, for it preferred Hume's bil1. 77 
The attitude of the Radicals was thought 
unrealistic by many political observers. 
75 1:12, ser. 2. xvii. 231, 233. 
76 Ibid, xvii. 1131. 
Wetherell 
77 Loe. cit., ix. (1828), 62. The post-1815 price 
index is debatable, but probably declined. 
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declared that no person involved in trade would tolerate 
Hume's bill, 78 and others agreed. The Radicals had 
their own information about trading opinion. They 
knew traders who doubted the effectiveness of the 
existing powers of arrest, and who were prepared to 
have such powers curtailed in exchange for easier 
execution against property, such as Hume's bill offered. 
Hobhouse had in 1823 presented a petition to the House 
from two or three thousand "respectable tradesmen" of 
Westminster, praying that the insolvency laws be 
assimilated into the bankruptcy act. 79 It was a 
foretaste of changing attitudes. 
The felt ineffectiveness of arrest helped the 
Radicals to justify their attitude to the many traders 
in their constituencies. Brougham himself, in his 
attitude to Orders-in-Council and the Property Tax 
and his demand in 1812 for a Select Committee on the 
State of Trade, had sought the favour of traders, and 
liberal opinion was very much strengthened by support 
from urban merchants and bankers. The Radicals 
hoped to avoid losing this support by stressing the 
creditor's need for new laws, but such policies were 
still far more acceptable to the lower orders, and 
the Tories were more responsive to trading opinion. 
The Radicals were not primarily concerned to appease 
constituents. Beginning with a Utilitarian philosophy 
that the law needed to be remoulded to better provide 
for the needs of society, they believed that when the 
78 PD, ser. 2. xvii. 230. 
79 Ibid, ix. 376. 
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new laws were in operation the traders would then accept 
them. The reforming Royal Commissions of the first 
half of the nineteenth century shared such goals, and 
consequently Brougham's Commission on the Common Law 
Courts was a powerful advocate for radical reform of 
the debtor laws. 
The Commission met for four years from 1829, and 
produced five.reports, of which the first and fourth 
dealt with civil imprisonment, and the fifth with the 
Courts of Requests. The Commissioners were largely 
lawyers who accepted the need for reform. J. Frederick 
Pollock was destined to be a great judge and a Tory. 
member of the Commons. Thomas Starkie and William 
Wightman were both well-born, and both were technical 
experts in the processes of law. Henry J. Stephen had 
already made a reputation as an expert on Pleading. 80 
Less is known of the other Commissioners. 
Their first report dealt with the procedures of 
the Common Law, and avoided much discussion of insolvency 
procedures because they were not simply legal formulae 
but also matters of commercial policy. As legal 
processes alone they were surely uns~tisfactory~ for 
the Commission estimated that only one third of all 
writs of capias ever resulted in arrest. 81 
80 Pollock, :m:m_, xvi. 68; Starkie, ibid, xv111. 997; 
Wightman, 1J21.9:, xxi. 196; Stephen, 1!21.£, xviii. 
1047. 
81 First Report of the Commissioners, PP, 1829, (46), 
ix. 71. 
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By the time the Commissioners had completed their 
third report, Brougham was Lord Chancellor in the new 
Whig administration. Perhaps at his volition they 
next turned their attention to imprisonment for debt, 
thus submitting the practice to the kind of investiga-
tion Hume had requested in 1827. They found it very 
difficult to reach definite conclusions. The fourth 
report offered a closely reasoned argument that, 
other than for fraudulent or absconding debtors, 
"imprisonment for debt is neither warranted in principle, 
nor beneficial in practice. 1182 But such conclusions 
were reached only at the expense of the unanimity of 
the Commissioners. Appended to the report was a 
thirty page defence of the existing law by Henry J. 
Stephen. 
The Commission took the unusual step of seeking 
the written opinions of large numbers of qualified 
persons as well as hearing witnesses. They submitted 
one list of eighteen questions to more than three 
hundred bankers, merchants, and shopkeepers, and 
another list of thirty-two questions to many lawyers. 
Foreign ambassadors were also called before it to 
describe their laws, which were so often cited by 
reformers. The Commission found that most merchants 
defended their right to arrest debtors, but small 
traders made far more use of Mesne Process, and it 
was they who were most unhappy with the Insolvency 
Court. Bankers and large merchants, in contrast, 
82 Fourth Report of the Commissioners, PP, 1831-2, 
(239), xxv. 44. 
tended to doubt the utility of arrest in most cases. 
The Commissioners agreed with the bankers, not the 
shopkeepers. 83 They recommended the abolition of all 
imprisonment for debt, and its replacement by simpler 
processes against property. 
rrhese conclusions, as cri ties pointed out, 
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arose not so much from the evidence as from the Utilitarian 
principles of the Commissioners. The report stated: 
We know not on what sound principle 
a law can be justified which sanctions 
injustice to some for the sake of 
benefit to others, or how any law 
can be deemed to be expedient which 
is founded on the direct violation 
of several of the plain and elementary 
rules of justice.84 
They judged the law by the absolutes of equality and 
utility. Such powerful reasoning by Benthami tes was, 
as Parris thought, far more important than pragmatic 
institutional grmvth in helping the debtors' lot. 
Henry Stephen dissented from the Report because he 
worked from different principles. To him it was 
sufficient justification for the law that the traders 
supported it. It was the responsibility of the law 
to defend the "sacredness" of contracts. Certainly 
the debtors needed protection, but he thought that 
this was readily- perhaps too readily - available through 
the Court of Insolvent Debtors. He agreed with the 
recommendations of the other Commissioners that easier 
83 
84 
Ibid, pp. 11, 12, 19. Cf. Tighe, Imprisonment 
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J:E, 1831-2, (239), xxv. 31. Cf. Fraser's 
Magazine, xvii. (1838), 187. 
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access was needed to the debtor's property, but he wanted 
to maintain the power of arrest. 85 
Stephens' ardently worded defence achieved a 
popuJ.arity among traders that nobody accorded to the 
majority report. When Benjamin Hawes wrote in favour 
of abolition in 1836, he found it necessary to specific-
ally rebut Stephens' arguments, and so did the Commission 
which reported in 1840. 86 Traders seem to have been 
looking for spokesmen for their interests. In 1831, 
while the Commission had been sitting, William Best, 
that old opponent of debtors, introduced a "Frauds on 
Creditors" bill into the Lords, where he now sat as 
Baron Wynford. The bill sought to revive and 
strengthen the unused compulsory clauses of the Lords' 
Act, by which a debtor could be forced to surrender his 
property to his creditors and accept his freedom. A 
fierce debate developed in the Lords, and although 
even Eldon ultimately opposed the bill, initially it 
commanded considerable support except from Lord 
Plunkett and the Earl of Fife. 87 A new mood of 
mercantile bitterness at debtors was developing. 
This mood may well explain the curious political 
fortunes of the abolition campaign in the following 
ten years. For while in one sense the issue had never 
been more prominent, with a bill for abolition presented 
to Parliament in every year between 1833 and 1838, 
85 PP, 1831-2, (239), xxv. 46, 75. 
86 B. Hawes, p. 14ff; PP, 1840, (274), xvi. p.ix. 
87 PD, ser. 3. ii. 1-4; ibid, iv. 483-493, 1246-8. 
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even its passage in 1838 was fortuitous. Outside the 
House a growing number of' pamphleteers demanded reform. 
Did this literature have even the slightest influence 
on proceedings in Parliament? 
In the light of the Reform Act of 1832, this 
question has real interest. For one writer in the 
Westminster Review argued that since traders were now 
the largest section of the electorate as a result of the 
enlarged franchise, they ought to bestir themselves 
d . P 1· t t ~ the law. 88 H t d an require ar iamen o re~orm e quo e 
a pamphlet which claimed that: 
to the existing legal system, more than 
to any other cause, are to be imputed all 
the evils, disappointments, and 
distresses, which, in the conduct of 
his affairs, have arisen both to himself 
and others. 89 
H0v1rever the willingness of the Radicals to speak for 
the traders does not in itself indicate what the 
traders wanted. The Royal Commission had shown that 
small traders were strongly opposed to abolition. 
They disagreed with the Radicals, and instead foLmd 
allies in the House of Lords; so ephemeral was 
"middle class opinion". The Lords who were immune 
from arrest themselves, were in many cases concerned 
that reform meant increasing the power of creditors 
to seize property. Such an increase in the alienability 
of land could upset the landed estates and hence the 
social stability of the Kingdom. For their part, 
88 Loe. cit., xix. (1833), 205. 
89 On the Law of Debtor and Creditor, (1833), quoted 
by ibid, p. 215. 
small traders were opposed to reform because they knew 
that their debtors had no property worth seizing. 
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That the shopkeepers found such strange defenders 
should deter the historian from claiming that the 1832 
Reform Act changed the structure of politics very much. 
The few "new men" in the Commons were bankers and the 
like, who were no more aware of the needs of small 
traders than any other Members. 
The 1832 Reform Act increased the enfranchised 
opponents to abolition. At the same time, as a 
legislative programme became part of the business of 
Government, abolition of civil imprisonment was seriously 
considered. Nevertheless this was only one issue, 
and perhaps members could afford disloyalty to their 
constituents on one measure, as long as they had a 
better record on other matters. The opponents of 
abolition constantly lamented that a House which 
acted rightly over the Corn Laws deserted their middle 
class loyalties on the issue of Mesne Process arrest. 90 
The abolition of imprisonment for civil debts 
was proposed by the Solicitor General, Sir John 
Campbell, in a bill presented to the House of 
Commons on 13 June 1833. CampbeJ.l had previously 
indicated his willingness to carry out the recommenda-
tions of the Royal Commission, but he only introduced 
the bill at this point because of the taunts of Joseph 
Hume, and demands outside the House. 91 Little effort 
90 Cf. Ibid, xx. (1834), 369. 
91 PD, ser. 3. xviii. 785. Cf. ibid, xix. 613. 
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was expended in trying to hurry the bill through 
Parliament, and by the end of the session it had made 
no progress, and only indicated that the Administration 
had adopted the proposal. The bill sought the abolition 
of both aspects of civil imprisonment, although 
Campbell noted that imprisonment on execution "has 
not generally been so much reprobated. 1192 No great 
extension of the creditor's powers against his debtor's 
property were proposed, and the writer in the Westminster 
Review commented that "this bill is of ministerial 
origin, and has therefore the characteristics of 
ministerial halfness and deficiency. 1193 The Radicals 
did not approve of a bill which aided the debtor but 
not the creditor. Compassion for the prisoners was 
never their thought, and the Westminster urged 
Parliament not to act in haste • 
. During the sub sequent five years the Whigs 
presented abolition bills in every session. Melbourne 
had resolved to alter the law, 94 although it cannot 
have been a high priority to the Ministry. Although 
the opposition was Tory based and looked to Peel, and 
taunted that abolition was the result of "pseudo-
liberali ty11, 95 the issue was not fought on party lines, 
and in the eighteen-forties Peel's administration 
eased the passage of' further reform bills. Not every 
Tory was against reform. A Tory magazine made the 
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renege on abolition, that it was: 
never the sincere intention of the 
present government to legislate on 
the matter. The shuffling, the 
delay, the heartless insincerity, 
proved either their incapacity or 
their indifference, or both. 96 
These were partisan comments, for the general 
feeling of the House was that compassion obliged them 
to make some reforms. The main opposition in the 
Commons during the six years in which reform bills 
were presented, came from mercantile petitioners. In 
1833 the Common Councils of London and Westminster 
forcibly expressed their objections to the bill. 97 
Such opposition did not daunt reformers. In May 
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1834 one of the members of the Royal Commission, Sir 
Frederick Pollock, a Tory, introduced a bill to abolish 
arrest on Mesne Process. Pollock apparently was 
seeking to force the hand of the Ministry, which he 
suspected of having shelved the report of the Commission. 98 
This move was successful, for, with some apologies for 
his tardiness, Sir John Campbell who was now the 
Attorney General presented a bill three weeks later 
which proposed the abolition of both aspects of imprison-
ment for civil debts. "There was nothing nearer his 
heart", he declared, than such a reform. 99 Campbell 
100 was a very consistent advocate of reform, but that 
did not help the passage of a bill introduced so late 
96 Fraser's Magazine, xvii. (1838), 187. 
97 PD, ser. 3. xxvi. 781; 1J2.i.9:, xxvii. 1055. 
98 Ibid, xxiii. 1224. 
99 .Illl.£!, xxiv. 412. 
100 DNB, iii. 834. 
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in the session. In 1835 the proposal received much 
more attention from the Commons, but that year Campbell 
introduced the proposal as a private member, for Peel 
and the Tories were briefly in office. The Commons 
bitterly debated the issue, and the bill survived 
several divisions. Soon after the Whigs had returned, 
to office, it was referred to a Select Committee. 
Perhaps this session would see the bill passed. 
It did not so eventuate. There was a growing 
realisation of the unhappiness of traders with the 
measure, although it sought to guard their interests. 
The Tory Attorney General had warned that the comm~rcial 
world was best appeased by very gradual alterations, 101 
and the Whigs wanted to avoid contentious issues. 
The merchants were unhappy, for of sixty-six of the 
petitions presented to the House, fifty-three were 
against the bill, and their concern was repeated by 
commercial Members. Mr Rickards, a Tory, bitterly 
complained that: "on subjects of commercial credit, 
ffiampbel]J was not so well informed as he would wish. 11102 
Benjamin Hawes found it necessary to write a pamphlet 
to his constituents who had criticised his support of 
the bill. 1 o3 
However the Commons did pass the bill, which 
was defeated in the Lords only after consideration of 
it had been delayed until 31 August. The bill was 
thought to have been poorly drafted, and was seen as 
an attempt, "under the mask of humanity(!) to pull. 
101 PD, ser. 3. xxvi. 565. 
102 Ibid, xxix. 1093. 
103 B. Hawes, p. 3. 
down the aristocracy and landed proprietor of the 
Kingdom. 11104 1rhe weight of mercantile objections 
was also sensed, and even Brougham acquiesced in the 
postponement, for he felt that the bill needed more 
careful scrutiny. As a result he was subjected to 
some unfair criticism. Robert Gordon, a cousin of 
the Duke of Gordon, declared that: "the-roof of 
heaven does not this day cover politically speaking, a 
worse man 11 • 105 The complaint was that Brougham had 
pecuniary reasons for retaining the old law. The 
complaint can be dismissed as untrue. 
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In the session of 1836, the wisest course seemed 
to be to introduce the bill in the Upper House, and 
overcome its opposition first. This was the course 
the Ministry followed, but Cottenham, the Lord 
Chancellor, did not do so until July. This unwise 
delay was occasioned by the sickness of Brougham, who 
was the only no tab le Whig lawyer in the Lords. The 
bill was like that of the previous session in the 
controls it placed upon the power of arrest, but it 
also proposed the appointment of Commissioners in 
106 every county to hear such cases. Such an 
expensive administration naturally made the bill 
unpopular. 
that: 
The Duke of Wellington also complained 
104 Fraser's Magazine, xvii. (1838), 187. Cf. 
R. Gordon, p. 4. 
105 Gordon, p. 68. 
106 PD, ser. 3. xxv. 68; ibid, xxxix. 185-192. 
to lay hold of these :g.ersons, 
@ebtors on executio!1f, their 
Lordships were called upon to 
overthrow all the existing 
system of real and personal 
propertJr in England. 107 
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And he declared that the Whigs had no consideration for 
shopkeepers. 
Unfortunately the issue was raised when many 
"backwoods-men" peers were in attendance, attracted 
by the debate over the Births Deaths and Marriages 
Registration bill, which they amended to embarrass 
the Dissenters. 108 They took time off to defeat 
the debtor bill by forty-six votes to twenty-two. 
The bill was supported by Cotten.ham, the Duke of 
Richmond, Lansdowne, Westminster, Headford, Loitrim, 
Radnor, Charlemont, Minto, Burlington, Melbourne, 
Holland, Glenelg, Plunket, Poltimore, Templemore, 
Hatherton and Strafford, and the Bishops of Hereford, 
Bristol and Lichfield and Coventry. 109 Of' the rest, 
a Whig journal sarcastically commented that: 
A prisoner for debt ••• is precisely 
the servile and venial tool which a 
depraved oligarchy would wish every 
subject of Britain to be, so long as 
that venality and servility can be 
rendered available for certain 
purposes. 11 O 
New tactics were called for, and the bill 
presented to the Commons in 1837 by Campbell and 
Benjamin Hawes, the Surrey magistrate who was a future 
107 ill.£!:, xxxv. 72. 
108 Cf. R.G. Cowherd, The Politics of English 
Dissent, p. 93. 
109 f!2, ser. 3. xxxv. 79. 
110 British and Foreign Review, v. (1837), 88. 
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Under-Secretary for War, was a new draft. The proposal 
for Commissioners was omitted, and the bill empowered 
sheriffs to seize the property of judgement debtors and 
distribute it equitably. Even this draft was not 
universally acceptable, and one Tory declared that 
the bill was "framed by a soapboiler !Jf.awey and two 
pettifogging lawyers ffiampbell and Brougha!!?. 11111 The 
bill was introduced on 6 February, but it was not rush-
ed through the House. In committee there were 
divisions over its remedies for creditors. It 
required the death of the King to expedite proceedings, 
for by three days after the death, on 30 June, the bill 
had progressed from the committee stage where it had 
rested for four months, to presentation to the Lords 
for their assent. The Upper House was not to be 
rushed, and they found time only for one brief debate 
before Parliament was dissolved. Brougham could only 
urge that proceedings begin in the Lords very early in 
th P 1 . t 112 e new ar iamen. The haste in the Commons had 
not been in order to enact the measure, but to enable 
the Whigs to face voters and declare that they had 
sought reform, but that the Lords had prevented it. 113 
That election committed the Whigs to reform, 
and it was generally felt that they must fulfil the 
commitment in the new Parliament. Consequently the 
111 Fraser's Magazine, xvii. (1838), 173. 
112 PD, ser. 3. xxxvii. 1861-3; British and Foreign 
Review, v. (1837), 65. 
113 Quarterly Review, lix. (1837), 253-4. 
issue attracted public attention. Traders tried 
desperately to arouse opposition to abolition. 114 
They achieved little. The Standard reported the 
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comment of the young Queen Victoria that arrest for 
.debt was illegal, and the abolitionists repeated this 
with delight. 115 Moreover Charles Dickens in the 
earliest of his serialised novels, Pickwick Papers, 
committed his hero to the Fleet prison, where Mr 
Pickwick remarked: "It strikes me, Sam, that imprison-
ment for debt is scarcely any punishment at all", to 
which Sam 
"t" 116 on 1 • 
replied, "It's unekal and that's the fault 
Dickens' comments may well have 
influenced his middle class readers, but they did 
not necessarily sway Members of Parliament. Despite 
what some literary critics and others have alleged, 117 
laws were not passed on the literary merits of their 
advocates. 
In 1838 Parliament passed a bill which abolished 
imprisonment on Mesne Process. (1 & 2 Victoria 
c. 110.) The bill was introduced into the Lords in 
November 1837. At this stage it was a short draft 
which proposed the abolition of both aspects of civil 
imprisonment, but it emerged from the Lords Select 
Committee shorn of the clauses abolishing imprisonment 
on execution, and with other clauses added to guard 
114 E.g. in the pamphlet Imprisonment for Debts Bill: 
Two Sides. 
115 Runnymede Secundus, Magna Charta, p. 3. 
116 Op. cit., pp. 586-7. 
117 Cf'. A. Teetgen, "Dickens and some modern aspects 
of Penal Reform", Contemporary Review, cxxiv. 
(1924), 502; E.A. Parry, The Law and the Poor, 
p. 44ff. 
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the creditors' interests. 118 By making this alteration 
the Lords chose the circumspect approach of abolishing 
that aspect of civil imprisonment which was most often 
criticised. The Ministry accepted this alteration, 
and with some reluctance but no outright opposition 
the Lords passed the bill on 12 June 1838. The 
imminent passage of .the bill aroused a final defence 
of the bill from outside the House. Commissioner 
Fane of the Bankruptcy Court hurriedly prepared a 
pamphlet in which he argued that while some amendment 
of the law was needed, abolition of Mesne Process 
arrest would deprive the creditor of his means of 
testing the solvency of his debtors, and would destroy 
the grounds upon which a trader could be forced into 
an act of bankruptcy. 11 9 The Commons were prepared 
to amend the bill to provide alternative means of 
forcing an act of bankruptcy at the behest of the 
whole Bankruptcy Court, but they were heedless of 
Fane's chief argument. They also ignored the protest 
of the merchant J.H. Elliott, who declared that the 
bill would endanger millions of pounds of credit. 120 
Despite the large number of petitions against the 
bill, it was carefully guided through the Commons 
without significant alterations. 
118 1:12,, ser. 3. xliii. 657, 665. Cf. Lord Esher, 
The Girlhood of Queen Victoria, i. 241. 
119 c. Fane, Observations on the Proposed Abolition, 
p. 2 and passim. 
120 Elliott, A Remonstrance addressed to Lord 
.Brougham, p. 3. 
The bill was moderate enough to satisfy most 
members and it even upset a reformer like Benjamin 
Hawes, who complained that "it was very far indeed 
from being the wholesome and salutary measure to which 
he had on a.former occasion given his assent. 11121 
The :preamble to the bill declared that the ":present 
:power ••• is unnecessarily extensive and severe, and 
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ought to be relaxed." Mesne Process against the :person 
of the debtor was only to be used at the instance of 
the judges of the superior courts, when there was a 
likelihood that the debtor would flee overseas. The 
Insolvent Debtors Court was continued, and could hear 
:petitions for release from judgement debtors or those 
held under judge's orders within fourteen days of 
their confinement. Within twenty-one days of the 
writ of arrest, the creditor could order the sheriff 
to seize all the lands and goods of the debtor for 
equitable distribution, but after his release the insol-
vent was now excused future liability for his debts, 
which the old law had :preserved. 122 
It was reform of a cautious kind. The full 
:programme that Hawes and Campbell desired was finally 
completed thirty years later. There is some indica-
tion that the Courts used the judge's :power to 
order an arrest more often than the authors of the bill 
121 PD, ser. 3. xliv. 145. 
122 1 & 2 Viet. c. 110. ss. i-vi, xxxv-xxxviii, 
lxxv. 
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had intended, 123 and the continued inadequacy of' the law 
af'ter 1838 was described by another Royal Commission 
chaired by Thomas Erskine, which in 1840 reported on 
the bankruptcy and insolvency laws. 124 The Whigs 
drafted a bill to implement the Commission's recommenda-
tion to abolish all civil imprisonment, but the 
proposals were very controversial, and the weak 
Ministry dared not introduce the measure. 125 Peel's 
ad.ministration would only implement the recommendations 
of' the Commission on bankruptcy reform, but they 
allowed the passage of a bill introduced by Brougham 
which permitted the debtor to petition the Bankruptcy 
Court for protection of his person and property. 
(5 & 6 Victoria c. 116. )126· A further private 
members bill in 1844 abolished imprisonment on 
execution for debts under £20. 
Why did a reform bill pass in 1838? Several 
possible explanations have been explored in this 
chapter. The political explanation is the most 
obvious but also the least satisfactory. The Whigs 
were too casual about abolition for it to have been a 
party issue. Was it, perhaps, the result of middle 
class pressure? The evidence surely refutes this, 
for the.lower sectors of commercial society were the 
123 Cf. the experience recounted by H., Prison 
Reminiscences, (1859), p. 8. 
124 Report of the Commissioners, PP, 1840, (274), 
xvi. 1-568. 
125 Cf. British and Foreign Review, xvi. (1844), 
137; Elliott, Credit the Life of Commerce, 
pp. 113-122. 
126 Cf. British and Foreign Review, xvi. (18Lil~), 
163; Quarterly Review, lxxvii. (1845), 
219-220. 
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chief opponents of change. It is impossible to describe 
a 11middle class attitude" to the issue, and even more 
difficult to explain how such an attitude might have 
influenced Parliament. Or perhaps it was a reform 
forced upon the House by the problems in administering 
the Insolvency Act? This may be so, but that legisla-
tion was not promoted by the Insolvent Debtors Court, 
for its outcome was to sharply reduce the clientele of 
that Court. 
The most viable explanation is that there had 
been a profound change in the public and Parliamentary 
attitudes to the debtor laws. That this occurred.is 
indubitable. Even an opponent of the 1838 reform like 
Commissioner Fane was forced to admit that imprisonment 
for debt was "the occasion of great injustice and 
cruelty", 127 and even he offered alternative proposals 
for reform. The attitude of Members of Parliament 
had changed in a two-fold way. The old law and even 
the system of relief now awakened distaste in Members. 
Moreover this sentiment was clothed in the new garments 
of a pervasive Benthamite understanding of the function 
of law, which prevailed far beyond the Radical party. 
The virtue and not the vice of the 1838 reform was 
that it remodelled existing insolvency law. What 
hope had mercantile opinion against such powerful 
forces? 
127 c. Fane, Observations on the Proposed Abolition, 
p. 7. 
EPILOGUE 
THE CREDITOR'S LOT 
LJir Micawbey solemnly conjured 
me, I remember, to take warning 
by his fate; and to observe that 
if a man had twenty pounds a year 
for his income, and spent nineteen 
pounds nineteen shillings and 
sixpence, he would be happy, but 
that if he spent twenty pounds 
one he would be miserable.1 
224. 
The nineteenth century attitude to debtors 
remained harsh even after the reforms of 1838. Mr 
Micawber, whose fate was imprisonment in King's Bench, 
endured his misery_ before the reforms, but his advice 
did not lose its force thereafter. For the legisla-
tion of 1838 abolished imprisonment on Mesne Process, 
but not all imprisonment for debt. Brougham, Hawes, 
and Campbell were disappointed that the alterations 
were not more complete, but the weak Whig government 
wished to avoid the controversy this would have aroused. 
Imprisonment on execution and imprisonment for small 
debts thus survived. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to recount 
in detail the subsequent course of reform. Nor is it 
possible to record the complete abolition of civil 
imprisonment, for the courts can still commit to gaol 
those who fail to pay some kinds of debts. The 1838 
reform was followed by a series of alterations in the 
1 Dickens, David Copperfield, p. 181. 
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eighteen-forties, however, which together reduced the 
committals for debt to a quarter of their previous level. 2 
These reforms were not the work of Peel's govern-
ment. All of them were introduced by Brougham, although 
the Tories smoothed their passage through the House. 
In 1842 a statute provided procedures by which insolvent 
persons could petition the Bankruptcy Court to avoid 
imprisonment. (5 & 6 Victoria c. 116.) For those 
whose debts were large, this was a beneficial procedure. 
Brougham's mind seems next to have turned to small 
debtors who could still be held on execution. His 
statute of 18L~ abolished imprisonment on execution for 
debts under £20, unless the debtor was wilfully 
responsible for his inability to pay. (7 & 8 Victoria 
C • 96 •) Thus imprisonment for small debts, which had 
been the cause of so much suffering, was virtually 
abolished, although in fact in the years preceding 
its abolition, its use had declined. 3 Such a measure 
upset the basis of the Courts of Requests that had 
continued to multiply throughout the country. Consequent-
ly the Ministry accepted with some amendments Brougham's 
"County Courts Act" of 1846, (9 & 10 Victoria c. 95), 
which abolished all the old Courts of Requests and 
established a new unified court system, with cheaper 
more summary procedure for debts up to £20, and provision 
2 Cf. PP, 1847-8, (207), li. 172. 
3 W. Winder, "The Courts of Requests", LQR, lii. 
(1936), 382. 
in certain cases for payment by instalments and trial 
by jury.4 
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The establishment of County Courts was a profoundly 
significant development in debtor law. Their responsi-
bilities were gradually increased to debts of £50, and 
their powers extended into equity. The duties of the 
touring Commissioners of the Insolvent Debtors Court 
were transferred to them in 1847, and in 1861 the 
Insolvency Court was finally abolished, and its remain-
ing powers passed to the County Courts and the 
Bankruptcy Court. 5 The County Courts were more 
comprehensive in scope than the Court in Portugal 
Street, and therefore they were more durable. They 
were so effective that there was an unexpected increase 
in imprisonment for 11':ftraudulent debt", partly because 
the fraud might be no more than inability to account 
for the failure to pay. 
The statute of 1861 merged bankruptcy and 
insolvency for all debts above £50 by removing the 
distinction between those who were traders and those 
who were not. Its logical correlative was the Debtors 
Act of 1869, which abolished imprisonment for debts 
of over £20 in execution. (32 & 33 Victoria c. 62.) 
Imprisonment for debt was abolished! After the 
jubilation, observers noticed that the County Courts 
4 Cf. "An Act for the better securing of the Payment 
of Small Debts", Quarterly Review, lxxvii. (1845), 
215-220. 
5 Cf. 10 & 11 Viet. c. 102; 12 & 13 Viet. c. 110; 
13 & 14 Viet. c. 61; 15 & 16 Viet. c. 54; 19 & 20 
Viet. c. 108; 24 & 25 Viet. c. 134. 
were continuing to imprison debtors who failed to pay 
on the order of the Court, or who were fraudulent. 
They did so on the basis of an escape clause in the 
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1869 act. Until 1914 more than four thousand persons 
6 were imprisoned every year for such offences. The 
law was amended in 1914, but the exceptions still 
remained in the cases of crown debts and certain court 
orders, including those for the payment of maintenance 
to separated wives. In 1969 the Payne Commission 
recommended a further partial abolition, which was 
enacted in 1970. 7 Incidentally New Zealand laws 
continue to permit imprisonment in more cases than does 
the most necent English law. 
The survival of civil imprisonment is largely 
unnoticed today, but realisatioh of it may help the 
contemporary observer to answer the query framed by 
John Dillon in 1894, who commented on the old law: 
As we look back upon the absurdity, 
impolicy, and cruelty of imprison-
ment for debt, we wonder what 
influences had stupified the 
conscience and intelligence of 
mankind, that laws so atrocious were 
so long endured.8 
This thesis has suggested a number of explanations for 
the tardiness of reform. Firstly, recalling its 
significance alongside other issues of the period, it 
6 Cf. L. Leone, "On Imprisonment for Debt", (1874); 
R. Lowe, "Have we abolished ImJ?risonment for Debt?", 
Fortnightly Review, n.s. xxi. {1877), 307-316; 
Ford, Michigan Law Review, xxv. (1927), 31. 
7 Cf. J.D. Unwin, The Scandal of Imprisonment for 
~, (1935); M. Zander, Cases and Materials on 
the English Legal System, pp. 414-9. 
8 Dillon, Laws and Jurisprudence of England and 
America, p. 359. 
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should be noted that although abolition was long delayed, 
Parliament had for many years sought to eliminate the 
absurdity, impolicy and cruelty of the practice. 
Eighteenth century Parliaments lacked neither conscience 
nor intelligence. They sought to control the effects 
of the debtor law, though they never thought of alter-
ing the law itself. From the time of the Restoration 
in 1660, acts were passed to relieve the prisoners. 
By 1759 these had matured into the Lords' Act for 
judgement debtors, and regular temporary acts that 
aided others. These compassionate statutes were thought 
to have relieved all those who suffered under the law, 
even if in fact they had not done this. The first 
cause of the nineteenth century alterations in the 
law was better information about the problems of debtors. 
The Thatched House Society was an important source of 
this information, and the Society also set an example 
of a system of permanent relief. There was a profound 
change in public attitudes to the problem in the period 
from 1770 to 1820, and one of its chief causes was the 
revelations of John Howard and James Neild. 
In the eyes, then, of early nineteenth century 
Members of Parliament, the problems of debtors did not 
seem as serious as Dillon was later to describe them. 
His puzzlement might have been further reduced had he 
realised that imprisonment for debt was not the only 
aspect of the debtor laws at issue. For there was 
further discussion about the desire of traders that 
the property of debtors be more readily seized. 
Traders were not prepared to surrender their power 
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over the body of the debtor unless they could more easily 
secure his property. Such demands were resisted by the 
landed aristocracy, who feared that if the ownership 
of land was thus endangered, society itself would be 
weakened. 
Traders found arrest on Mesne Process a useful 
adjunct to mercantile law, for it induced many debtors 
to pay. Not unnaturally traders were reluctant to 
lose such a power altogether, for it was felt that 
there were some cases when only imprisonment would 
make debtors co-operative. This evaluation of the 
law was mistaken. Certainly many debtors paid when 
they were arrested, but those unable to pay were 
rendered even less able by imprisonment. Those 
unwilling to pay could enjoy comfort and ease in prison 
until released by the Insolvent Act. 
put it, "a prison pays no debts". 
As the proverb 
If imprisonment was pointless, why was it used? 
Simply because to the creditor it did not seem point-
less, considering the alternatives. Attachment of 
property was inadequate against debtors whose wealth 
was in land, or government bonds, or whose debts were 
small. Such procedure was also slow and expensive, 
and made more so by the high fees and cumbersome 
actions of sheriffs. In contrast, a capias led to 
the rapid arrest of the debtor before '½he legal 
formalities of the trial. Traders therefore defended 
a law which protected them when nothing else in 
commercial law did, although they would have preferred 
effective attachment powers over property. When reform 
came in 1838, it inevitably included such provisions. 
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Over a period those new powers of attachment 
proved inadequate. Thus the abolition of imprison-
ment for debt upset the structure of mercantile law, 
which on 12 March 18'47 The Times described as a 
"shapeless undigested mass" with "rotten foundations 11 • 9 
The ultimate effect of the abolition was the removal 
of the protection of the law from small contracts, 
for attachment of property was ineffective in such 
cases. In the long term there has been a very marked 
decline in the use of litigation to recover debts 
because the law is no longer able to induce the 
recalcitrant debtor to pay. 10 The law has abandon~d 
the small trader. 
Thus a second explanation for the delay in 
reform was the reluctance of traders to abandon the 
practice without the provision of some alternative; 
an alternative the landed nobility and gentry were 
hesitant to provide. A third reason was the survival 
of a traditional concept of the role of law in society. 
Men of the eighteenth century did not seek to change 
the law, because they thought of law as an immutable 
framework within which society functioned. There 
might be relief from the law, even in a permanent :provi-
sion like the Redesdale Act of 1813, but the authority 
of the law remained. Benthamite Radicalism provided 
an alternative theory of jurisprudence. Nineteenth 
century Radicals proposed to alter the laws in order 
to bring about reforms. Such reforms necessarily 
9 Quoted by c. Fane, Bankruptcy Reform, (1848), p. 6. 
10 Cf. Zander, p. 396. 
proceeded from private initiatives, for England never 
had a Minister of the Crown responsible for law revi-
sion. When the debtor laws were changed, a 
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Utilitarian approach to law was accepted by reformers, 
although this does not mean all Utilitarians approved 
of reform. The Westminster Review belatedly objected 
to reform in 1845, and three years later John Stuart 
Mill complained that the rev'ised law treated "the fact 
of having lost or squandered other people's property 
[;..§]' a peculiar title to indulgence", and he attributed 
abolition to "modish humanity". 11 Such comments 
show that Benthamite principles could lead to several 
conflicting conclusions over any specific issue. 
Those who favoured abolition of civil imprisonment 
were also influenced by the humanitarian tradition; 
those who opposed it influenced by the trading morality. 
These reasons for the delay in reform are linked 
with the slowness of "middle class opinion" to make 
any impact on English legislation. Reform of the 
commercial code was never of great importance in 
Parliament. Some commercial Members regularly raised 
the issue in the House, but the Commons was not interest-
ed. Debates on the i~solvency laws rarely attracted 
more than one hundred Members. Like Mr Fantom in 
Hannah More's story, they were too occupied with 
reducing the National Debt to spare time to help 
11 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, p. 907; 
Westminster Review, xliv. (1845), 449-468. 
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imprisoned debtors. 12 
middle class parlour. 
The House of Commons was not a 
Moreover neither insolvency 
reform nor opposition to it was really suitable for a 
middle class campaign. Too many of the victims of the 
law were shopkeepers put there by fellow shopkeepers. 
The law was not of crucial significance to any other 
group. Reform took place not as a concession to 
middle class opinion, or an attack on it, but because 
more information on the problem fed a more humanitarian 
attitude, which expressed itself in a Utilitarian 
approach to law. In addition it had come to be the 
case that the old law required more prison space an.d 
legal supervision than its alternative. 
The old law had strong support only from the 
trading classes, who in a poll taken by the 1831 Royal 
Commission preferred it to reform by 259 votes to 61. 13 
It was they who were most vociferous against abolition, 
and they who were most affected by it. Two consequences 
of reform may be isolated, although these do not include 
a decline in the number of shopkeepers, for in fact 
they increased twice as fast as the population from 
1851 to 1881. 14 The first was instead a sudden change 
from credit sales to cash sales, which became the 
largest proportion of the turnover of many late 
nineteenth century shops. 15 The second was a new 
12 H. More, Works, i. pt. 2. 9. 
13 n, 1831-2, (239), xxv. 54, 11. 
14 Charles Booth, "Occupations of the People of the 
United Kingdom, 1801-1881", Journal of the 
Statistical Society, xlix. (1886), 335. 
15 Cf. D. Davies, A History of Shopping, pp. 258-9. 
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form of trading morality shown in greater caution by 
shopkeepers where credit was in fact granted. The 
eighteen-forties saw the rise of a new type of organisa-
tion among traders, which became the basis of a stronger 
corporate sense among such men. This was the debt 
collecting agency, an early example of which was the 
"London Association.for Protection of Trade 11 • 16 This 
influential body appears to have had curious origins, 
for its title is remarkably close to that of the 
"Society for the Prevention of Frauds on Trade" which 
was formed in 1816 to campaign against the Redesdale 
Act. The link is confirmed by the fact that the 
President of the earlier body, Peter Laurie, was a 
patron of the later one. Laurie, who served as 
President of the Saddlers Company in 1833, and who 
rose by this means to become Lord Mayor of London, was 
a disciple of Joseph Hume, though he evidently did not 
share Hume's attitude to the debtor laws. 17 Thus 
opposition to reform had a long-term significance for 
the organisation of traders. 
Moreover that opposition helped to consolidate 
trading opinion. Small Traders were well represented 
in the Common Council of the City of London, which 
several times voiced its concern at attempts to change 
the laws. Joseph Hume and Bentham were the heroes of 
16 Elliott, Credit the Life of Commerce, pp. 62-3. 
17 PP, 1816, (472), iv. 20/365; DNB, xi. 651. 
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18 such traders, but they interpreted Bentham as an 
opponent of abolition. Radicalism was not permitted 
to threaten the shopkeeper's pocket. This consolida-
tion of trading opinion continued, as the revision of 
.the law continued. In February 1847, a series of 
meetings in London resolved: 
That it is the deliberate opinion of 
this meeting that the existing 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Laws are 
a disgrace to our age and country. 
That under their shelter, deceit, 
reckless trading, extravagance, 
dishonesty, and every species of 
fraud may be practised with impunity • 
... .Lthuy undermining commercial 
morality••• especially ff.ii' the 
industrious classes.19 
In defeat, trading morality became a distinctive middle 
class cry. This was the major result of the campaign 
opposing debtor law reform, (and it was the opponents, 
not the advocates of reform, who mounted the most 
vigorous campaign on the issue}. The debate helped 
to formulate what Harold Perkin has called the 
"entrepeneurial idea1 11 • 20 The debtor who failed to 
survive in the commercial society was thought worthy 
of a punishment administered by the trader. 
Aristocracy and working classes ought to submit to 
the authority of trade. 
The abolition of imprisonment for debt stripped 
one of their few powers from the traders. It forced 
18 Elliott, p. v. 
19 Quoted by Fane, Bankruptcy Reform, p. 6. 
20 H. Perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society. 
p. 221 • 
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them to defend their morality, and led them to seek 
support for their cause. J.H. Elliott and Commissioner 
Fane were such supporters. Even J.S. Mill recognised 
their pre-eminence and praised their judgement, for in 
defeat, trading morality became a force that Radicalism 
felt obliged to absorb. 
Imprisonment for civil debts was never regarded 
as a fundamental evil by Englishmen of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Few debtors were as 
attractive in character as Mr Micawber, and their 
sufferings were hidden behind the gates and walls of 
prisons. Nevertheless, three Select Committees from 
the House 0f Commons and one from the House of Lords 
as well as two Royal Commissions reported on the 
practice, and confirmed its bad reputation. By 1838 
it was almost universally condemned, except by traders, 
and even some more wealthy merchants were prepared to 
surrender their power to arrest. Legal and social 
conservatism underlay part of the opposition to 
abolition, but the key opponents were the forces of 
trade. Thus the movement to abolish imprisonment 
for debt attacked and defeated the growing forces of 
trading opinion, in the name of civil liberties. 
Historians err when they describe liberty and trade 
as permanent allies. 
APPENDIX ONE 
COMMITTALS FOR DEBT IN 1801 , IN COUNTY TO'l'ALS 
The 1819 Sessional Papers provide lists of 
committals to all English gaols for the previous 
twenty-one years. The year 1801 was chosen because 
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a census was held that year, and because James Neild's 
figures were from the same period. However thirty-
nine gaols could not report their committals in 1801. 
It was therefore necessary to estimate these figures, 
which was done by assuming that taken together the 
growth in the population of these gaols would have 
been the same as for other gaols. Consequently 
the figures were approximated by scaling dovm either 
their 1811 or their 1818 figure by the net national 
proportion. It should be pointed out that in most 
cases the gaols which did not report their committals 
were small ones. 
Neild's lists of those in gaol in 1800 when he 
visited are also provided here, in order to determine 
whether a high committal rate also meant a large gaol 
population. If' this was not so, it could be assumed 
that the average :period of confinement in that county 
was shorter than in others. 
These figures were then divided throughout by 
the County populations reported in the 1801 census, 
and it is these figures which were used in Figure One 
on page 47. 
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Counti No. Committals Debtors Committals Debtors : 
of' Population Committals 
Gaols X 10 1 000 
Bedf'ord 1 9 4 1.420 0.45 
Berkshire 3 21 10 1.923 o.48 
Bucks 2 50 17 4.654 0.34 
Cambridge 4 35 12 3.917 0.34 
Chester 3 67 40 3.494 0.60 
Cornwall 2 31 10 1.647 0.32 
Cumberland 1 56 28 4.777 0.50 
Derby 2 32 13 1.986 0.41 
Devon 6 86 38 2.507 0.44 
Dorset 4 19 7 1.648 0.37 
Durham 1 43 14 2. 681 0.33 
Essex 2 78 17 3.445 0.22 
Gloucester 4 68 25 2.946 0.37 
Hampshire 5 109 33 4.962 0.30 
Heref'ord 3 36 1 1 4.036 0.31 
Hertf'ord 3 10 10 1 .025 1. 00 
Huntingdon 1 12 5 3.194 0.42 
Kent 6 193 52 6.274 0.27 
Lancaster 2 475 132 7 .061 0.28 
Leicester 2 52 20 3.997 0.38 
Lincoln 6 61 14 2.925 0.23 
Middlesex• 3 1228 519 15.010 0.42 
Monmouth 1 8 11 1.755 1 .38 
Norf'olk 4 49 36 1. 792 0.74 
Northampton 3 28 13 2 .125 o.46 
Northumberland 3 75 14 4.774 0.18 
Nottingham 3 34 14 2.423 o.41 
0xf'ord 2 31 20 2.828 o.45 
Rutland 1 1 0.611 
Salop 3 44 23 2.625 0.52 
Somerset 4 189 50 6.904 0.26 
Staf'f'ord 4 54 22 2.258 o.41 
Suf'f'olk 3 60 17 2. 851 0.28 
Surrey* 5 1211 476 45. 011 0.39 
Sussex 2 18 7 1.130 0.39 
Warwick 2 56 34 2.690 0.61 
Westmorland 1 1 1 6 2.643 0.55 
Wiltshire 1 24 17 1 .297 o. 71 
Worcester 3 49 18 3.517 0.38 
York 13 534 106 6.217 0.20 
All England 124 5347 1954 6.418 0.37 
Wales 18 117 52 2.137 0.23 
England and 
Wales 142 5464 2006 6.154 0.37 
* Including the national prisons of' Fleet in 
Middlesex, and King's Bench in Surrey. 
Source: Committals; PP,. 1819, ( 237), xvii. 145f'f'. 
Debtors; Neild, Persons Conf'ined, ( 1 800). 
Population; ~, 1812, (12), x. 171-4. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION OF DEBTORS 
RELEASED BY THE COURT, 1821-2. 
These figures are estimated from a complete 
list of the names and occupations of the debtors 
whose petitions were heard by the Court in the period. 
The sample of 270 from the total of approximately 
4000 represents c. 6.75%. The sample was all those 
debtors whose names began with A, and half of those 
whose name began with B. 
The list is arranged in the categories Patrick 
Coloquhoun used, as set out by Harold Perkin. It was 
not easy in every case to turn a list of trades into 
-
a list of classes. Neither the debtors nor 
Coloquhoun explain whether a "manufacturer" is a 
master or an employee. "Artisans" and "manufacturers" 
tended to be almost indistinguishable. Shopkeepers 
have been broken down into subdivisions. The amount 




Gentry 1 3 9 
II. Middle Ranks: 
1 • Agriculture 
Freeholders; 
Farmers 1 6 6 
2. Industry & 
Commerce 









Manuf'acturers 0 12 12 24 25,000 
Warehousemen 0 1 1 2 500 
Shipbuilders, 
owners 1 1 3 5 5,300 
Surveyors, 
Engineers 0 0 1 1 5,000 
Tailors 2 4 7 13 25,000 
Grocers 0 8 21 29 l Bakers 0 5 8 13 Butchers 1 5 6 12 
Druggists 0 1 2 3 ) 
General, Dealers 0 5 9 14 ) 
All Shopkeepers 1 24 46 71 74,500 
Innkeepers, etc. 0 0 7 7 50,000 
Clerks, Shopmen 1 5 11 17 30,000 
3. Prof'essions 
Civil Of'f'ices 1 1 6 8 12,500 
Law 0 1 6 7 11,000 
Clergy 0 0 1 1 13,500 
Arts, Sciences 0 0 1 1 16,300 
Education 0 1 1 2 20,500 
Navy, Army 
Of'f'icers 0 1 2 3 1 o, 000 
Theatrical 0 0 3 3 500 
L,Females 1 3 1 5J 
III. Lower Orders: 
Artisans 9 9 19 37 445,726 
Hawkers, Pedlars 1 0 0 1 800 
Seamen 2 6 1 9 105,000 
Labourers 6 5 6 17 340,000 
(Miners, Canal Workers, Soldiers, Vagrants, Pensioners, 
Debtors [;,if, Paupers, Vagrants are also listed by 
Coloquhoun. 
Source: PP, 1822, (276), xxii. 203/16-23. 
H. Perkin, The Origins of' Modern 
English Society. pp. 20-1. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
COMMITTALS FOR DEBT AND THE 
BUSINESS CLIMATE, 1798-1818. 
Table Two on page 57 totals the figures mentioned 
in Appendix One for those ninety-nine prisons which had 
complete figures for the whole period. These f'igures 
reveal an astonishing increase in committals. They 
were scaled relative to the changing population, but still 
showed an increase of sixty percent over twenty-one years. 
A linear regression analysis plotted the growth. 
It was found to be: 
Yk = 4786.15 + (7.1)K2 , K = 1, 2, ••• 21. 
where yk = the number of committals in any year K 
K = any year 1798 to 181 8, where 1798 = 
s.n. = 1055.88 
r = 0.9448 
Thus a projected figure was obtained for every year, 
and it was then subtracted from the actual figure for 
1 
any year. This produced a new range of values, called 
Z. The values of Z were then placed in a linear 
regression with the figures for the business climate 
in each year, (which may be called W), as estimated 
by Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz. 
First: 
Second: 
Two hypotheses were then tested: 
That the number of debtors was related to 
the business climate. 
That the Redesdale Act of 1813 significantly 
affected the number of committals for· debt 
thereafter. 
• • • 
The linear regression f'or the years 1798 to 
1818 produced the equation. 
Z = (8.23)W - 20.24 
s.n. f'or z = 345.96 
r = 0.03695 
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With such a low r-value, these results have no statistical 
signif'icance. 
For the years 1798 to 1813 the f'ollowing 
equation was obtained: 
Z = (78.74)W - 185-78 
s.n. f'or z = 56.11 
r = 0.5368 
These results achieve a reasonable level of signif'icance. 
Thus hypothesis one is conf'irmed f'or the years 
1798 to 1813. No more accuracy could have been 
obtained using the index of' Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz, 
which they admit is very basic. 
Hypothesis two is also confirmed, because of' 
the abnormality of the years 1814 to 1818, and the 
high value of' Zin those years. 
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